scholarly journals Using focal point learning to improve human–machine tacit coordination

2010 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-316 ◽  
Author(s):  
Inon Zuckerman ◽  
Sarit Kraus ◽  
Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
Sensors ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (24) ◽  
pp. 7026
Author(s):  
Dor Mizrahi ◽  
Inon Zuckerman ◽  
Ilan Laufer

In recent years collaborative robots have become major market drivers in industry 5.0, which aims to incorporate them alongside humans in a wide array of settings ranging from welding to rehabilitation. Improving human–machine collaboration entails using computational algorithms that will save processing as well as communication cost. In this study we have constructed an agent that can choose when to cooperate using an optimal strategy. The agent was designed to operate in the context of divergent interest tacit coordination games in which communication between the players is not possible and the payoff is not symmetric. The agent’s model was based on a behavioral model that can predict the probability of a player converging on prominent solutions with salient features (e.g., focal points) based on the player’s Social Value Orientation (SVO) and the specific game features. The SVO theory pertains to the preferences of decision makers when allocating joint resources between themselves and another player in the context of behavioral game theory. The agent selected stochastically between one of two possible policies, a greedy or a cooperative policy, based on the probability of a player to converge on a focal point. The distribution of the number of points obtained by the autonomous agent incorporating the SVO in the model was better than the results obtained by the human players who played against each other (i.e., the distribution associated with the agent had a higher mean value). Moreover, the distribution of points gained by the agent was better than any of the separate strategies the agent could choose from, namely, always choosing a greedy or a focal point solution. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to construct an intelligent agent that maximizes its utility by incorporating the belief system of the player in the context of tacit bargaining. This reward-maximizing strategy selection process based on the SVO can also be potentially applied in other human–machine contexts, including multiagent systems.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher R. Chartier

Tacit coordination between individuals has received considerable research attention (Mehta, Starmer & Sugden, 1994; Abele, & Stasser, 2008). However, groups often must coordinate tacitly with other groups, and such intergroup coordination has been rarely studied. In three experiments, we found that interacting groups are more successful at coordinating tacitly than are individuals. This advantage is driven by two types of coordination salience that are uniquely derived from groups deliberating and making collective responses. Consensual salience occurs when groups select a response because a majority of members support it. Majorities efficiently identify popular response tendencies (i.e., focal points) and thereby increase the chances of matching other groups’ responses. Disjunctive salience occurs when at least one member of a group suggests a focal point. We propose that focal points are often demonstratively evident when mentioned, and if proposed by any group member, are likely to be adopted as the group response.


Ledger ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 119-133 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Abramowicz

This paper proposes a self-governing cryptocurrency, dubbed Autonocoin. Cryptocurrency owners play formal tacit coordination games by making investments recorded on the blockchain. Such investments represent bets about the focal point resolution of normative issues, such as whether a proposed change to Autonocoin should occur. The game produces a result that resolves the issue. With a typical cryptocurrency, the client software establishes conventions that ultimately lead to the identification of the authoritative blockchain. Autonocoin completes a circle by making transactions on the blockchain that in turn define those conventions and the expected software behavior. The distributed consensus mechanism embodied by formal tacit coordination games, meanwhile, can make other types of decisions, including which of competing blockchains is authoritative and whether new Autonocoins should be rewarded to benefit those who have taken actions to benefit Autonocoin. This establishes a unique funding model for a cryptocurrency, and it addresses objections to cryptocurrencies issued predominantly to the initial founders, as well as to those that encourage wasteful mining activities.


2015 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 395-409
Author(s):  
Mike Holland ◽  
Jannie Rossouw ◽  
Jessica Staples

The Competition Amendment Act introduced section 10A, which provides the Competition Commission with the powers to investigate complex monopoly conduct in a market and allows the Competition Tribunal, under certain conditions, to prohibit such behaviour. Although more than five years have elapsed since the Competition Amendment Act was promulgated, this provision has yet to come into force. However, when it eventually does so, it will mark a significant change in South African competition law, as it seeks to regulate firms’ consciously parallel conduct. This is coordinated conduct that occurs without communication or agreement, but results in the prevention or substantial lessening of competition. Examples of horizontal tacit coordination practices include price leadership and facilitating practices, such as information exchanges and price signaling. The successful implementation of the amendment poses problems for the competition authorities in assessing the competitive effects of complex monopoly conduct and in providing effective remedies. Oligopoly markets result in mutual interdependent decision-making by firms, which can lead to market outcomes similar to explicit collusion. However, a further and little noticed issue is that firms in oligopolistic markets have opportunities to use focal points to determine coordinated strategies. This paper explores the nature and role of focal point pricing, which can lead to prices that are above competitive levels. The South African banking industry is used as an example. We find that focal point pricing is difficult to control, making the successful implementation of section 10A even more problematic. Moreover, the proposed amendment provides scope for the imposition of structural remedies by the Competition Tribunal, a function that the Competition Tribunal is ill-suited to perform.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher R. Chartier

