scholarly journals The impact of intermediaries on a negotiation: an approach from game theory

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susana López ◽  
Guillermo Owen ◽  
Martha Saboya
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Network Analysis ◽  
Optimal Design ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Efficient Algorithm ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Interaction Networks ◽  
Model Interaction ◽  
Game Outcome ◽  
The Impact

AbstractStandard approaches to model interaction networks are limited in their capacity to describe the nuances of real communication. We present a game theoretical framework to quantify the effect of intermediaries on the interaction between agents. Inspired by the seminal work Myerson (1977). on cooperative structures in cooperative games, we set the basis for multidimensional network analysis within game theory. More specifically, an extension of the point-arc game Feltkamp and van den Nouwe51 land (1992). is introduced, generalizing the analysis of cooperative games to multigraphs. An efficient algorithm is proposed for the computation of Shapley value of this game. We prove the validity of our approach by applying it to a intermediaries network model. We are able to recover meaningful results on the dependence of the game outcome on the intermediaries network. This work contributes to the optimal design of networks in economic environments and allows the ranking of players in complex networks.

scholarly journals Interactions, information and emergence: Exploring task allocation in ant colonies using network analysis

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anshuman Swain ◽  
Sara D Williams ◽  
Louisa J Di Felice ◽  
Elizabeth A Hobson
Keyword(s):  
Network Analysis ◽  
Functional Groups ◽  
Task Allocation ◽  
Interaction Networks ◽  
Group Level ◽  
Ant Colonies ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Network Measures ◽  
Interaction History ◽  
The Impact

In animal societies, individuals may take on different roles to fulfil their own needs and the needs of their groups. Ant colonies display high levels of organisational complexity, with ants fulfilling different roles at different timescales (what is known as task allocation). Factors affecting task allocation can be at the individual level (e.g., physiology), or at the group level (e.g., interaction histories). In this work, we focus on group level processes by exploring the impact of the history of interaction networks on task allocation and task switching using a previously published dataset (Mersch et al., 2013) tracking the behaviour of six Camponotus fellah colonies over 41 days. First, we investigated the architecture of interaction networks using node (individual) level network measures and their relation to the individual's task - foraging, cleaning or nursing - and whether or not the ant switched tasks. We then explored how noisy information propagation is among ants, as a function of the colony composition (how many ants are carrying out which tasks), through the information-theoretic metric of effective information. Our results show that interaction history affected task allocation, with ants more likely to switch to a task if they had interacted with other ants carrying out that task. The degree to which interaction history affected task allocation, as well as the noise in their interactions, depended on which groups of ants are interacting. Overall, we showed that colony cohesion is stable even as ant-level network measures vary more for ants when they switched functional groups; thus ant colonies maintain a high level of information flow as determined by network analysis and ant functional groups play different roles in maintaining colony cohesion.

scholarly journals Satisfaction-Based Energy Allocation with Energy Constraint Applying Cooperative Game Theory

Energies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (5) ◽  
pp. 1485
Author(s):  
Samira Ortiz ◽  
Mandoye Ndoye ◽  
Marcel Castro-Sitiriche
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Energy Consumption ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
User Satisfaction ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Pv System ◽  
Novel Method ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Satisfaction Model

There has been an effort for a few decades to keep energy consumption at a minimum or at least within a low-level range. This effort is more meaningful and complex by including a customer’s satisfaction variable to ensure that customers can achieve the best quality of life that could be derived from how energy is used by different devices. We use the concept of Shapley Value from cooperative game theory to solve the multi-objective optimization problem (MOO) to responsibly fulfill user’s satisfaction by maximizing satisfaction while minimizing the power consumption, with energy constrains since highly limited resources scenarios are studied. The novel method uses the concept of a quantifiable user satisfaction, along the concepts of power satisfaction (PS) and energy satisfaction (ES). The model is being validated by representing a single house (with a small PV system) that is connected to the utility grid. The main objectives are to (i) present the innovative energy satisfaction model based on responsible wellbeing, (ii) demonstrate its implementation using a Shapley-value-based algorithm, and (iii) include the impact of a solar photovoltaic (PV) system in the energy satisfaction model. The proposed technique determines in which hours the energy should be allocated to maximize the ES for each scenario, and then it is compared to cases in which devices are usually operated. Through the proposed technique, the energy consumption was reduced 75% and the ES increased 40% under the energy constraints.

A CONSISTENT IMPUTATION GENERATION METHOD FOR LINGUISTIC COOPERATIVE GAMES AND ITS APPLICATION TO RISK AVERSION

2012 ◽  
Vol 20 (supp01) ◽  
pp. 49-66
Author(s):  
JIAN LIN ◽  
QIANG ZHANG
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Existence And Uniqueness ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Management Systems ◽  
Linguistic Label ◽  
Null Player ◽  
Linguistic Labels

Cooperative game theory is very useful to risk aversion problems in economics and management systems. The existing methods only focus on the situation payoffs take the form of numerical values, ones take the form of linguistic labels are seldom discussed. The aim of this study is to propose the consistent imputation for cooperative games under a linguistic environment. To support risk aversion, a 2-tuple linguistic representation is employed to obtain the valid results and avoid the loss of linguistic information. This paper firstly defines some concepts for linguistic cooperative games, such as linguistic imputation, carrier, core and null player. A set of their desirable properties are also discussed. The linguistic Shapley value is then presented based on three axioms. Moreover, the existence and uniqueness of the linguistic Shapley value are discussed in detail. To adjust the linguistic imputation in accordance with the cardinality of a given original linguistic label set, an adjustment algorithm for generating consistent imputation is proposed. Finally, we give the application of linguistic imputation in solving risk aversion problems to illustrate the validity of the consistent imputation generation (CIG) method.

