scholarly journals ‘Utilitarianism for animals: deontology for people’ and the doing/allowing distinction

Author(s):  
Fiona Woollard

AbstractIt is tempting to think that zebras, goats, lions, and similar animals matter morally, but not in quite the same way people do. This might lead us to adopt a hybrid view of animal ethics such as ‘Utilitarianism for Animals; Deontology for People’. One of the core commitments of deontology is the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing (DDA): the view that doing harm is harder to justify than allowing harm. I explore how this core tenant of deontology applies to non-person, non-human animals and whether hybrid views of animal ethics can accept it. In doing so, I aim to do three things. First, to show that my defence of the DDA can solve a problem surrounding our duties to wild animals, while making only minimal claims about animal moral status. Second, to offer an argument that for many non-person, non-human animals, we should recognise deontological constraints on their treatment, but also see those constraints as importantly different from the constraints against doing harm to persons. Third, to get clearer on how we should understand Utilitarianism for Animals and Nozickian hybrid approaches to animal ethics.

Author(s):  
Sue Donaldson ◽  
Will Kymlicka

Western political theorists have largely ignored the animal question, assuming that animals have no place in our theories of democracy, citizenship, membership, sovereignty, and the public good. Conversely, animal ethicists have largely ignored political theory, assuming that we can theorize the moral status and moral rights of animals without drawing on the categories and concepts of political theory. This chapter traces the history of this separation between animals and political theory, examines the resulting intellectual blind spots for animal ethics, and reviews recent attempts to bring the two together. Situating animal rights within political theory has the potential to identify new models of justice in human-animal relations, and to open up new areas of scholarship and research.


BioScience ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 69 (10) ◽  
pp. 778-788 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine E Webb ◽  
Peter Woodford ◽  
Elise Huchard

Abstract Animal ethics—the field of philosophy concerned with the moral status of animals—is experiencing a momentum unprecedented in its history. Surprisingly, animal behavior science remains on the sidelines, despite producing critical evidence on which many arguments in animal ethics rest. In the present article, we explore the origins of the divide between animal behavior science and animal ethics before considering whether behavioral scientists should concern themselves with it. We finally envision tangible steps that could be taken to bridge the gap, encouraging scientists to be aware of, and to more actively engage with, an ethical revolution that is partly fueled by the evidence they generate.


2018 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 7-19
Author(s):  
Clare Palmer ◽  

In this paper, I consider whether we should offer assistance to both wild and domesticated animals when they are suffering. I argue that we may have different obligations to assist wild and domesticated animals because they have different morally-relevant relationships with us. I explain how different approaches to animal ethics, which, for simplicity, I call capacity-oriented and context-oriented, address questions about animal assistance differently. I then defend a broadly context-oriented approach, on which we have special obligations to assist animals that we have made vulnerable to or dependent on us. This means that we should normally help suffering domesticated animals, but that we lack general obligations to assist wild animals, since we are not responsible for their vulnerability. However, we may have special obligations to help wild animals where we have made them vulnerable to or dependent on us (by habitat destruction or by captivity, for instance). I consider some obvious difficulties with this context-oriented approach, and I conclude by looking more closely at the question whether we should intervene, if we could do so successfully, to reduce wild animal suffering by reducing predation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 282-295
Author(s):  
Zorana Todorovic

This paper addresses the issue of the moral status of non-human animals, or the question whether sentient animals are morally considerable. The arguments for and against the moral status of animals are discussed, above all the argument from marginal cases. It is argued that sentient animals have moral status based on their having interests in their experiential well-being, but that there are degrees of moral status. Two interest-based approaches are presented and discussed: DeGrazia?s view that sentient animals have interests in continuing to live, and that their interests should be granted moral weight; and McMahan?s TRIA which similarly postulates that animals have interests and that in a given situation we should compare the human and animal interests at stake. Finally, the paper concludes that the anthropocentric approach to animal ethics should be abandoned in favour of the biocentric ethics.


Author(s):  
Zoltan Miklosi

This chapter explores the relational critique of distributive conceptions of justice, according to which the proper focus of egalitarian justice is the egalitarian nature of social relations rather than the equal distribution of certain goods. It maintains that the relational critique constitutes a fundamental challenge to distributive egalitarianism only if it rejects the “core distributive thesis” that holds that the distribution of some nonrelational goods has relation-independent significance for justice. It argues that several relational proposals are compatible with that thesis, and therefore constitute extensions or revisions of the distributive conception rather than alternatives to it, and that those relational views that reject the core distributive thesis are the least plausible ones. Finally, the chapter shows that relational views are often ambiguous regarding the nature of the significance of egalitarian relations, i.e. whether it consists in their contribution to well-being, or in being the fitting response to equal moral status.


