Feedback controls for stochastic equations with monotone coefficients

1993 ◽  
Vol 67 (4) ◽  
pp. 3177-3181
Author(s):  
M. A. Karabash
2021 ◽  
Vol 104 (1) ◽  
pp. 267-287
Author(s):  
Radu Cimpeanu ◽  
Susana N. Gomes ◽  
Demetrios T. Papageorgiou

AbstractThe ability to robustly and efficiently control the dynamics of nonlinear systems lies at the heart of many current technological challenges, ranging from drug delivery systems to ensuring flight safety. Most such scenarios are too complex to tackle directly, and reduced-order modelling is used in order to create viable representations of the target systems. The simplified setting allows for the development of rigorous control theoretical approaches, but the propagation of their effects back up the hierarchy and into real-world systems remains a significant challenge. Using the canonical set-up of a liquid film falling down an inclined plane under the action of active feedback controls in the form of blowing and suction, we develop a multi-level modelling framework containing both analytical models and direct numerical simulations acting as an in silico experimental platform. Constructing strategies at the inexpensive lower levels in the hierarchy, we find that offline control transfer is not viable; however, analytically informed feedback strategies show excellent potential, even far beyond the anticipated range of applicability of the models. The detailed effects of the controls in terms of stability and treatment of nonlinearity are examined in detail in order to gain understanding of the information transfer inside the flows, which can aid transition towards other control-rich frameworks and applications.


Axioms ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 132
Author(s):  
Valery Y. Glizer

A finite-horizon two-person non-zero-sum differential game is considered. The dynamics of the game is linear. Each of the players has a quadratic functional on its own disposal, which should be minimized. The case where weight matrices in control costs of one player are singular in both functionals is studied. Hence, the game under the consideration is singular. A novel definition of the Nash equilibrium in this game (a Nash equilibrium sequence) is proposed. The game is solved by application of the regularization method. This method yields a new differential game, which is a regular Nash equilibrium game. Moreover, the new game is a partial cheap control game. An asymptotic analysis of this game is carried out. Based on this analysis, the Nash equilibrium sequence of the pairs of the players’ state-feedback controls in the singular game is constructed. The expressions for the optimal values of the functionals in the singular game are obtained. Illustrative examples are presented.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-348 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. A. Ayryan ◽  
A. D. Egorov ◽  
D. S. Kulyabov ◽  
V. B. Malyutin ◽  
L. A. Sevastyanov

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