Reliability of high-pressure recovery system in the power-generating units of nuclear power plants with VVÉR-1000 and -440 nuclear reactors

Atomic Energy ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 78 (2) ◽  
pp. 129-135
Author(s):  
V. I. Baranenko ◽  
A. I. Piontkovskii ◽  
S. P. Khmaryuk ◽  
N. N. Davidenko ◽  
A. G. Shalaev ◽  
...  
2021 ◽  
Vol 68 (4) ◽  
pp. 285-294
Author(s):  
V. M. Zorin ◽  
A. S. Shamarokov ◽  
S. B. Pustovalov

Vestnik MEI ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (6) ◽  
pp. 11-17
Author(s):  
Dmitriy A. Kuz'min ◽  
◽  
Aleksandr Yu. Kuz'michevskiy ◽  
Artem E. Gusarov ◽  
◽  
...  

The reliability of nuclear power plants (NPPs) has an influence on power generation safety and stability. The reliability of NPP equipment and pipelines (E&P), and the frequency of in-service inspections are directly linked with damage mechanisms and their development rates. Flow accelerated corrosion (FAC) is one of significant factors causing damages to E&P because these components experience the influence of high pressure, temperature, and high flow velocity of the inner medium. The majority of feed and steam path components made of pearlitic steels are prone to this kind of wear. The tube elements used in the coils of high pressure heaters (HPH) operating in the secondary coolant circuit of nuclear power plants equipped with a VVER-1000 reactor plant were taken as the subject of the study. The time dependences of changes in the wall thickness in HPH tube elements are studied proceeding from an analysis of statistical data of in-service nondestructive tests. A method for determining the initial state of the E&P metal wall thickness before the commencement of operation is proposed. The article presents a procedure for predicting the distribution of examined objects' wall thicknesses at different times of operation with determining the occurrence probability of damages caused by flow accelerated corrosion to calculate the time of safe operation until reaching a critical state. A function that determines the boundary of permissible values of the HPH wall thickness distributions is obtained, and it is shown that the intervals of in-service inspections can be increased from 6 years (the actual frequency of inspections) to 9 years, and the next in-service inspection is recommended to be carried out after 7.5 years of operation. A method for determining the existence of FAC-induced local thinning in the examined object has been developed. The developed approaches and obtained study results can be adapted for any pipelines prone to wall thinning to determine the frequency of in-service inspections (including an express analysis based on the results of a single nondestructive in-service test), the safe operation time, and quantitative assessment of the critical value reaching probability.


Author(s):  
Florentine KOPPENBORG

Abstract The March 2011 nuclear accident (3.11) shook Japan’s nuclear energy policy to its core. In 2012, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) returned to government with a pro-nuclear policy and the intention to swiftly restart nuclear power plants. In 2020, however, only six nuclear reactors were in operation. Why has the progress of nuclear restarts been so slow despite apparent political support? This article investigates the process of restarting nuclear power plants. The key finding is that the ‘nuclear village’, centered on the LDP, Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry, and the nuclear industry, which previously controlled both nuclear policy goal-setting and implementation, remained in charge of policy decision making, i.e. goal-setting, but lost policy implementation power to an extended conflict over nuclear reactor restarts. The main factors that changed the politics of nuclear reactor restarts are Japan’s new nuclear safety agency, the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA), and a substantial increase in the number of citizens’ class-action lawsuits against nuclear reactors. These findings highlight the importance of assessing both decision making and implementation in assessments of policy change.


2007 ◽  
Vol 26-28 ◽  
pp. 259-262 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weon Ju Kim ◽  
Seok Min Kang ◽  
Ji Yeon Park

Silicon nitride (Si3N4) ceramics have been considered for various components of nuclear power plants such as mechanical seal of reactor coolant pump (RCP), guide roller for control rod drive mechanism (CRDM), and seal support, etc. Corrosion behavior of Si3N4 ceramics in high-temperature and high-pressure water must be elucidated before they can be considered for components of nuclear power plants. In this study, the corrosion behaviors of Si3N4 ceramics at hydrothermal condition (300°C, 9.0 MPa) were investigated in pure water. The grain-boundary phase was preferentially corroded and the corrosion reaction was controlled by the diffusion of the reactive species and/or products through the corroded layer. Results of this study imply that the variation of sintering aids and/or the control (e.g., crystallization) of the grain-boundary phase are necessary to increase the corrosion resistance of Si3N4 ceramics in high-temperature water.


Author(s):  
Vincent Coulon ◽  
Sébastien Christophe ◽  
Laurence Grammosenis ◽  
Luc Guinard ◽  
Hervé Cordier

Abstract The field of protection against external natural hazards (eg.: rare and severe hazards) has regularly evolved since the design of the first NPPs (Nuclear Power Plants) to take into account the experience feedback. Following the Fukushima Daiichi accident in March 2011, consideration of rare and severe natural hazards has considerably increased in the international context. Taking rare and severe natural hazards into account is a challenge for operating nuclear reactors and a major issue for the design of new nuclear reactors. In Europe, considering lessons learnt from the Fukushima Daiichi accident, European safety authorities released new reference levels in the framework of WENRA 2013 (Western European Nuclear Regulators Association) standards for new reactors [1] to address external hazards more severe than the design basis hazards. Considering this input, the French and UK nuclear regulators have released specific guidelines (Guide No. 22 related to design of new pressurized water reactors [2] for France and ONR Safety Assessment Principles SAPs [3] for the UK) to describe how to apply those principles in their national context. To comply with those different guidelines, EDF has developed different approaches, called Beyond Design Basis (BDB) approaches, related to rare and severe natural hazards issue in the French and UK context for nuclear new build projects. Those two approaches are presented in the present technical paper with the following structure: - safety objectives; - hazards to consider; - SSCs (Structures, Systems, and Components) required to meet safety objectives; - study rules and assumptions; - analysis of deterministic or probabilistic nature, thereby including the following: ○ analysis of available margins (margin between 10−4 per annum exceedance frequency of hazard site level or equivalent level of safety and the chosen Design Basis Hazard level also called ‘inherent margin’); ○ Fukushima Daiichi accident Operating Experience feedback; ○ probabilistic safety analyses. This technical paper highlights common characteristics and differences between the two approaches considering the French and UK regulatory contexts.


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