scholarly journals Correction to: Relationally equal treatment of equals and affine combinations of values for TU games

2019 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 555-555
Author(s):  
Koji Yokote ◽  
Takumi Kongo ◽  
Yukihiko Funaki
Keyword(s):  
Equal Treatment ◽  
Tu Games ◽  
Equal Treatment Of Equals

Relationally equal treatment of equals and affine combinations of values for TU games

2019 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Koji Yokote ◽  
Takumi Kongo ◽  
Yukihiko Funaki
Keyword(s):  
Equal Treatment ◽  
Tu Games ◽  
Equal Treatment Of Equals

scholarly journals Multi-Type Resource Allocation with Partial Preferences

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (02) ◽  
pp. 2260-2267
Author(s):  
Haibin Wang ◽  
Sujoy Sikdar ◽  
Xiaoxi Guo ◽  
Lirong Xia ◽  
Yongzhi Cao ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Resource Allocation ◽  
Partial Order ◽  
Impossibility Result ◽  
Equal Treatment ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Hybrid Mechanism ◽  
Random Priority ◽  
Unrestricted Domain ◽  
Main Message ◽  
Equal Treatment Of Equals

We propose multi-type probabilistic serial (MPS) and multi-type random priority (MRP) as extensions of the well-known PS and RP mechanisms to the multi-type resource allocation problems (MTRAs) with partial preferences. In our setting, there are multiple types of divisible items, and a group of agents who have partial order preferences over bundles consisting of one item of each type. We show that for the unrestricted domain of partial order preferences, no mechanism satisfies both sd-efficiency and sd-envy-freeness. Notwithstanding this impossibility result, our main message is positive: When agents' preferences are represented by acyclic CP-nets, MPS satisfies sd-efficiency, sd-envy-freeness, ordinal fairness, and upper invariance, while MRP satisfies ex-post-efficiency, sd-strategyproofness, and upper invariance, recovering the properties of PS and RP. Besides, we propose a hybrid mechanism, multi-type general dictatorship (MGD), combining the ideas of MPS and MRP, which satisfies sd-efficiency, equal treatment of equals and decomposability under the unrestricted domain of partial order preferences.

Consistency implies equal treatment in TU-games

2005 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Toru Hokari
Keyword(s):  
Equal Treatment ◽  
Tu Games

scholarly journals Mechanisms for Fair Allocation Problems: No-Punishment Payment Rules in Verifiable Settings

2014 ◽  
Vol 49 ◽  
pp. 403-449 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. Greco ◽  
F. Scarcello
Keyword(s):  
Computational Complexity ◽  
High Probability ◽  
Optimal Allocation ◽  
Equal Treatment ◽  
Fair Allocation ◽  
Presumption Of Innocence ◽  
Indivisible Goods ◽  
Coalitional Games ◽  
Monetary Compensation ◽  
Equal Treatment Of Equals

Mechanism design is considered in the context of fair allocations of indivisible goods with monetary compensation, by focusing on problems where agents' declarations on allocated goods can be verified before payments are performed. A setting is considered where verification might be subject to errors, so that payments have to be awarded under the presumption of innocence, as incorrect declared values do not necessarily mean manipulation attempts by the agents. Within this setting, a mechanism is designed that is shown to be truthful, efficient, and budget-balanced. Moreover, agents' utilities are fairly determined by the Shapley value of suitable coalitional games, and enjoy highly desirable properties such as equal treatment of equals, envy-freeness, and a stronger one called individual-optimality. In particular, the latter property guarantees that, for every agent, her/his utility is the maximum possible one over any alternative optimal allocation. The computational complexity of the proposed mechanism is also studied. It turns out that it is #P-complete so that, to deal with applications with many agents involved, two polynomial-time randomized variants are also proposed: one that is still truthful and efficient, and which is approximately budget-balanced with high probability, and another one that is truthful in expectation, while still budget-balanced and efficient.

scholarly journals Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryosuke Sakai ◽  
Shigehiro Serizawa
Keyword(s):  
Arbitrary Number ◽  
Econ Theory ◽  
Equal Treatment ◽  
Revenue Maximization ◽  
Object Allocation ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Monetary Transfers ◽  
Strategy Proof ◽  
Equal Treatment Of Equals ◽  
Strategy Proofness

AbstractWe consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation mechanisms satisfying individual rationality, non-wastefulness, equal treatment of equals, and strategy-proofness. Extending the result of Kazumura et al. (J Econ Theory 188:105036, 2020b), we show that for an arbitrary number of agents and objects, the minimum price Walrasian is the unique ex-post revenue maximizing mechanism among the mechanisms satisfying no subsidy in addition to the four properties, and that no subsidy in this result can be replaced by no bankruptcy on the positive income effect domain.

Special Education: Justice, Tolerance, and Beneficence as Duty1

1998 ◽  
Vol 180 (2) ◽  
pp. 41-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerald S. Fain
Keyword(s):  
Special Education ◽  
Educational Achievement ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
Equal Treatment ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Civic Virtues ◽  
Education Justice ◽  
Equal Treatment Of Equals

This article establishes the moral basis for special education as it concerns the duties of justice, toleration, and beneficence. The same fundamental moral principles apply to children with disabilities as to others, but the context here is public education with particular interest in the educational achievement of each child. Special education relies on justice, toleration and beneficence as it seeks the equal treatment of equals. The moral motives for special education are in the liberal democratic ideals of self-determination of every citizen and justice for all. Rights of liberty and justice can be secured, at least imperfectly, by law and regulation. But a civil and humane society needs more than law, more than justice, and more than toleration. It depends also on other civic virtues including respect for and commitment to beneficence.

A CO-MARGINALISTIC CONTRIBUTION VALUE FOR SET GAMES

2001 ◽  
Vol 03 (04) ◽  
pp. 351-362 ◽  
Author(s):  
HAO SUN ◽  
SHENGGUI ZHANG ◽  
XUELIANG LI ◽  
THEO DRIESSEN ◽  
CORNELIS HOEDE
Keyword(s):  
Equal Treatment ◽  
Tu Games ◽  
Global Efficiency

In this paper, a new value for set games, named co-marginalistic contribution value, is characterised by the standard axioms of global efficiency and equal treatment property, and another axiom of co-coalitional marginalistic monotonicity, which is a modification of the axiom of monotonicity. The co-marginalistic contribution value for set games is analogous to the solidarity value for n-person TU-games. Since the co-marginalistic contribution value does not satisfy the axiom of additivity, the proof of the characterisation is much different from that for TU-games.

Bariery w przepływie pracowników na rynku wewnętrznym – stary problem w nowych odsłonach

2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (4 (1)) ◽  
pp. 39-54
Author(s):  
Robert Grzeszczak
Keyword(s):  
Equal Treatment ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Integration Process ◽  
Labour Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Political Criticism ◽  
Eu Policies ◽  
The Will ◽  
Free Movement Of Persons ◽  
The Eu

The issue of re-nationalization (disintegration and fragmentation) of integration process is manifested by the will of some of the Member States to verify their relations with the European Union. In the age of an economic crisis of the EU and in relation to the large migration of the population, there has emerged strong social and political criticism, on the European level, of the integration process, with some Member States even consideringtheir withdrawal from the EU. In those States, demands forextending the Member States’ competences in the field of some EU policies are becoming more and more popular. The legal effects of the above-mentioned processes are visible in the free movements of the internal market, mainly within the free movement of persons. Therefore, there are problems, such as increased social dumping process, the need to retain the output of the European labour law, the issue of the so-called social tourism, erosion of the meaning of the EU citizenship and the principle of equal treatment.

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