Small nuclear power plants based on ship-propulsion nuclear reactors

Atomic Energy ◽  
1994 ◽  
Vol 77 (6) ◽  
pp. 889-895
Author(s):  
V. K. Ulasevich
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Reactors ◽  
Ship Propulsion

Nuclear power plants for ship-propulsion Application

1955 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 116-121 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. L. Witzke ◽  
S. A. Haverstick
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Power Plants ◽  
Ship Propulsion

scholarly journals Nuclear Restart Politics: How the ‘Nuclear Village’ Lost Policy Implementation Power

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florentine KOPPENBORG
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Policy Implementation ◽  
Goal Setting ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Reactor ◽  
Nuclear Reactors ◽  
Nuclear Industry ◽  
Nuclear Policy

Abstract The March 2011 nuclear accident (3.11) shook Japan’s nuclear energy policy to its core. In 2012, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) returned to government with a pro-nuclear policy and the intention to swiftly restart nuclear power plants. In 2020, however, only six nuclear reactors were in operation. Why has the progress of nuclear restarts been so slow despite apparent political support? This article investigates the process of restarting nuclear power plants. The key finding is that the ‘nuclear village’, centered on the LDP, Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry, and the nuclear industry, which previously controlled both nuclear policy goal-setting and implementation, remained in charge of policy decision making, i.e. goal-setting, but lost policy implementation power to an extended conflict over nuclear reactor restarts. The main factors that changed the politics of nuclear reactor restarts are Japan’s new nuclear safety agency, the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA), and a substantial increase in the number of citizens’ class-action lawsuits against nuclear reactors. These findings highlight the importance of assessing both decision making and implementation in assessments of policy change.

Nuclear power plants for ship propulsion

1954 ◽  
Vol 73 (4) ◽  
pp. 331-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. E. Crever ◽  
T. Trocki
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Power Plants ◽  
Ship Propulsion

Reliability of high-pressure recovery system in the power-generating units of nuclear power plants with VVÉR-1000 and -440 nuclear reactors

Atomic Energy ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 78 (2) ◽  
pp. 129-135
Author(s):  
V. I. Baranenko ◽  
A. I. Piontkovskii ◽  
S. P. Khmaryuk ◽  
N. N. Davidenko ◽  
A. G. Shalaev ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
High Pressure ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Reactors ◽  
Pressure Recovery ◽  
Recovery System ◽  
Pressure Recovery System

Protection of Nuclear Power Plants Against Natural Hazards: Protection Principles Against Rare and Severe Natural Hazards for New Nuclear Power Plants

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vincent Coulon ◽  
Sébastien Christophe ◽  
Laurence Grammosenis ◽  
Luc Guinard ◽  
Hervé Cordier
Keyword(s):  
Natural Hazards ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Reactors ◽  
Operating Experience ◽  
Pressurized Water ◽  
Technical Paper ◽  
Design Basis ◽  
Fukushima Daiichi

Abstract The field of protection against external natural hazards (eg.: rare and severe hazards) has regularly evolved since the design of the first NPPs (Nuclear Power Plants) to take into account the experience feedback. Following the Fukushima Daiichi accident in March 2011, consideration of rare and severe natural hazards has considerably increased in the international context. Taking rare and severe natural hazards into account is a challenge for operating nuclear reactors and a major issue for the design of new nuclear reactors. In Europe, considering lessons learnt from the Fukushima Daiichi accident, European safety authorities released new reference levels in the framework of WENRA 2013 (Western European Nuclear Regulators Association) standards for new reactors [1] to address external hazards more severe than the design basis hazards. Considering this input, the French and UK nuclear regulators have released specific guidelines (Guide No. 22 related to design of new pressurized water reactors [2] for France and ONR Safety Assessment Principles SAPs [3] for the UK) to describe how to apply those principles in their national context. To comply with those different guidelines, EDF has developed different approaches, called Beyond Design Basis (BDB) approaches, related to rare and severe natural hazards issue in the French and UK context for nuclear new build projects. Those two approaches are presented in the present technical paper with the following structure: - safety objectives; - hazards to consider; - SSCs (Structures, Systems, and Components) required to meet safety objectives; - study rules and assumptions; - analysis of deterministic or probabilistic nature, thereby including the following: ○ analysis of available margins (margin between 10−4 per annum exceedance frequency of hazard site level or equivalent level of safety and the chosen Design Basis Hazard level also called ‘inherent margin’); ○ Fukushima Daiichi accident Operating Experience feedback; ○ probabilistic safety analyses. This technical paper highlights common characteristics and differences between the two approaches considering the French and UK regulatory contexts.

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