Author(s):  
Shelly Kagan

According to a prominent view in contemporary philosophical discussions of animal ethics—a view the author calls unitarianism—animals have the same moral status as people do, so that otherwise similar interests of animals and people should be given the very same consideration in moral deliberation. In contrast, this book lays out and defends a hierarchical approach, according to which people count more than animals do, and some animals count more than others. Surprisingly, although this idea is close to being commonsense, for the most part moral theories have not been developed in such a way as to take account of these crucial differences in status. Accordingly, the author both argues for a hierarchical account of morality and explores what suitably status sensitive moral principles might look like. Particular topics examined include the modification of distributive principles to take account of status, whether animals should be given deontological standing, and the moral complications that arise in cases that either involve defending animals or defending people from animals. The book also considers what the basis of moral status might be, and it responds to some of the potentially troubling implications of adopting a hierarchical approach to morality.


Relations ◽  
2013 ◽  
pp. 23-35
Author(s):  
Matteo Andreozzi

The main aim of this paper is to demonstrate the need for a reassessment of the moral status of pets. I argue that pets rest on an undefined ethical borderline, which brings several puzzling problems to both human-centered ethics and animal ethics and that neither of these fields adequately handles these issues. I focus specifically on human relationships with companion animals as one of the most significant interspecific relationship involving humans and pets. I also show that a deeper questioning of the moral status of pets is a required step toward the moral rethinking of human-animal relationships.


Jurnal MIPA ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 217
Author(s):  
Meis Nangoy ◽  
A. Pudong ◽  
Tiltje. A. Ransaleleh ◽  
G. J.V. Assa ◽  
Hanry Lengkong

Ancaman bahaya penyakit menular satwa liar merupakan isu strategi dunia dalam beberapa decade akhir ini. Peningkatan arus ekowisatawan dalam mengunjungi hutan-hutan memberi peluang bagi transimisi penyakit dari hewan liar ke hewan lain maupun manusia. Hutan merupakan tempat penyimpanan satwa liar yang unik, endemik dan  juga virus yang dapat menimbulkan penyakit bagi manusia (zoonosis). Oleh karena itu telah dilakukan Program kemitraan Masyarakat kelompok pemandu wisata Batu Putih Tangkoko untuk mencegah terjadinya penularan penyakit dari satwa liar ke manuasia melalui peningkatan pengetahuan dan  ketrampilan dalam mendeteksi dini hewan liar sakit yang dijumpai. Metode yang digunakan yaitu penyuluhan dan praktek lapang di Pos 2 Taman Wisata Alam Batu Putih Tangkoko. Hasil kegiatan menunjukkan bahwa 20 (dua puluh) orang pemandu wisata telah mengetahui  dan memahami penyakit yang berpotensi zoonosis dan mengenali  tanda tanda hewan liar sakit serta tata cara pelaporannyaThreat of the contaminating disease of wild animals is a strategic issue in the world at last several decades. Increase of ecotourism flow visiting forrest destination become possible of disease transmition from wild animals to human. Forrest is the core of some unique wild animal.  Virus of animals would be able also to cause disease in human called zoonosis. Therefore, collaborative program of guidance groups of community for the ecotourisms was encouraged at Batu Putih Tangkoko to prevent contaminating disease  from wild animals to human by increasing knowledge and skill on early detection contaminated animals found. Method applied was extension and filed practices at Post 2 ecotourism natural park at Batu Putih Tangkoko. Result activity showed that 20 people guidance group had knowledge the potential zoonosis disease and symtoms of wild animals suffering from diseases as well as procedures of the case reports


Author(s):  
Joshua Gert

This chapter considers Keith Allen’s heroic primitivism and Derek Brown’s layering view. Both views hold that our experience of a color can vary with perspective, without that variation entailing any error or illusion. But Allen rejects one of the core theses of the hybrid view; he takes the existence of widespread agreement about rough objective colors to suggest that disagreements about precise color appearances reflect a lack of precision in our visual systems, rather than the absence of a precise fact of the matter. That is, he seems to hold that there is always a precise and determinate fact of the matter regarding the objective colors of objects. And Brown takes a similar view, holding that the colors of opaque surfaces can be located, precisely, in HSL space or something similar. The chapter argues that this determinacy assumption leads to problems.


Author(s):  
Robert Garner

This final chapter explores the range of ideas current in the contemporary animal ethics debate. Much of the chapter is devoted to documenting the critique of the animal welfare ethic, which holds that, while animals have moral standing, humans, being persons, have a superior moral status. Three different strands of this critique—based on utilitarian, rights, and contractarian approaches—are identified and explored. The final part of the chapter documents the fragmentation of the animal ethics debate in recent years. This has included a more nuanced position which seeks to decouple animal rights from abolitionism, accounts of animal ethics from virtue ethics and capabilities perspectives, and a relational turn associated with the feminist care ethic tradition and, more recently, the utilization of citizenship theory by Donaldson and Kymlicka.


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