APPLICATIONS OF GAME THEORY TO ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM

1999 ◽  
Vol 01 (01) ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
GUILLERMO OWEN
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Competitive Equilibrium ◽  
Random Variable ◽  
Market Games ◽  
The Core ◽  
Thin Markets ◽  
Shapley Values ◽  
Game Theoretic

One of the original expectations for the theory of cooperative games was that it would give us results valid for thin markets (where the number of traders is too small for an equilibrium to be reached). Over a period of years, however, it has been shown that, for market games, both the core and the Shapley values converge, in some sense, to the competitive equilibrium. Thus, the feeling arises that for large market games, the game-theoretic concepts yield nothing other than the equilibrium. In this article, we study the question of convergence of the Shapley value to the equilibrium and show that in some cases the convergence can be extremely slow. A very simple example (the "shoe" game) suggests that replacing the value by the equilibrium is in some sense akin to replacing a random variable by its mean.

scholarly journals Vitality Indices are Equivalent to Induced Game-Theoretic Centralities

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oskar Skibski
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Theoretical Analysis ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Centrality Measures ◽  
Coalitional Game ◽  
The Shapley Value ◽  
Balanced Contributions ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Coalitional Game Theory

Vitality indices form a class of centrality measures that assess the importance of a node based on the impact its removal has on the network. To date, theoretical analysis of this class is lacking. In this paper, we show that vitality indices can be characterized using the axiom of Balanced Contributions proposed by Myerson in the coalitional game theory literature. We explore the link between both fields and show an equivalence between vitality indices and induced game theoretic centralities based on the Shapley value. Our characterization allows us to easily determine which known centrality measures are vitality indices.

scholarly journals A Study of Taxi Service Mode Choice Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Zhu Bai ◽  
Mingxia Huang ◽  
Shuai Bian ◽  
Huandong Wu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Mode Choice ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stable States ◽  
Taxi Service ◽  
Service Mode ◽  
The Impact

The emergence of online car-hailing service provides an innovative approach to vehicle booking but has negatively influenced the taxi industry in China. This paper modeled taxi service mode choice based on evolutionary game theory (EGT). The modes included the dispatching and online car-hailing modes. We constructed an EGT framework, including determining the strategies and the payoff matrix. We introduced different behaviors, including taxi company management, driver operation, and passenger choice. This allowed us to model the impact of these behaviors on the evolving process of service mode choice. The results show that adjustments in taxi company, driver, and passenger behaviors impact the evolutionary path and convergence speed of our evolutionary game model. However, it also reveals that, regardless of adjustments, the stable states in the game model remain unchanged. The conclusion provides a basis for studying taxi system operation and management.

scholarly journals Quantitative Dynamics Effects of Belt and Road Economies Trade Using Structural Gravity and Neural Networks

SAGE Open ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 215824402110326
Author(s):  
Koffi Dumor ◽  
Li Yao ◽  
Jean-Paul Ainam ◽  
Edem Koffi Amouzou ◽  
Williams Ayivi
Keyword(s):  
Neural Network ◽  
Neural Networks ◽  
Network Analysis ◽  
Bilateral Trade ◽  
Belt And Road Initiative ◽  
Neural Network Analysis ◽  
Analysis Techniques ◽  
Belt And Road ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Trade Partners

Recent research suggests that China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) would improve the bilateral trade between China and its partners. This article uses detailed bilateral export data from 1990 to 2017 to investigate the impact of China’s BRI on its trade partners using neural network analysis techniques and structural gravity model estimations. Our main findings suggest that the BRI countries would raise exports by a modest 5.053%. This indicates that export and network upgrades should be considered from economic and policy perspectives. The results also show that neural networks is more robust compared with structural gravity framework.

Query Games in Databases

2021 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 78-85
Author(s):  
Ester Livshits ◽  
Leopoldo Bertossi ◽  
Benny Kimelfeld ◽  
Moshe Sebag
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
The Shapley Value ◽  
Computational Aspects ◽  
Aggregate Query ◽  
Boolean Query

Database tuples can be seen as players in the game of jointly realizing the answer to a query. Some tuples may contribute more than others to the outcome, which can be a binary value in the case of a Boolean query, a number for a numerical aggregate query, and so on. To quantify the contributions of tuples, we use the Shapley value that was introduced in cooperative game theory and has found applications in a plethora of domains. Specifically, the Shapley value of an individual tuple quantifies its contribution to the query. We investigate the applicability of the Shapley value in this setting, as well as the computational aspects of its calculation in terms of complexity, algorithms, and approximation.

Shapley Ranking of Wines

2012 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-180 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victor Ginsburgh ◽  
Israël Zang
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Unique Solution ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Rank Order ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Ranking Method ◽  
The Shapley Value ◽  
Shapley Values

AbstractWe suggest a new game-theory-based ranking method for wines, in which the Shapley Value of each wine is computed, and wines are ranked according to their Shapley Values. Judges should find it simpler to use, since they are not required to rank order or grade all the wines, but merely to choose the group of those that they find meritorious. Our ranking method is based on the set of reasonable axioms that determine the Shapley Value as the unique solution of an underlying cooperative game. Unlike in the general case, where computing the Shapley Value could be complex, here the Shapley Value and hence the final ranking, are straightforward to compute. (JEL Classification: C71, D71, D78)

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