Electromagnetic buffer optimization based on Nash game

AbstractThis paper discusses linear quadratic Nash game of stochastic singular time-delay systems governed by Itô’s differential equation. Sufficient condition for the existence of Nash strategies is given by means of linear matrix inequality for the first time. Moreover, in order to demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed theory, stochastic H2∕H∞control with multiple decision makers is discussed as an immediate application.

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Nash game‐based adaptive robust control design optimization for the underactuated mechanical system with fuzzy evidence theory

Optimal Control Applications and Methods ◽

10.1002/oca.2761 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Yunjun Zheng ◽

Han Zhao ◽

Chunsheng He

Keyword(s):

Robust Control ◽

Design Optimization ◽

Mechanical System ◽

Evidence Theory ◽

Control Design ◽

Adaptive Robust Control ◽

Nash Game ◽

Underactuated Mechanical System ◽

Robust Control Design

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A stochastic differential game of low carbon technology sharing in collaborative innovation system of superior enterprises and inferior enterprises under uncertain environment

Open Mathematics ◽

10.1515/math-2018-0056 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 16 (1) ◽

pp. 607-622 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Shi Yin ◽

Baizhou Li

Keyword(s):

Differential Game ◽

Cooperative Game ◽

Stackelberg Game ◽

Innovation System ◽

Stochastic Differential Game ◽

Low Carbon ◽

Nash Game ◽

Low Carbon Economy ◽

Collaborative Innovation ◽

Technology Level

AbstractConsidering the fact that the development of low carbon economy calls for the low carbon technology sharing between interested enterprises, this paper study a stochastic differential game of low carbon technology sharing in collaborative innovation system of superior enterprises and inferior enterprises. In the paper, we consider the random interference factors that include the uncertain external environment and the internal understanding limitations of decision maker. In the model, superior enterprises and inferior enterprises are separated entities, and they play Stacklberg master-slave game, Nash non-cooperative game, and cooperative game, respectively. We discuss the feedback equilibrium strategies of superior enterprises and inferior enterprises, and it is found that some random interference factors in sharing system can make the variance of improvement degree of low carbon technology level in the cooperation game higher than the variance in the Stackelberg game, and the result of Stackelberg game is similar to the result of Nash game. Additionally, a government subsidy incentive and a special subsidy that inferior enterprises give to superior enterprises are proposed.

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Stochastic Nash Game Approach to Stochastic H2/H∞ Robust Control Design for Linear Systems with State-Dependent Wiener Noise and External Disturbance

Stochastic Game Strategies and Their Applications ◽

10.1201/9780429432941-6 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 137-164

Author(s):

Bor-Sen Chen

Keyword(s):

Robust Control ◽

Linear Systems ◽

External Disturbance ◽

Control Design ◽

Nash Game ◽

State Dependent ◽

Robust Control Design

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Managing a 5G mobile phone supply chain under the impact of strategic consumers: A two-period game analysis and applications

RAIRO - Operations Research ◽

10.1051/ro/2021047 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Qin Zhang ◽

Zijian He ◽

Junhai Ma

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Mobile Phone ◽

Stackelberg Game ◽

Great Influence ◽

Purchasing Behavior ◽

Optimal Price ◽

Nash Game ◽

Strategic Consumers ◽

Game Analysis ◽

The Impact

Consumers' strategic purchasing behavior has a great influence on the pricing and sales of new products. In order to study the impact of strategic consumers on the sales of 5G mobile phones, we establish a two-period pricing model. The supply chain contains two manufacturers, a communications operator and a mobile phone retailer. Cases where two manufacturers have the same or different pricing rights are researched by using the Stackelberg game and the Nash game model. Our research results are as follows:(1) We obtain the optimal 5G communication fees in two periods and find out how they change with the proportion of consumers changing. (2) We figure out the profits of the supply chain in two periods and analyze them. We find that the communication operator earns more than the others most of the time. (3) We investigate how the proportion of strategic consumer impact on supply chain profits and conclude that the optimal price and demand in a period will decrease as the proportion of consumers who only purchase products in the other period increases.

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Horizontal Coalition Stability Analysis of Supply Chain Entities Based on Sequential Game

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society ◽

10.1155/2014/972401 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 2014 ◽

pp. 1-10 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Shizhao Wang ◽

Yong Luo

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Wholesale Price ◽

Market Price ◽

Sensitivity Coefficient ◽

Game Model ◽

Nash Game ◽

Sequential Game ◽

Second Stage ◽

Coalition Stability ◽

Reasonable Range

Aiming to find the effect of the same status entities’ horizontal coordination on supply chain, this paper studied the coalition stability of dealers in a two-stage supply chain with one supplier and multiple dealers. First, a vertical sequential game model is built, where the supplier is leader and the multiple dealers are followers. In the second stage of the game, multiple dealers face two selections: playing Nash game with each other or developing a coalition. Then, according to the results acquired by comparing the dealers’ profits which depend on their coalition situations, the criterion of coalition stability is developed. Finally, numerical simulation is used to verify the validity of the model, and some insights are obtained. For example, if the sensitivity coefficientTof the market price is fixed, dealers’ coalition tends to be stable with the increasing of the substitution ratekin a reasonable range; the supplier’s optimal wholesale price is constant with and without dealer’s coalition, but dealers’ coalition causes demand to decrease, which leads to the decrease of the supplier’s profit too. The result of this paper provides an important reference for the formation of dealers’ coalition in IT or automobile supply chain.

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