scholarly journals China's New Multilateral Institutions: A Framework and Research Agenda

Author(s):  
Matthew D Stephen

Abstract As China has risen to the status of a global power, it has taken the lead in fostering several new multilateral institutional initiatives. Some of these are formal intergovernmental organizations; others are informal clubs, forums, or platforms. Collectively, these acts of institutional creation suggest that China is no longer content to “join” the existing global order but is constructing its own multilateral infrastructure. What do such institutions mean for global governance? This article provides a framework for studying such multilateral institutions and sketches an emerging research agenda. First, it provides a systematic empirical overview of China's participation in the creation of multilateral institutions between 1990 and 2017. Second, it develops analytical categories for describing types of new institutions based on their relationships with incumbent institutions. Central to this typology is (1) whether new multilateral institutions’ governance functions are additive or rivalrous to those of existing ones, and (2) whether they promote congruent or distinct social purposes. Based on these characteristics, new multilateral institutions may be complementary, divergent, substitutive, or competing. Third, it considers the implications of China's multilateral institution-building for global governance in the context of an international power shift. A medida que China ha ido adquiriendo la condición de potencia mundial, ha asumido el mando de promover varias iniciativas nuevas relacionadas con las instituciones multilaterales. Algunas de estas son organizaciones intergubernamentales formales, mientras que otras son clubes, foros o plataformas informales. En conjunto, estos actos de creación institucional sugieren que China ya no está interesada en «unirse» al orden mundial actual, sino que está construyendo su propia infraestructura multilateral. ¿Qué implican dichas instituciones para la gobernabilidad mundial? Este artículo ofrece un marco para el estudio de dichas instituciones multilaterales y describe brevemente un programa de investigación emergente. En primer lugar, ofrece una visión general empírica y sistemática de la participación de China en la creación de instituciones multilaterales entre 1990 y 2017. En segundo lugar, desarrolla categorías analíticas para describir los tipos de nuevas instituciones en función de sus relaciones con las instituciones vigentes. Un aspecto clave de esta tipología es (1) si las funciones de gobernabilidad de las nuevas instituciones multilaterales se adhieren o se oponen a las de las existentes y (2) si promueven propósitos sociales congruentes o distintos. En función de estas características, las nuevas instituciones multilaterales pueden ser complementarias, divergentes, sustitutivas o competidoras. En tercer lugar, se analizan las consecuencias de la creación de instituciones multilaterales por parte de China para la gobernabilidad mundial en el contexto de un cambio de poder internacional. En s’élevant au rang de puissance mondiale, la Chine a pris la main dans l'encouragement de plusieurs nouvelles initiatives institutionnelles multilatérales. Certaines d'entre elles concernent des organisations intergouvernementales, et d'autres concernent plutôt des plateformes, forums ou clubs informels. Collectivement, ces actes de création institutionnelle suggèrent que la Chine ne contente plus de « rejoindre » l'ordre mondial existant, mais qu'elle construit sa propre infrastructure multilatérale. Que signifient de telles institutions pour la gouvernance mondiale ? Cet article propose un cadre pour l’étude de telles institutions multilatérales et esquisse un programme de recherche émergent. Il commence par fournir une présentation empirique systématique de la participation de la Chine dans la création d'institutions multilatérales entre 1990 et 2017. Il développe ensuite des catégories analytiques permettant de décrire les types de nouvelles institutions en se basant sur leurs relations avec les institutions en place. Pour cette typologie , deux questions centrales consistent à se demander (1) si les fonctions de gouvernance des nouvelles institutions multilatérales s'ajoutent ou rivalisent avec celles des institutions existantes, et (2) si elles promeuvent des objectifs sociaux congruents ou distincts. Sur la base de ces caractéristiques, les nouvelles institutions multilatérales peuvent être complémentaires, divergentes, substitutives ou concurrentes. Enfin, cet article prend en considération les implications de la construction d'institutions multilatérales de la Chine pour la gouvernance mondiale dans le contexte du changement des puissances mondiales.

2021 ◽  
pp. 019251212110522
Author(s):  
Niall Duggan ◽  
Bas Hooijmaaijers ◽  
Marek Rewizorski ◽  
Ekaterina Arapova

Over the past decades, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) countries have experienced significant economic growth. However, their political voices in global governance have not grown on par with their economic surge. The contributions to the symposium ‘The BRICS, Global Governance, and Challenges for South–South Cooperation in a Post-Western World’ argue there is a quest for emerging markets and developing countries to play a more significant role in global governance. There is a widening gap between the actual role of emerging markets and developing countries in the global system and their ability to participate in that system. However, for the moment, various domestic and international political-economic challenges limit this quest. To understand why this is the case, one should understand the BRICS phenomenon in the broader context of the global power shift towards the Global South.


