Kant’s Categorical Imperative and Moral Duties

2018 ◽  
pp. 11-38
Author(s):  
Richard M. Robinson
Keyword(s):  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Moral Duties

Deontological International Ethics

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas E. Doyle
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Formal Method ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Divine Command ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
International Ethics ◽  
Economic Relations ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Moral Nature

Deontological international ethics describes, analyzes, and assesses the principles governing the interactions of actors at and across various levels of society; focuses on the relations between states and other international actors; and is concerned with identifying and specifying the moral duties that each kind of international actor bears toward all others. The core theoretical elements of deontological international ethics include accounts of individual and collective agency, moral reason, the moral nature of action, and respect for the moral law as a necessary feature of ethical action. There are three historical phases of deontological international ethics: divine command and natural law ethics prior to Kant, late-modern thinker Immanuel Kant’s international ethics, and contemporary neo-Kantian approaches to nuclear ethics and transnational economic relations. The divine command ethical theories posit divine authority as the absolute and incontrovertible source of moral obligation. Meanwhile, natural law focuses on the intrinsically moral nature of military action and the centrality of moral agency and intention in the rightful use of force. On the other hand, Kant’s systemic deontological ethical theory posits individuals and states as autonomous and rational moral agents, identifies the categorical imperative as the supreme rational principle or morality and the concept of public right as its political corollary, describes a formal method for actors to determine their moral duty in ideal and non-ideal contexts, and applies this theory to the problems of interstate conflict and commerce.

On the Rationale of Kant’s Categorical Imperative

2000 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 185-208
Author(s):  
Nicholas Rescher
Keyword(s):  
Categorical Imperative

Climate Change and Individual Moral Duties

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Luisa Lippold ◽  
Reiner Roos ◽  
Anna Braungart
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Moral Duties

Lisa Sowle Cahill and the Search for a “Functionalist” Paradigm of Feminist Global Ethics

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark S. Massa
Keyword(s):  
Real World ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Social Ethics ◽  
Moral Theology ◽  
Global Ethics ◽  
New Paradigm ◽  
The Real ◽  
Boston College ◽  
Moral Duties

This chapter presents an examination of the thoughts and writings of Lisa Sowle Cahill, a moral theologian at Boston College. Taking issue with both Germain Grisez and Jean Porter, Cahill seeks to construct a new paradigm of natural law that addresses feminist and poststructural scholars. Cahill believed that any paradigm of intercultural or interreligious ethics that purported to be describing moral duties in the real world must begin by exploring how ethical questions are intimately tied to the concrete experiences in specific (often religiously diverse) communities. Her paradigm addressed the concerns of feminist and postimperialist scholars in moving beyond the “false universalism” offered by paradigms like that of neo-scholasticism, while offering a “realist” understanding of social ethics that remained true to the realist impulses in Catholic moral theology.

Group Duties

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephanie Collins
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Systemic Reform ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Tripartite Model ◽  
Group Level ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Fundamental Categories ◽  
Group Pattern

Moral duties are regularly attributed to groups. We might think that the United Kingdom has a moral duty to defend human rights, that environmentalists have a moral duty to push for global systemic reform, or that the affluent have a moral duty to alleviate poverty. This book asks (i) whether such groups are apt to bear duties and (ii) what this implies for their members. It defends a ‘Tripartite Model’ of group duties, which divides groups into three fundamental categories. First, combinations are collections of agents that do not have any goals or decision-making procedures in common. Combinations cannot bear moral duties. Instead, we should re-cast their purported duties as a series of duties—one held by each agent in the combination. Each duty demands its bearer to ‘I-reason’: to do the best they can, given whatever they happen to believe the others will do. Second, coalitions are groups whose members share goals but lack decision-making procedures. Coalitions also cannot bear duties, but their alleged duties should be replaced with members’ several duties to ‘we-reason’: to do one’s part in a particular group pattern of actions, on the presumption that others will do likewise. Third, collectives have group-level procedures for making decisions. They can bear duties. Collectives’ duties imply duties for collectives’ members to use their role in the collective with a view to the collective doing its duty.

