Purpose
This paper aims to investigate the motivation for firms to innovate their products to be socially responsible in the presence of the spillover effect. The follower of the innovation in corporate social responsibility (CSR) can benefit from the leader’s innovation by technological spillover. For instance, evidence can be found in the cosmetics industry (e.g. Lush Retail Ltd. and The Body Shop) and the market of hybrid electric vehicles (e.g. Toyota and Honda). Moreover, consumers may have different perceptions on the sequence of CSR innovation by firms, they may prefer more on the CSR product launched by the leader because they usually relate the desired stage to their interests when making a purchase decision. Therefore, the firms’ decision to be a leader of the CSR innovation depends on the trade-off between the loss in the spillover effect and the benefit of the first-mover advantage, which has not been considered by the existing literature. This paper explains the firms’ motivation on CSR innovation in a realistic situation where competing firms’ CSR programs are launched sequentially and sheds light on the private sector’s decision on strategy from the perspective on the social contribution, and provides some managerial implications about the competing firms’ strategies of launching the CSR innovation.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors construct a two-period Hotelling model in which consumers are divided into two groups: the altruistic and normal consumers. The altruistic consumers have more willingness to pay for the CSR product while the normal consumers only care about the product performance improved by the firms’ CSR activities. Firms have the option to innovate their basic products to be socially responsible and make their decision on such CSR innovation sequentially. Moreover, the follower of the innovation can receive a spillover effect from the leader, meaning that there may exist a second-mover advantage in terms of innovation (the authors define this as a spillover effect), but in the meanwhile, the altruistic consumers value more on the CSR product sold by the leader than that by the follower (the authors define this as a preference-reduction effect). This implies that the firm can benefit in the production process from being a second-mover of the CSR innovation but may lose its first-mover advantage in terms of the preference-reduction effect. By finding and analyzing the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium, the authors try to figure out the firms’ decisions on CSR innovation in various situations.
Findings
The authors find that the firms’ motivation of CSR innovation crucially depends on the fraction of the altruistic consumers, as well as the spillover effect and the preference-reduction effect. A large (small) fraction of the altruistic consumers attracts (restricts) both the leader and the follower to engage in CSR innovation. More importantly, when such fraction is not too large but stays at a relatively high level, a potential leader of the CSR innovation may not wish to innovate. Hence, the potential follower may be the monopolist in the market of the socially responsible product. In addition, the authors reexamine this result in a variation model where a leader can make its decision on the CSR innovation to be more flexible by allowing it can innovate in either periods 1 or 2. The authors demonstrate that when the fraction of the altruistic consumers falls in an intermediate range, the leader may wish to delay the CSR innovation to period 2. In such a case, the leader of the CSR innovation may tend to trade its first-mover advantage for head-to-head competition with the follower and prevents the follower from benefiting from the spillover effect. Moreover, a flexible choice on the CSR innovation brings greater initiative to a firm to be the leader of the innovation.
Originality/value
Nearly all the studies about firms’ decisions on CSR innovation are conducted in an environment of simultaneous move, which is not appropriate to describe the real business world; many pieces of evidence show that many CSR programs are launched sequentially rather than simultaneously. The theory identifies a couple of important factors of the CSR innovation in a more realistic situation, i.e. sequential more on CSR innovation. Both spillover effect and preference-reduction effect crucially affect the firms’ decision on innovating their products to be socially responsible, which contributes to the existing literature in CSR and strategic decision. This paper also sheds some light on managerial implications with CSR innovation under various situations of competition.
CSR leadership, spillovers, and first-mover advantage
