Global Power-Shift, the Decline of the West and New Authoritarianism

Author(s):  
Vassilis K. Fouskas ◽  
Bülent Gökay
Keyword(s):  
The West ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 277-278
Author(s):  
Steven Rosefielde

Author(s):  
Roberts Cynthia ◽  
Leslie Armijo ◽  
Saori Katada

The chapter analyzes the prospects for continued BRICS collective financial statecraft. Contrary to initial expectations, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) have hung together by identifying common aversions and pursuing common interests within the existing international order. Their future depends not only on their bargaining power, but also on their ability to overcome domestic impediments to the sustainable economic growth that provides the basis for their international positions. To continue successfully with collective financial statecraft, the members must tackle the so-called middle-income trap, as well as their preferences for informal rules originating from their own institutional weaknesses or regime preferences. This study shows that, in the context of a global power shift, the BRICS club has operated to protect the member countries’ respective policy autonomy, while also advancing their joint voice in global governance. Recently, the BRICS have made concrete institutional gains, giving them expanded outside options to achieve specific objectives in global finance.


Author(s):  
Roberts Cynthia ◽  
Leslie Armijo ◽  
Saori Katada

This chapter evaluates multiple dimensions of the global power shift from the incumbent G5/G7 powers to the rising powers, especially the members of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). Taking note of alternative conceptualizations of interstate “power,” the text maps the redistribution of economic capabilities from the G7 to the BRICS, most particularly the relative rise of China and decline of Japan, and especially Europe. Given these clear trends in measurable material capabilities, the BRICS have obtained considerable autonomy from outside pressures. Although the BRICS’ economic, financial, and monetary capabilities remain uneven, their relative positions have improved steadily. Via extensive data analysis, the chapter finds that whether one examines China alone or the BRICS as a group, BRICS members have achieved the necessary capabilities to challenge the global economic and financial leadership of the currently dominant powers, perhaps even the United States one day.


2021 ◽  
pp. 019251212110522
Author(s):  
Niall Duggan ◽  
Bas Hooijmaaijers ◽  
Marek Rewizorski ◽  
Ekaterina Arapova

Over the past decades, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) countries have experienced significant economic growth. However, their political voices in global governance have not grown on par with their economic surge. The contributions to the symposium ‘The BRICS, Global Governance, and Challenges for South–South Cooperation in a Post-Western World’ argue there is a quest for emerging markets and developing countries to play a more significant role in global governance. There is a widening gap between the actual role of emerging markets and developing countries in the global system and their ability to participate in that system. However, for the moment, various domestic and international political-economic challenges limit this quest. To understand why this is the case, one should understand the BRICS phenomenon in the broader context of the global power shift towards the Global South.


2021 ◽  
pp. 227-240
Author(s):  
Shaun Breslin
Keyword(s):  
The West ◽  

The conclusion shows how specific “themes of the time” can come to dominate the way that China is thought of and spoken about in different era. The idea of a clear China challenge to the existing western/liberal global order is one example of such a theme, and shows how attitudes to China as a risen power (rather than a still rising one) have evolved. While this change in perceptions was underway before the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, it argues that the politics of the pandemic have acted to highlight existing concerns about the nature and consequences of Chinese global power, and suggest a future world that might not be bipolar in nature, but one where conflict and contention between China and the West is ever more common and pronounced.


2020 ◽  
pp. 177-200
Author(s):  
Yun Wen

The concluding chapter discusses the distinct experience generated from the Huawei case. It is argued that the Chinese state possesses strong autonomy and capacity to seek reorientation of China’s ICT developmental path and to increase the country’s competence in indigenous technology, which formed a strong state-capital alliance to carry out strategic developmental plans. The Huawei story sheds light on geoeconomic and geopolitical implications of China’s globalized corporate power, suggesting China’s role in the global power shift. It also underscores the significance of “self-reliant” development that constitutes the distinct “Chinese model” of ICT development.


