scholarly journals Artefactualism as an Ontology of Art

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Alistair Hamel

<p>This thesis argues for artefactualism about works of art, which is the claim that works of art are artefacts. It does this by considering the cases of works of music, and works of fiction, and arguing that each of these are artefacts, or existent, created, individual entities. To do this, it argues against anti-realist, eternalist, and type theories in these domains. The thesis draws on arguments made by philosophers such as Amie Thomasson regarding fictional characters and Guy Rohrbaugh regarding repeatable works of art.</p>

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Alistair Hamel

<p>This thesis argues for artefactualism about works of art, which is the claim that works of art are artefacts. It does this by considering the cases of works of music, and works of fiction, and arguing that each of these are artefacts, or existent, created, individual entities. To do this, it argues against anti-realist, eternalist, and type theories in these domains. The thesis draws on arguments made by philosophers such as Amie Thomasson regarding fictional characters and Guy Rohrbaugh regarding repeatable works of art.</p>


Author(s):  
Gregory Currie

In trying to decide what kinds of thing art works are, the most natural starting point is the hypothesis that they are physical objects. This is plausible only for certain works, such as paintings and sculptures; in such cases we say that the work is a certain marked canvas or piece of stone. Even for these apparently favourable cases, though, there is a metaphysical objection to this proposal: that works and the physical objects identified with them do not possess the same properties and so cannot be identical. There is also an aesthetic objection: that the plausibility of the thesis for painting and sculpture rests on the false view that the authentic object made by the artist possesses aesthetically relevant features which no copy could possibly exemplify. Once it is acknowledged that paintings and sculptures are, in principle, reproducible in the way that novels and musical scores are, the motivation for thinking of the authentic canvas or stone as the work itself collapses. For literary and musical works, the standard view is that they are structures: structures of word-types in the literary case and of sound-types in the musical case. This structuralist view is opposed by contextualism, which asserts that the identity conditions for works must take into account historical features involving their origin and modes of production. Contextualists claim that works with the same structure might have different historical features and ought, therefore, to count as distinct works. Nelson Goodman (1981) has proposed that we divide works into autographic and allographic kinds; for autographic works, such as paintings, genuineness is determined partly by history of production: for allographic works, such as novels, it is determined in some other way. Our examination of the hypothesis that certain works are physical objects and our discussion of the structuralist/contextualist controversy will indicate grounds for thinking that Goodman’s distinction does not provide an acceptable categorization of works. A wholly successful ontology of art works would tell us what things are art works and what things are not; failing that, it would give us identity conditions for them, enabling us to say under what conditions this work and that are the same work. Since the complexity of the issues to be discussed quickly ramifies, it will be appropriate after a certain point to consider only the question of identity conditions. For simplicity, this entry concentrates on works of art that exemplify written literature, scored music and the plastic and pictorial arts.


2016 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 61
Author(s):  
André Leclerc

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n1p61In what follows, I present only part of a program that consists in developing a version of actualism as an adequate framework for the metaphysics of intentionality. I will try to accommodate in that framework suggestions found in Kripke’s works and some positions developed by Amie Thomasson. What should we change if we accept “fictional entities” in the domain of the actual world? Actualism is the thesis that everything that exists belongs to the domain of the actual world and that there are no possibilia. I shall defend that there are abstract artefacts, like fictional characters, and institutions. My argument could be seen as a version of Moore’s paradox: it is paradoxical to say: “I made (created) it, but I do not believe it exists”. Moreover, there are true sentences about them. I will examine what it means to include abstract artefacts in the domain of the actual world. I favour a use of “exist” that includes beings with no concrete occupation of tri-dimensional space; to exist, it is enough to have been introduced at some moment in history. Abstract artefacts, like fictional characters, exist in that sense. I argue that it is important to distinguish two perspectives (internal and external) in order to clarify the kind of knowledge we have of fictional characters. However, their existence presupposes a relation of dependence to a material basis and the mental activities of many people.


2016 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 5-18
Author(s):  
Andrej Jandric

Amie Thomasson has developed a theory of fictional entities, according to which they exist as contingent abstract objects. In her view, fictional characters are cultural artifacts just as the works of fiction they feature in. They are doubly dependent objects: for their becoming they depend on creative intentional acts of their author, and for maintaining their existence they depend on preservation of a copy of any fictional work they appear in. Thomasson claims that her theory has the advantage of vindicating the common beliefs about fictional entities embodied in the study, evaluation and interpretation of literature. However, I argue that, under this theory of fictional entities, no account of reference of fictional singular terms ? neither the descriptive, nor the causal, nor Thomasson?s preferred hybrid account ? can accommodate all the aspects of our literary practices.


Author(s):  
Dominic McIver Lopes

An ontology of art specifies the category of being to which works of art belong. Most philosophers accept that works in different art forms belong to different categories of being—e.g. sculptures are objects but symphonies are events. Some go further: also ontology varies by cultural context because practices of art appreciation vary enough from one culture to the next that they imply different ontologies. This chapter examines the continuous plan of architectural renovation and restoration in the Shinto shrine complex of Ise Jingu in Japan as a case study in Japanese traditional architectural aesthetics. In doing so, it illustrates how empirical studies of culture can be used to construct an ontology of art.


Author(s):  
Stephen Davies

Ontology is the study of the kinds of things there are in the world. The ontology of art considers the matter, form, and mode in which art exists. Works of art are social constructs in the sense that they are not natural kinds but human creations. The way we categorize them depends on our interests, and to that extent ontology is not easily separated from sociology and ideology. Nevertheless, some classifications and interests are likely to be more revealing of why and how art is created and appreciated. There are a number of traditional classifications of the arts, for instance in terms of their media (stone, words, sounds, paint, etc.), their species (sculpture, literature, music, drama, ballet, etc.), or their styles or contents (tragedy, comedy, surrealism, impressionism, etc.). The ontology of works of art does not map neatly on to these classifications, however.


2020 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 110-126
Author(s):  
Italo Lins Lemos

Se traduções diferentes de uma mesma obra literária têm sintaxes e semânticas diferentes, como elas podem ser sobre um e o mesmo personagem ficcional? Para responder essa pergunta é necessário (a) saber o que são personagens ficcionais e (b) apresentar suas condições de referência. A partir das obras de Amie Thomasson (1999, 2003, 2007) e Saul Kripke (1980, 2013), defendo que personagens ficcionais são artefatos abstratos cuja referência é fixada pelo batismo performado por um autor; e que a identidade de um personagem ficcional é preservada através da manutenção da mesma cadeia de referência. Por fim, mostro como os tradutores mantêm a cadeia de referência iniciada pelo autor de determinada obra e como consequentemente um personagem ficcional permanece o mesmo artefato abstrato no decorrer de diferentes traduções.


2013 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 21001 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-Luc Bodnar ◽  
Jean-Jacques Metayer ◽  
Kamel Mouhoubi ◽  
Vincent Detalle

2020 ◽  
pp. 145-163
Author(s):  
Marta Casals Balaguer

This article aims to analyse the strategies that jazz musicians in Barcelona adopt to develop their artistic careers. It focuses on studying three main areas that influ-ence the construction of their artistic-professional strategies: a) the administrative dimension, characterized mainly by management and promotion tasks; b) the artistic-creative dimension, which includes the construction of artistic identity and the creation of works of art; and c) the social dimension within the collective, which groups together strategies related to the dynamics of cooperation and col-laboration between the circle of musicians. The applied methodology came from a qualitative perspective, and the main research methods were semi-structured inter-views conducted with active professional musicians in Barcelona and from partic-ipant observation.


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