2015 ◽  
Vol 01 (04) ◽  
pp. 537-551
Author(s):  
Paul Evans

At a moment of strategic transition in Asia Pacific security, views differ widely on the inevitability of conflict and the prospects of a managed accommodation of great power relations. There is widespread agreement that economic integration is deep and valuable, that a power shift is underway, and that the new array of multilateral institutions are welcome but merely formative. At the end of the Cold War period, there was a creative moment in which key concepts like cooperative and comprehensive security underpinned an era of institution building. The essay argues that it is time to revisit these ideas and look at the fundamental elements of a security order appropriate to a diverse and increasingly interconnected region in the midst of a power transition. It examines some of the key ideas offered by security thinkers from several countries and pays particular attention to the concept of a consociational security order as an entree to constructive discussion. As important as the U.S.-China relationship is to a future security order, a G2 is neither likely nor desirable. The conclusion poses a series of questions that will need to be answered as a new version of cooperative security with 21st century characteristics is developed.


Author(s):  
Cynthia Roberts ◽  
Leslie Armijo ◽  
Saori Katada

In the context of an ongoing global power shift, the largest emerging economies (China, Russia, India, Brazil) formed an exclusive and informal club called the BRICs. Subsequently joined by South Africa, the BRICS have exercised collective financial statecraft, defined as the use of financial and monetary policies by sovereign governments for the purpose of achieving larger foreign policy goals. This volume identifies four types of such financial statecraft, ranging from pressure for inside reforms of either multilateral institutions or global markets, to outside options exercised through creating new multilateral institutions or jointly pushing for new realities in international financial markets. The joint actions of the BRICS have been largely successful. Although each member has its own unique rationale for collaboration, the largest member, China, controls resources that afford it the greatest influence in intraclub decision-making. The BRICS hang together due to common aversions (resentment over being perennial junior partners in global economic and financial governance, resistance to infringements on their autonomy and dollar dominance) and common interests (obtaining greater voice in international institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund). The BRICS are neither revolutionaries nor shirkers. The group seeks reforms, influence, and leadership roles within the existing liberal capitalist global economic order. Where blocked, they experiment with parallel multilateral institutions in which they are the dominant rule-makers. The future of the BRICS depends not only on their bargaining power and adjustment to market players, but also on their ability to overcome domestic impediments to the sustainable economic growth that provides the basis for their international positions.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth W. Abbott ◽  
Benjamin Faude

Abstract Contemporary global governance takes place not only through formal inter-governmental organizations and treaties, but increasingly through diverse institutional forms including informal inter-governmental organizations, trans-governmental networks, and transnational public–private partnerships. Although these forms differ in many ways, they are all what we call ‘low-cost institutions’ (LCIs): the costs of creating, operating, changing, and exiting them, and the sovereignty costs they impose, are substantially lower on average than those of treaty-based institutions. LCIs also provide substantive and political governance benefits based on their low costs, including reduced risk, malleability, and flexibility, as well as many of the general cooperation benefits provided by all types of institutions. LCIs are poorly-suited for creating and enforcing binding commitments, but can perform many other governance functions, alone and as complements to treaty-based institutions. We argue that the availability of LCIs changes the cost–benefit logic of institutional choice in a densely institutionalized international system, making the creation of new institutions, which existing research sees as the ‘last resort’, more likely. In addition, LCIs empower executive, bureaucratic, and societal actors, incentivizing those actors to favor creating LCIs rather than treaty-based institutions. The availability of LCIs affects global governance in multiple ways. It reduces the status quo bias of governance, changes its institutional and actor composition, enables (modest) cooperation in times of polarization and gridlock, creates beneficial institutional divisions of labor, and expands governance options. At the same time, the proliferation of LCIs reduces the focality of incumbent institutions, increasing the complexity of governance.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Oliver Westerwinter

Abstract Friedrich Kratochwil engages critically with the emergence of a global administrative law and its consequences for the democratic legitimacy of global governance. While he makes important contributions to our understanding of global governance, he does not sufficiently discuss the differences in the institutional design of new forms of global law-making and their consequences for the effectiveness and legitimacy of global governance. I elaborate on these limitations and outline a comparative research agenda on the emergence, design, and effectiveness of the diverse arrangements that constitute the complex institutional architecture of contemporary global governance.


