Imagining one experience to be another
AbstractI can imagine a banana to be a phone receiver. I can also imagine the flapping of my arms to be flying. So it is possible to imagine one thing to be another—at least for some types of ‘things’. I will argue that although it is possible to imagine an object to be another object and it is also possible to imagine an activity to be a different activity, one cannot imagine one’s present sensory experience to be a different sensory experience with different qualitative character. This claim will have some important consequences beyond the philosophy of imagination, for example, for some accounts of depiction.
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2017 ◽
Vol 8
(1-2)
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pp. 137-160
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2018 ◽
Vol 27
(5)
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pp. 1-16
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