scholarly journals Limited Rights as Partial Veto and Sen’s Impossibility Theorem

2008 ◽  
pp. 11-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maurice Salles
Keyword(s):  
Impossibility Theorem

Assessment criteria for aggregate social welfare

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (12) ◽  
pp. 2358-2371
Author(s):  
S.A. Moskal'onov
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Mathematical Analysis ◽  
Exchange Economy ◽  
Assessment Criteria ◽  
Impossibility Theorem ◽  
New Approaches ◽  
History Of Development ◽  
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem ◽  
History Of

Subject. The article addresses the history of development and provides the criticism of existing criteria for aggregate social welfare (on the simple exchange economy (the Edgeworth box) case). Objectives. The purpose is to develop a unique classification of criteria to assess the aggregate social welfare. Methods. The study draws on methods of logical and mathematical analysis. Results. The paper considers strong, strict and weak versions of the Pareto, Kaldor, Hicks, Scitovsky, and Samuelson criteria, introduces the notion of equivalence and constructs orderings by Pareto, Kaldor, Hicks, Scitovsky, and Samuelson. The Pareto and Samuelson's criteria are transitive, however, not complete. The Kaldor, Hicks, Scitovsky citeria are not transitive in the general case. Conclusions. The lack of an ideal social welfare criterion is the consequence of the Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, and of the group of impossibility theorems in economics. It is necessary to develop new approaches to the assessment of aggregate welfare.

An Impossibility Theorem on Beliefs in Games

2001 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam M. Brandenburger ◽  
H. Jerome Keisler
Keyword(s):  
Impossibility Theorem

A Comment on Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Alec Sandroni ◽  
Alvaro Sandroni
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Function ◽  
Social Preference ◽  
Social Choice Function ◽  
Individual Preference ◽  
Impossibility Theorem ◽  
Preference Order ◽  
Individual Choice ◽  
Choice Functions ◽  
Preference Orders

AbstractArrow (1950) famously showed the impossibility of aggregating individual preference orders into a social preference order (together with basic desiderata). This paper shows that it is possible to aggregate individual choice functions, that satisfy almost any condition weaker than WARP, into a social choice function that satisfy the same condition (and also Arrow’s desiderata).

scholarly journals An impossibility theorem for matching problems

2010 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-266 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shohei Takagi ◽  
Shigehiro Serizawa
Keyword(s):  
Impossibility Theorem ◽  
Matching Problems

An impossibility theorem for indicators aggregation

1983 ◽  
Vol 9 (1-3) ◽  
pp. 205-210 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gheorghe Paun
Keyword(s):  
Impossibility Theorem

scholarly journals Interpersonal Comparison of Utility by Measuring Neural Activity

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kaosu Matsumori ◽  
Kazuki Iijima ◽  
Yukihito Yomogida ◽  
Kenji Matsumoto
Keyword(s):  
Neural Activity ◽  
Optimal Taxation ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Impossibility Theorem ◽  
Interpersonal Comparison ◽  
Neural Signals ◽  
Collective Decisions ◽  
Economic Goods ◽  
Household Incomes

Aggregating welfare across individuals to reach collective decisions is one of the most fundamental problems in our society. Interpersonal comparison of utility is pivotal and inevitable for welfare aggregation, because if each person's utility is not interpersonally comparable, there is no rational aggregation procedure that simultaneously satisfies even some very mild conditions for validity (Arrow's impossibility theorem). However, scientific methods for interpersonal comparison of utility have thus far not been available. Here, we have developed a method for interpersonal comparison of utility based on brain signals, by measuring the neural activity of participants performing gambling tasks. We found that activity in the medial frontal region was correlated with changes in expected utility, and that, for the same amount of money, the activity evoked was larger for participants with lower household incomes than for those with higher household incomes. Furthermore, we found that the ratio of neural signals from lower-income participants to those of higher-income participants coincided with estimates of their psychological pleasure by "impartial spectators", i.e. disinterested third-party participants satisfying specific conditions. Finally, we derived a decision rule based on aggregated welfare from our experimental data, and confirmed that it was applicable to a distribution problem. These findings suggest that our proposed method for interpersonal comparison of utility enables scientifically reasonable welfare aggregation by escaping from Arrow's impossibility and has implications for the fair distribution of economic goods. Our method can be further applied for evidence-based policy making in nations that use cost-benefit analyses or optimal taxation theory for policy evaluation.

scholarly journals In Search of Refutation of Rodrik’s Impossibility Theorem

2021 ◽  
Vol 102 (3) ◽  
pp. 22-39
Author(s):  
M. V. Kharkevich
Keyword(s):  
Civil Society ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
System Integration ◽  
Fundamental Problem ◽  
Global Capitalism ◽  
Impossibility Theorem ◽  
Nation State ◽  
World Culture ◽  
The World

The article is devoted to the analysis of the so called impossibility theorem, according to which democracy, state sovereignty and globalization are mutually exclusive and cannot function to the full extent when present simultaneously. This theorem, elaborated in 2011 by Dani Rodrik, a famous economist from Harvard University, poses a fundamental problem about the prospects of the global scalability of political institutions of the nation-state. Is it in principle possible to globalize executive, legislative and judicial branches of power, civil society, and democracy, or is it necessary to limit globalization in order to preserve democracy and nation-state? Rodrik’s conclusions, in essence, make one give up hopes to create global democratic order against the background of global capitalism. On the basis of the Stanford School of Sociological Institutionalism and the reconstruction of the historical materialism by Jürgen Habermas, the author refutes Rodrik’s theorem. The author’s analysis shows that not only is it possible to build democratic order at the global level, but also that it already exists in the form of the world culture that includes such norms as electoral democracy, nation-state, civil society and other institutions of Modernity. The world culture reproduces fundamental social values, playing the role of social integration for the humanity, while global capitalism provides for its material reproduction, playing the role of system integration. However, since globalization is a more dynamic process than the development of the world culture, between material and ideational universalism arises a gap, which in its turn is fraught with various kinds of political and economic crises.

scholarly journals Feasibility of reforms regarding their reaches: An outline of an impossibility theorem

2003 ◽  
Vol 44 (159) ◽  
pp. 7-19
Author(s):  
Ljubomir Madzar
Keyword(s):  
French Revolution ◽  
Initial Position ◽  
Impossibility Theorem ◽  
Reform Process ◽  
Institutional Changes ◽  
Standard Argument ◽  
Lack Of Information ◽  
Run Up ◽  
The One ◽  
The French Revolution

Reform endeavors run up against various sorts of constraints. A major set of constraints is the one derived from the lack of information and knowledge. This category of constraints is inextricably linked with the size of the reform undertakings. The architects of reforms do not have the knowledge needed for designing big institutional changes. Moreover, the big changes take the system far a field from its initial position, the one to be overcome by the reform process. Both features generate two distinct types of uncertainty which are sources of potential hazards and could easily produce the breakdown of the system as a whole with well-known disastrous consequences. This reasoning turns down to the standard argument of feasibility and (there- fore) desirability of the Popper-like piecemeal engineering. Another important issue is the necessity/desirability of preserving old institutions while the new ones are being built lest institutional vacua be developed with disastrous consequences. The argument is analogous to the tenor of the Burke critique of the French Revolution. The upshot of the analysis is that quick implementation of the far-reaching changes is not to be expected and that the going criticisms of the alleged sluggishness of reforms are to some extent ill-advised.

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