The Concept of the Categorical Imperative (review)

1970 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 222-224
Author(s):  
Thomas E. (Thomas English) Hill
Keyword(s):  
Categorical Imperative

scholarly journals UK consultants’ experiences of the decision-making process around referral to intensive care: an interview study

BMJ Open ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. e044752
Author(s):  
Kaja Heidenreich ◽  
Anne-Marie Slowther ◽  
Frances Griffiths ◽  
Anders Bremer ◽  
Mia Svantesson
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Intensive Care ◽  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Critically Ill ◽  
Interpersonal Relationships ◽  
Qualitative Interviews ◽  
Working Environment ◽  
Critically Ill Patient ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Moral Duties

ObjectiveThe decision whether to initiate intensive care for the critically ill patient involves ethical questions regarding what is good and right for the patient. It is not clear how referring doctors negotiate these issues in practice. The aim of this study was to describe and understand consultants’ experiences of the decision-making process around referral to intensive care.DesignQualitative interviews were analysed according to a phenomenological hermeneutical method.Setting and participantsConsultant doctors (n=27) from departments regularly referring patients to intensive care in six UK hospitals.ResultsIn the precarious and uncertain situation of critical illness, trust in the decision-making process is needed and can be enhanced through the way in which the process unfolds. When there are no obvious right or wrong answers as to what ought to be done, how the decision is made and how the process unfolds is morally important. Through acknowledging the burdensome doubts in the process, contributing to an emerging, joint understanding of the patient’s situation, and responding to mutual moral duties of the doctors involved, trust in the decision-making process can be enhanced and a shared moral responsibility between the stake holding doctors can be assumed.ConclusionThe findings highlight the importance of trust in the decision-making process and how the relationships between the stakeholding doctors are crucial to support their moral responsibility for the patient. Poor interpersonal relationships can damage trust and negatively impact decisions made on behalf of a critically ill patient. For this reason, active attempts must be made to foster good relationships between doctors. This is not only important to create a positive working environment, but a mechanism to improve patient outcomes.

The Idea of Moral Duties to History

Philosophy ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Saul Smilansky
Keyword(s):  
Roman Empire ◽  
Surprising Result ◽  
The Past ◽  
Special Obligations ◽  
Good People ◽  
The Future ◽  
Moral Duties

History is, indeed, little more than the register of the crimes, follies, and misfortunes of mankind. Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire I argue that there are duties that can be called ‘Moral duties due to history’ or, in short, ‘Duties to History’ (DTH). My claim is not the familiar thought that we need to learn from history on how to live better in the present and going forward, but that history itself creates moral duties. In addition to those obligations we currently recognise in response to the present and the future, there also exist special obligations in response to the past. If convincing, this means that our lives ought to be guided, in part, not only by our obligations to the living but by our DTH. This is a surprising result, with significant and sometimes perplexing implications. My focus is on the obligations of individuals in the light of history rather than on collective duties. I argue that there are duties that can be called ‘Moral duties due to history’ or, in short, ‘Duties to History’ (DTH). My claim is not the familiar thought that we need to learn from history on how to live better in the present and going forward, but that history itself creates moral duties. In addition to those obligations we currently recognise in response to the present and the future, there also exist special obligations in response to the past; such as obligations to good people in the past, but going beyond them. If convincing, this means that our lives ought to be guided, in part, not only by our obligations to the living but by our DTH. This is a surprising result, with significant and sometimes perplexing implications. My focus is on the obligations of individuals in the light of history rather than on collective duties.

scholarly journals Trusting the Corona-Warn-App? Contemplations on trust and trustworthiness at the intersection of technology, politics and public debate

2021 ◽  
pp. 026732312110283
Author(s):  
Judith Simon ◽  
Gernot Rieder
Keyword(s):  
Technology Development ◽  
Public Debate ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Initial Development ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Debates ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Moral Demands

Ever since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, questions of whom or what to trust have become paramount. This article examines the public debates surrounding the initial development of the German Corona-Warn-App in 2020 as a case study to analyse such questions at the intersection of trust and trustworthiness in technology development, design and oversight. Providing some insights into the nature and dynamics of trust and trustworthiness, we argue that (a) trust is only desirable and justified if placed well, that is, if directed at those being trustworthy; that (b) trust and trustworthiness come in degrees and have both epistemic and moral components; and that (c) such a normatively demanding understanding of trust excludes technologies as proper objects of trust and requires that trust is directed at socio-technical assemblages consisting of both humans and artefacts. We conclude with some lessons learned from our case study, highlighting the epistemic and moral demands for trustworthy technology development as well as for public debates about such technologies, which ultimately requires attributing epistemic and moral duties to all actors involved.

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