Evolutionary Game Analysis of Tripartite Cooperation Strategy under Mixed Development Environment of Cascade Hydropower Stations

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (6) ◽  
pp. 1951-1970 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yun Chen ◽  
Zhigen Hu ◽  
Quan Liu ◽  
Shu Chen
IEEE Access ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. 226754-226772
Author(s):  
Trong-The Nguyen ◽  
Hong-Jiang Wang ◽  
Thi-Kien Dao ◽  
Jeng-Shyang Pan ◽  
Jian-Hua Liu ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Hua Li ◽  
Qingqing Lou ◽  
Qiubai Sun ◽  
Bowen Li

In order to solve the conflict of interests of institutional investors, this paper uses evolutionary game model. From the point of view of information sharing, this paper discusses four different situations. Only when the sum of risk and cost is less than the penalty of free riding, the evolution of institutional investors will eventually incline to the stable state of information sharing. That is, the phenomenon of hugging. The research shows that the institutional investors are not independent of each other, but the relationship network of institutional investors for the purpose of information exchange. The content of this paper enriches the research on information sharing of institutional investors.


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