Author(s):  
Roberts Cynthia ◽  
Leslie Armijo ◽  
Saori Katada

The chapter analyzes the prospects for continued BRICS collective financial statecraft. Contrary to initial expectations, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) have hung together by identifying common aversions and pursuing common interests within the existing international order. Their future depends not only on their bargaining power, but also on their ability to overcome domestic impediments to the sustainable economic growth that provides the basis for their international positions. To continue successfully with collective financial statecraft, the members must tackle the so-called middle-income trap, as well as their preferences for informal rules originating from their own institutional weaknesses or regime preferences. This study shows that, in the context of a global power shift, the BRICS club has operated to protect the member countries’ respective policy autonomy, while also advancing their joint voice in global governance. Recently, the BRICS have made concrete institutional gains, giving them expanded outside options to achieve specific objectives in global finance.


Author(s):  
Roberts Cynthia ◽  
Leslie Armijo ◽  
Saori Katada

This chapter evaluates multiple dimensions of the global power shift from the incumbent G5/G7 powers to the rising powers, especially the members of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). Taking note of alternative conceptualizations of interstate “power,” the text maps the redistribution of economic capabilities from the G7 to the BRICS, most particularly the relative rise of China and decline of Japan, and especially Europe. Given these clear trends in measurable material capabilities, the BRICS have obtained considerable autonomy from outside pressures. Although the BRICS’ economic, financial, and monetary capabilities remain uneven, their relative positions have improved steadily. Via extensive data analysis, the chapter finds that whether one examines China alone or the BRICS as a group, BRICS members have achieved the necessary capabilities to challenge the global economic and financial leadership of the currently dominant powers, perhaps even the United States one day.


Author(s):  
Steven Bernstein

This commentary discusses three challenges for the promising and ambitious research agenda outlined in the volume. First, it interrogates the volume’s attempts to differentiate political communities of legitimation, which may vary widely in composition, power, and relevance across institutions and geographies, with important implications not only for who matters, but also for what gets legitimated, and with what consequences. Second, it examines avenues to overcome possible trade-offs from gains in empirical tractability achieved through the volume’s focus on actor beliefs and strategies. One such trade-off is less attention to evolving norms and cultural factors that may underpin actors’ expectations about what legitimacy requires. Third, it addresses the challenge of theory building that can link legitimacy sources, (de)legitimation practices, audiences, and consequences of legitimacy across different types of institutions.


Author(s):  
Tyler Pratt

Abstract Why do states build new international organizations (IOs) in issue areas where many institutions already exist? Prevailing theories of institutional creation emphasize their ability to resolve market failures, but adding new IOs can increase uncertainty and rule inconsistency. I argue that institutional proliferation occurs when existing IOs fail to adapt to shifts in state power. Member states expect decision-making rules to reflect their underlying power; when it does not, they demand greater influence in the organization. Subsequent bargaining over the redistribution of IO influence often fails due to credibility and information problems. As a result, under-represented states construct new organizations that provide them with greater institutional control. To test this argument, I examine the proliferation of multilateral development banks since 1944. I leverage a novel identification strategy rooted in the allocation of World Bank votes at Bretton Woods to show that the probability of institutional proliferation is higher when power is misaligned in existing institutions. My results suggest that conflict over shifts in global power contribute to the fragmentation of global governance.


Polar Record ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Flamm

Abstract While the Antarctic Treaty System intended to keep Antarctica an area of international cooperation and science free from militarisation and international conflict, the region has not been completely shielded from global power transitions, such as decolonisation and the end of the Cold War. Presently, emerging countries from Asia are increasingly willing to invest in polar infrastructure and science on the back of their growing influence in world politics. South Korea has also invested heavily in its Antarctic infrastructure and capabilities recently and has been identified as an actor with economic and political interests that are potentially challenging for the existing Antarctic order. This article first assesses the extent and performance of the growing bilateral cooperation between South Korea and one of its closest partners, New Zealand, a country with strong vested interests in the status quo order. How did the cooperation develop between these two actors with ostensibly diverging interests? This article finds that what may have been a friction–laden relationship, actually developed into a win-win partnership for both countries. The article then moves on to offer an explanation for how this productive relationship was made possible by utilising a mutual socialisation approach that explores socio-structural processes around status accommodation.


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