Subsidiary Condition and Longitudinal Field

Author(s):  
J. M. Jauch ◽  
F. Rohrlich
Author(s):  
Martin Bettschart ◽  
Marcel Herrmann ◽  
Benjamin M. Wolf ◽  
Veronika Brandstätter

Abstract. Explicit motives are well-studied in the field of personality and motivation psychology. However, the statistical overlap of different explicit motive measures is only moderate. As a consequence, the Unified Motive Scales (UMS; Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 2012 ) were developed to improve the measurement of explicit motives. The present longitudinal field study examined the predictive validity of the UMS achievement motive subscale. Applicants of a police department ( n = 168, Mage = 25.11, 53 females and 115 males) completed the UMS and their performance in the selection process was assessed. As expected, UMS achievement predicted success in the selection process. The findings provide first evidence for the predictive validity of UMS achievement in an applied setting.


2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shuhua Sun ◽  
Zhaoli Song ◽  
Vivien Kim Geok Lim ◽  
Don J. Q. Chen ◽  
Xian Li

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thalis N. Papadakis ◽  
Evdokia Lagakou ◽  
Christina Terlidou ◽  
Dimitra Vekiari ◽  
Ioannis K. Tsegos

1988 ◽  
Vol 49 (C8) ◽  
pp. C8-1035-C8-1036 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Pinkvos ◽  
F. N. Gygax ◽  
E. Lippelt ◽  
Ch. Schwink

2007 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 425-433 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan B. Heide ◽  
Kenneth H. Wathne ◽  
Aksel I. Rokkan

This article examines the effects of monitoring on interfirm relationships. Whereas some research suggests that monitoring can serve as a control mechanism that reduces exchange partner opportunism, there is also evidence showing that monitoring can actually promote such behavior. The authors propose that the actual effect of monitoring depends on (1) the form of monitoring used (output versus behavior) and (2) the context in which monitoring takes place. With regard to the form of monitoring, the results from a longitudinal field study of buyer–supplier relationships show that output monitoring decreases partner opportunism, as transaction cost and agency theory predict, whereas behavior monitoring, which is a more obtrusive form of control, increases partner opportunism. With regard to the context, the authors find that informal relationship elements in the form of microlevel social contracts serve as buffers that both enhance the effects of output monitoring and permit behavior monitoring to suppress opportunism in the first place.


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