scholarly journals Prospects for a Euro-Area Budget: An Analytical Outline

European View ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-218
Author(s):  
Siegfried Mureşan
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Monetary Union ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
Economic And Monetary Union ◽  
Structural Reforms ◽  
Member States ◽  
Key Issues ◽  
The Creation

In a reflection paper intended to generate debate among euro-area governments, the European Commission has put forward ideas on what could be done to deepen the Economic and Monetary Union by 2025. One of the ideas outlined by the Commission is the creation of a euro-area budget. This article reviews the key issues that are relevant in the discussion on establishing such a budget; outlines the possible functions of such a budget, such as incentivising structural reforms or ensuring macro-stabilisation; and discusses the issues of size, funding, moral hazard and governance, while touching upon the role of non-euro-area member states. The article concludes with the assertion that the answer to this question is essentially political in nature and could constitute an example of how member states are ready to integrate further, while giving non-euro-area member states the opportunity to participate.

The Crisis-Induced Developments in the Economic and Monetary Union

2020 ◽  
pp. 18-65
Author(s):  
Menelaos Markakis
Keyword(s):  
Economic Integration ◽  
Monetary Union ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
Economic And Monetary Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Legal Principle ◽  
Democratic Control ◽  
Economic Developments ◽  
Eu Economic Governance ◽  
The Eu

This chapter looks at the crisis-induced legal, institutional, and economic developments within the Economic and Monetary Union. It consists of two parts. First, there will be a brief sketch of the crisis-related developments. These include the setting-up of financial mechanisms, the European Central Bank’s interventions to combat the crisis, the enhanced oversight of national fiscal and economic policy, and the increased supervision over the financial sector. Second, there will be a ‘first assessment’ of their constitutional and structural implications. Two sets of issues will be examined here: issues of legal principle; and the bearing of the enacted measures on European economic integration. Three key arguments will be made in this chapter. First, it will be argued that the measures enacted have led to legislative fragmentation and have exacerbated problems of transparency and complexity which already existed in this area. Second, it will be shown that the chosen form of action has consequences for institutional balance in the EU, democratic control, and judicial review. Third, it will be argued that the enactment of measures which are only applicable to Euro area Member States has served to deepen economic integration within the Euro area and to further differentiate it from economic integration in non-Euro area Member States. Further, certain areas of the single market have integrated more deeply in the Euro area. It will be concluded that the various reforms which have been implemented have strengthened the EU economic governance framework from a legal, institutional, and economic perspective.

EU Institutions Representing Member States’ Governments

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eugenia Dumitriu Segnana ◽  
Alberto de Gregorio Merino
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Monetary Union ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
Central Place ◽  
Common Interest ◽  
Economic And Monetary Union ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
National Policies ◽  
Greek Crisis

The Council of the European Union (EU) occupies a central place in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), even more so than in any other Union policies. It exercises in this area a variety of roles going from a forum for coordination of national policies to legislative functions and executive powers. The different crises that affected the Union and in particular the euro area in the last ten years have strengthened its prominent position, in no small part due to the Council’s ownership by the Member States. Alongside the Council, the Euro Group, which is presided by a fixed-term president, has developed itself as the informal forum where Ministers from the Member States whose currency is the euro discuss matters of common interest. Its role has been decisive, in particular in the Cypriot and Greek crisis, which could have put into question the very existence of the euro area as a whole.

scholarly journals Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union—Comments on a Roadmap

2013 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ansgar Belke
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Monetary Union ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
Fiscal Federalism ◽  
Economic And Monetary Union ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
Interim Report ◽  
Fiscal Union ◽  
The North ◽  
To Come

The Van Rompuy Report and also additional proposals made by the European Commission outlined steps for a 'genuine Economic and Monetary Union'. This article explains, assesses and comments on the proposals made. Moreover, it outlines what could be recommendations in order to achieve a 'genuine Economic and Monetary Union'. For this purpose, details of the Interim Report are systematically evaluated. We also deal with different governance visions emerging from the ongoing euro area crisis and starts from different views of the 'North and the South' of the euro area on this issue. This contribution argues that there is an alternative option to the notion of cooperative fiscal federalism involving fiscal union, bailouts and debt mutualisation: competition-based fiscal federalism accompanied by a properly defined banking union. In order to be a successful one, any deal will have to come up with a successful recipe of how to (re-)create trust between European citizens and their elected governments.