Tacit coordination is a fundamental task for interdependent social actors. Everyday examples include negotiating rush hour traffic, working collaboratively on a group project, conversing smoothly, and meeting friends for lunch. Previous research (Schelling, 1960; Mehta, Starmer & Sugden, 1994) has focused extensively on differences between behavioral options that aid in small group coordination. Highly salient options are referred to as structural focal points, and are popular choices for actors. The current work presents a new type of focal point based on differences between social actors in a coordination problem. The focal social actor effect is hypothesized to occur when one group member is more salient than others, and actors correspond to behavioral options in a clear way. Three Experiments explored and ultimately supported this hypothesis. In Experiment 1, social information about group members was manipulated such that one group member was unique. Furthermore, players were identified by color. In a subsequent coordination game, players were more likely to select an option sharing an identifying color with the unique group member than an option corresponding to a common player. In Experiment 2, actors and options corresponded through slight payoff differences between group members across different behavioral options. Once again, players were more likely to select the option corresponding to the unique player. In Experiment 3, uniqueness was manipulated orthogonally to intragroup status by virtue of bogus feedback on a leadership questionnaire. The focal social actor served as a coordination cue, as players were more likely to select the option corresponding to the unique player. The focal social actor cue was found to be effective even in the presence of the previously established status cue for coordination (de Kwaadsteniet & van Dijk, 2010). Focal social actors serve as strong coordination aids for small groups, and may help explain portions of previously published tacit coordination findings.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Corbit ◽  
Chris Moore

Abstract The integration of first-, second-, and third-personal information within joint intentional collaboration provides the foundation for broad-based second-personal morality. We offer two additions to this framework: a description of the developmental process through which second-personal competence emerges from early triadic interactions, and empirical evidence that collaboration with a concrete goal may provide an essential focal point for this integrative process.


Author(s):  
R. W. Carpenter ◽  
I.Y.T. Chan ◽  
J. M. Cowley

Wide-angle convergent beam shadow images(CBSI) exhibit several characteristic distortions resulting from spherical aberration. The most prominent is a circle of infinite magnification resulting from rays having equal values of a forming a cross-over on the optic axis at some distance before reaching the paraxial focal point. This distortion is called the tangential circle of infinite magnification; it can be used to align and stigmate a STEM and to determine Cs for the probe forming lens. A second distortion, the radial circle of infinite magnification, results from a cross-over on the lens caustic surface of rays with differing values of ∝a, also before the paraxial focal point of the lens.


Author(s):  
Gertrude F. Rempfer

I became involved in electron optics in early 1945, when my husband Robert and I were hired by the Farrand Optical Company. My husband had a mathematics Ph.D.; my degree was in physics. My main responsibilities were connected with the development of an electrostatic electron microscope. Fortunately, my thesis research on thermionic and field emission, in the late 1930s under the direction of Professor Joseph E. Henderson at the University of Washington, provided a foundation for dealing with electron beams, high vacuum, and high voltage.At the Farrand Company my co-workers and I used an electron-optical bench to carry out an extensive series of tests on three-electrode electrostatic lenses, as a function of geometrical and voltage parameters. Our studies enabled us to select optimum designs for the lenses in the electron microscope. We early on discovered that, in general, electron lenses are not “thin” lenses, and that aberrations of focal point and aberrations of focal length are not the same. I found electron optics to be an intriguing blend of theory and experiment. A laboratory version of the electron microscope was built and tested, and a report was given at the December 1947 EMSA meeting. The micrograph in fig. 1 is one of several which were presented at the meeting. This micrograph also appeared on the cover of the January 1949 issue of Journal of Applied Physics. These were exciting times in electron microscopy; it seemed that almost everything that happened was new. Our opportunities to publish were limited to patents because Mr. Farrand envisaged a commercial instrument. Regrettably, a commercial version of our laboratory microscope was not produced.


Author(s):  
P.M. Houpt ◽  
A. Draaijer

In confocal microscopy, the object is scanned by the coinciding focal points (confocal) of a point light source and a point detector both focused on a certain plane in the object. Only light coming from the focal point is detected and, even more important, out-of-focus light is rejected.This makes it possible to slice up optically the ‘volume of interest’ in the object by moving it axially while scanning the focused point light source (X-Y) laterally. The successive confocal sections can be stored in a computer and used to reconstruct the object in a 3D image display.The instrument described is able to scan the object laterally with an Ar ion laser (488 nm) at video rates. The image of one confocal section of an object can be displayed within 40 milliseconds (1000 х 1000 pixels). The time to record the total information within the ‘volume of interest’ normally depends on the number of slices needed to cover it, but rarely exceeds a few seconds.


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