Author(s):  
Matthew D Stephen

Abstract As China has risen to the status of a global power, it has taken the lead in fostering several new multilateral institutional initiatives. Some of these are formal intergovernmental organizations; others are informal clubs, forums, or platforms. Collectively, these acts of institutional creation suggest that China is no longer content to “join” the existing global order but is constructing its own multilateral infrastructure. What do such institutions mean for global governance? This article provides a framework for studying such multilateral institutions and sketches an emerging research agenda. First, it provides a systematic empirical overview of China's participation in the creation of multilateral institutions between 1990 and 2017. Second, it develops analytical categories for describing types of new institutions based on their relationships with incumbent institutions. Central to this typology is (1) whether new multilateral institutions’ governance functions are additive or rivalrous to those of existing ones, and (2) whether they promote congruent or distinct social purposes. Based on these characteristics, new multilateral institutions may be complementary, divergent, substitutive, or competing. Third, it considers the implications of China's multilateral institution-building for global governance in the context of an international power shift. A medida que China ha ido adquiriendo la condición de potencia mundial, ha asumido el mando de promover varias iniciativas nuevas relacionadas con las instituciones multilaterales. Algunas de estas son organizaciones intergubernamentales formales, mientras que otras son clubes, foros o plataformas informales. En conjunto, estos actos de creación institucional sugieren que China ya no está interesada en «unirse» al orden mundial actual, sino que está construyendo su propia infraestructura multilateral. ¿Qué implican dichas instituciones para la gobernabilidad mundial? Este artículo ofrece un marco para el estudio de dichas instituciones multilaterales y describe brevemente un programa de investigación emergente. En primer lugar, ofrece una visión general empírica y sistemática de la participación de China en la creación de instituciones multilaterales entre 1990 y 2017. En segundo lugar, desarrolla categorías analíticas para describir los tipos de nuevas instituciones en función de sus relaciones con las instituciones vigentes. Un aspecto clave de esta tipología es (1) si las funciones de gobernabilidad de las nuevas instituciones multilaterales se adhieren o se oponen a las de las existentes y (2) si promueven propósitos sociales congruentes o distintos. En función de estas características, las nuevas instituciones multilaterales pueden ser complementarias, divergentes, sustitutivas o competidoras. En tercer lugar, se analizan las consecuencias de la creación de instituciones multilaterales por parte de China para la gobernabilidad mundial en el contexto de un cambio de poder internacional. En s’élevant au rang de puissance mondiale, la Chine a pris la main dans l'encouragement de plusieurs nouvelles initiatives institutionnelles multilatérales. Certaines d'entre elles concernent des organisations intergouvernementales, et d'autres concernent plutôt des plateformes, forums ou clubs informels. Collectivement, ces actes de création institutionnelle suggèrent que la Chine ne contente plus de « rejoindre » l'ordre mondial existant, mais qu'elle construit sa propre infrastructure multilatérale. Que signifient de telles institutions pour la gouvernance mondiale ? Cet article propose un cadre pour l’étude de telles institutions multilatérales et esquisse un programme de recherche émergent. Il commence par fournir une présentation empirique systématique de la participation de la Chine dans la création d'institutions multilatérales entre 1990 et 2017. Il développe ensuite des catégories analytiques permettant de décrire les types de nouvelles institutions en se basant sur leurs relations avec les institutions en place. Pour cette typologie , deux questions centrales consistent à se demander (1) si les fonctions de gouvernance des nouvelles institutions multilatérales s'ajoutent ou rivalisent avec celles des institutions existantes, et (2) si elles promeuvent des objectifs sociaux congruents ou distincts. Sur la base de ces caractéristiques, les nouvelles institutions multilatérales peuvent être complémentaires, divergentes, substitutives ou concurrentes. Enfin, cet article prend en considération les implications de la construction d'institutions multilatérales de la Chine pour la gouvernance mondiale dans le contexte du changement des puissances mondiales.


After the 1990, it is very important that in the immediate vicinity of the geopolitical changes that have occurred in Turkey. The first changes is Iran and Iraq on the edge. Especially the Turkey-Iran and Iraq, all kinds of geopolitical developments occurring in the triple border, to a critical value. Because the triple border Iran and Iraq by Turkey as a safety check. For this reason, has become the center of all kinds of illegal developments. Iran, conducts a policy of asymmetric after 1990, in the Caucasus, and the Middle East and Central Asia geography. This policy from time to time an anti-U.S. hostility toward the West and exacerbate. The attitude of the West and the United States due to the foreign policy of Turkey's neighbor Iran rather problematic periods. Because the entire Middle East and Central Asia, Turkey's policies on Iran, which is a pretty effective. For this reason, Iran, Turkey is a country that needs to be analyzed by far the best.


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 27-37
Author(s):  
Piotr Wawrzeniuk ◽  
Markus Balázs Göransson

Abstract The article discusses visions of future warfare articulated in recent Russian military publications. There seems to be agreement among Russian scholars that future war will be triggered by Western attempts to promote Western political and economic interests while holding back Russia's resurgence as a global power. The future war with the West is viewed as inevitable in one form or another, whether it is subversion and local wars or large-scale conventional war. While the danger of conventional war has declined, according to several scholars, the West is understood to have a wide range of non-kinetic means at its disposal that threaten Russia. In order to withstand future dangers, Russia has to be able to meet a large number of kinetic and non-kinetic threats at home and abroad.


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