ERM II

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulla Neergaard
Keyword(s):  
Exchange Rate ◽  
Monetary Union ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
Economic And Monetary Union ◽  
Convergence Criteria ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Third ◽  
Exchange Rate Mechanism ◽  
Third Phase ◽  
Rate Mechanism

From the very beginning, an essential cornerstone of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has been the European Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II). It has been in force since 1 January 1999, ie from the initiation of the third phase of the EMU. Its overall purpose is to link currencies of Member States outside the euro area to the euro. Its importance lies in the fact that aspiring Member States must first join the mechanism for at least two years before being admitted as members of the euro area, as ERM II ‘membership’ is one of the four convergence criteria, which are required to be fulfilled for a Member State’s eventual adoption of the euro.

11. The institutions of Economic and Monetary Union:

2021 ◽  
pp. 251-275
Author(s):  
Dermot Hodson
Keyword(s):  
Economic Policy ◽  
Monetary Union ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Economic And Monetary Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Theoretical Perspectives ◽  
Political Cost ◽  
Key Dimensions ◽  
New Institutions

Since 1999, a subset of EU member states—known collectively as the euro area—has delegated exclusive competence for monetary policy to the European Central Bank (ECB), while giving limited powers to the European Commission, ECOFIN, and the Eurogroup in other areas of economic policy. The euro crisis provided the first major test of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), as a sovereign debt crisis spread between member states and threatened to tear the single currency apart. The ECB and two new institutions—the European Stability Mechanism and Euro Summit—helped to keep the euro area together but at significant economic and political cost. EU institutions were better prepared for the initial economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, but the crisis still produced important institutional changes. The COVID-19 recovery fund Next Generation EU gives the Commission and Council a major new role in economic policy, albeit a temporary one for now. The EMU illustrates three key dimensions of EU institutional politics: the tension between intergovernmental versus supranational institutions, leaders versus followers, and legitimacy versus contestation. It also reveals the explanatory power of new institutionalism among other theoretical perspectives.

The So-Called Prothetic i- and the sḏm-f Paradigms II: The “Nominal” sḏm-f and a Reappraisal

2020 ◽  
Vol 28 ◽  
pp. 259-267
Author(s):  
Sami Uljas
Keyword(s):  
Present Author ◽  
Textual Data ◽  
Key Issues ◽  
Syllabic Structure ◽  
The Creation ◽  
Partial Revision

This article discusses, first, the role of the i-prefix in the so-called “nominal” sḏm-f paradigm in earliest Old Egyptian textual data. It is argued that this represented a means of facilitating the creation of a distinctive syllabic structure with 2rad roots and of harmonising it with that of the 2red and 3inf classes. Second, the study contains a partial revision of some of the key issues treated in an earlier article by the present author on the role of the similarly written prefix in the subjunctive and “circumstantial” sḏm-f paradigms.

Eurobonds: Three Lessons from China’s “Debt Centralization/Decentralization” Experience

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhiyong An
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Budget Constraint ◽  
Sovereign Debt Crisis ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Institutional Mechanism ◽  
Previous Series

Abstract Eurobonds, dubbed as Coronabonds in the context of the current coronavirus crisis, are being hotly debated among the euro area member states amid the COVID-19 pandemic. The debate is in many ways a retread of the euro area sovereign debt crisis of 2011–2012. As China’s “debt centralization/decentralization” experience is comparable with the introduction of Eurobonds in the European Union (EU) in terms of institutional mechanism design, we review our previous series of studies of China’s “debt centralization/decentralization” experience to shed some light on the Eurobonds debate. We obtain three key lessons. First, the introduction of Eurobonds in EU is likely to soften the budget constraint of the governments of the euro area member states. Second, it is also likely to strengthen the moral hazard incentives of the governments of the euro area member states to intentionally overstate their budget problems. Finally, the magnitudes of the moral hazard effects generated by the introduction of Eurobonds in EU are likely larger than their respective counterparts in China.

scholarly journals The Fiscal Compact and the European Constitutions: ‘Europe Speaking German’

2012 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
LB ◽  
JHR
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Czech Republic ◽  
Monetary Union ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
Economic And Monetary Union ◽  
Economic Policies ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The Czech Republic ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Fiscal Compact

In between the writing of this editorial and the publication of this issue of EuConst, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, in everyday parlance the ‘Fiscal Compact’, will have been signed by the representatives of the governments of the contracting parties — the member states of the European Union minus the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic. The Fiscal Compact is intended to foster budgetary discipline, to strengthen the coordination of economic policies and to improve the governance of the euro area.

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