Ontology, Reference, and the Qua Problem: Amie Thomasson on Existence

Axiomathes ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 543-550
Author(s):  
Andrea Sauchelli
Keyword(s):  
Qua Problem ◽  
Amie Thomasson

Some Issues Regarding Artifacts

2020 ◽  
Vol 65 (3) ◽  
pp. 183-191
Author(s):  
Paula Tomi
Keyword(s):  
Natural Kinds ◽  
Functional Perspective ◽  
Intended Function ◽  
New Perspective ◽  
Amie Thomasson

"When it comes to artifacts, the functional accounts define them as objects that have an intended function. This function is considered essential for them and is used to classify artifacts and differentiate them. However, functional accounts of artifacts face some serious criticism. It seems that a function is neither essential, nor sufficient for an artifact. Thomasson offers a new perspective on artifacts. The author defines artifacts based on their intended feature. A feature may, of course, be a function but does not have to be just that. Generally speaking, intended features are norms of how to treat that specific artifact. Such an account is able to escape the criticism raised against functional accounts. In this article is presented Baker’s functional account of artifacts and some criticism that can be raised for such an account. The second part of the article critically introduces Thomasson’s account for artifacts. The aim of this article is to support Thomasson’s account against a functional perspective. Keywords: artifacts, mind-dependent objects, intended function, natural kinds, intended feature, Amie Thomasson, L. R. Baker"

scholarly journals The qua-Problem, Meaning Scepticism, and the Life-World

2020 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 159-168
Author(s):  
Anar Jafarov
Keyword(s):  
Life World ◽  
Qua Problem

Ordinary Objects - Amie Thomasson

2008 ◽  
Vol 58 (230) ◽  
pp. 172-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Sidelle
Keyword(s):  
Ordinary Objects ◽  
Amie Thomasson

Artifacts

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathrin Koslicki
Keyword(s):  
Satisfactory Treatment ◽  
Discriminating Power ◽  
The Status ◽  
Lynne Rudder Baker ◽  
Further Development ◽  
Amie Thomasson ◽  
Special Case

This chapter continues the examination of the special features of artifacts by discussing their place within existing essentialist and anti-essentialist frameworks. It will be argued that prominent essentialist treatments of artifacts, such as those proposed by Amie Thomasson, Simon Evnine, and Lynne Rudder Baker, are susceptible to the concern that they exaggerate the creative and discriminating power of human intentions. Existing anti-essentialist frameworks, however, tend to trace the ascriptions of modal features to objects back to our semantic, inferential, or explanatory practices and are therefore also not particularly well suited to capture the primarily practical and action-based orientation of our engagement with the realm of artifacts. For the time being, the special case of artifacts eludes an entirely satisfactory treatment and must await the further development and refinement of suitable essentialist and anti-essentialist frameworks before the status of artifacts within a hylomorphic ontology can be fully resolved.

scholarly journals Actualism and Fictional Characters

2016 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 61
Author(s):  
André Leclerc
Keyword(s):  
Actual World ◽  
Dimensional Space ◽  
Fictional Characters ◽  
Moore’S Paradox ◽  
Material Basis ◽  
Fictional Entities ◽  
Moore's Paradox ◽  
Amie Thomasson

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n1p61In what follows, I present only part of a program that consists in developing a version of actualism as an adequate framework for the metaphysics of intentionality. I will try to accommodate in that framework suggestions found in Kripke’s works and some positions developed by Amie Thomasson. What should we change if we accept “fictional entities” in the domain of the actual world? Actualism is the thesis that everything that exists belongs to the domain of the actual world and that there are no possibilia. I shall defend that there are abstract artefacts, like fictional characters, and institutions. My argument could be seen as a version of Moore’s paradox: it is paradoxical to say: “I made (created) it, but I do not believe it exists”. Moreover, there are true sentences about them. I will examine what it means to include abstract artefacts in the domain of the actual world. I favour a use of “exist” that includes beings with no concrete occupation of tri-dimensional space; to exist, it is enough to have been introduced at some moment in history. Abstract artefacts, like fictional characters, exist in that sense. I argue that it is important to distinguish two perspectives (internal and external) in order to clarify the kind of knowledge we have of fictional characters. However, their existence presupposes a relation of dependence to a material basis and the mental activities of many people.

scholarly journals Artefactualism as an Ontology of Art

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Alistair Hamel
Keyword(s):  
Fictional Characters ◽  
Works Of Art ◽  
Ontology Of Art ◽  
Amie Thomasson

<p>This thesis argues for artefactualism about works of art, which is the claim that works of art are artefacts. It does this by considering the cases of works of music, and works of fiction, and arguing that each of these are artefacts, or existent, created, individual entities. To do this, it argues against anti-realist, eternalist, and type theories in these domains. The thesis draws on arguments made by philosophers such as Amie Thomasson regarding fictional characters and Guy Rohrbaugh regarding repeatable works of art.</p>

scholarly journals Non-Naturalism and Reference

2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jussi Suikkanen ◽  
Jussi Suikkanen
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Causal Mechanism ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Natural Properties ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Causal Theories ◽  
Qua Problem

Metaethical realists disagree about the nature of normative properties. Naturalists think that they are ordinary natural properties: causally efficacious, a posteriori knowable, and usable in the best explanations of natural and social sciences. Non-naturalist realists, in contrast, argue that they are sui generis: causally inert, a priori knowable and not a part of the subject matter of sciences. It has been assumed so far that naturalists can explain causally how the normative predicates manage to refer to normative properties, whereas non-naturalists are unable to provide equally satisfactory metasemantic explanations. This article first describes how the previous non-naturalist accounts of reference fail to tell us how the normative predicates could have come to refer to the non-natural properties rather than to the natural ones. I will then use the so-called qua-problem to show how the causal theories of reference of naturalists also fail to fix the reference of normative predicates to unique natural properties. Finally, I will suggest that, just as naturalists need to rely on the non-causal mechanism of reference magnetism to solve the previous problem, non-naturalists, too, can rely on the very same idea to respond to the pressing metasemantic challenges that they face concerning reference.

scholarly journals Deflationary metaphysics and ordinary language

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Button
Keyword(s):  
Ordinary Language ◽  
Ontological Commitments ◽  
Amie Thomasson ◽  
Eli Hirsch

Amie Thomasson and Eli Hirsch have both attempted to deflate metaphysics, by combining Carnapian ideas with an appeal to ordinary language. My main aim in this paper is to critique such deflationary appeals to ordinary language. Focussing on Thomasson, I draw two very general conclusions. First: ordinary language is a wildly complicated phenomenon. Its implicit ontological commitments can only be tackled by invoking a Context Principle; but this will mean that ordinary language ontology is not a trivial enterprise. Second: a wide variety of existence questions cannot be deflated using ordinary language, trivially or otherwise, for ordinary language often points in different directions simultaneously.Published in Synthese.

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