scholarly journals Lived body and the Other’s gaze: a phenomenological perspective on feeding and eating disorders

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Milena Mancini ◽  
Cecilia Maria Esposito
Keyword(s):  
Eating Disorders ◽  
The Other ◽  
Lived Body ◽  
First Person ◽  
Level Of Evidence ◽  
The Gaze ◽  
Feeding And Eating Disorders ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Phenomenological Perspective ◽  
Third Person

AbstractAccording to the phenomenological perspective, the lived body disorder is a core feature of feeding and eating disorders (FEDs). Persons with FEDs experience their own body first of all as an object looked by another person, rather than coenaesthetically or from a first-person perspective. In particular, the main features of this disorder are: alienation from the own body and from the own emotions, disgust for it, shame, and an exaggerated preoccupation for the way in which one appears to the others. Phenomenological research has recently highlighted that the gaze of the Other plays an important role. Because persons with FEDs cannot have an experience of their own body from within or coenesthetically, they need to apprehend their own body from outside through the gaze of the Other. This way of apprehending one’s own body when it is looked by another person is called by Sartre the ‘lived body-for-others’. Normally, the constitution of one’s own body, and consequently of one’s own Self and identity depends on the dialectic integration between the first-person apprehension of one’s body (lived body) that it is based on coenaesthesia, and the third-person one, that it is based on the sense of sight (lived-body-for-others). When the dialectic is unbalanced toward the pole of the lived-body-for-others, experienced from without, the symptom occurs. Starting from these clinical observations, the so-called Optical-Coenaesthetic Disproportion model has been developed. In this paper, we describe this model, its philosophical and clinical foundations, and finally its clinical implication and its relationship with other disciplines, i.e., neurosciences. Level of evidence: V.

scholarly journals Image schemas, mimetic schemas and children's gestures

2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jordan Zlatev
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
First Person ◽  
Natural Interaction ◽  
Image Schemas ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Cognitive Linguistic ◽  
Third Person ◽  
First Person Perspective ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
The One

Abstract Mimetic schemas, unlike the popular cognitive linguistic notion of image schemas, have been characterized in earlier work as explicitly representational, bodily structures arising from imitation of culture-specific practical actions (Zlatev 2005, 2007a, 2007b). We performed an analysis of the gestures of three Swedish and three Thai children at the age of 18, 22 and 26 months in episodes of natural interaction with caregivers and siblings in order to analyze the hypothesis that iconic gestures emerge as mimetic schemas. In accordance with this hypothesis, we predicted that the children's first iconic gestures would be (a) intermediately specific, (b) culture-typical, (c) falling in a set of recurrent types, (d) predominantly enacted from a first-person perspective (1pp) rather than performed from a third-person perspective (3pp), with (e) 3pp gestures being more dependent on direct imitation than 1pp gestures and (f) more often co-occurring with speech. All specific predictions but the last were confirmed, and differences were found between the children's iconic gestures on the one side and their deictic and emblematic gestures on the other. Thus, the study both confirms earlier conjectures that mimetic schemas “ground” both gesture and speech and implies the need to qualify these proposals, limiting the link between mimetic schemas and gestures to the iconic category.

Disrupting Vestibular Activity Disrupts Body Ownership

2015 ◽  
Vol 28 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 581-590 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adria E. N. Hoover ◽  
Laurence R. Harris
Keyword(s):  
Objective Measure ◽  
Vestibular Stimulation ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
First Person ◽  
Body Ownership ◽  
Healthy Individuals ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Minimum Delay

People are more sensitive at detecting asynchrony between a self-generated movement and visual feedback concerning that movement when the movement is viewed from a first-person perspective. We call this the ‘self-advantage’ and interpret it as an objective measure of self. Here we ask if disruption of the vestibular system in healthy individuals affects the self-advantage. Participants performed finger movements while viewing their hand in a first-person (‘self’) or third-person (‘other’) perspective and indicated which of two periods (one with minimum delay and the other with an added delay of 33–264 ms) was delayed. Their sensitivity to the delay was calculated from the psychometric functions obtained. During the testing, disruptive galvanic vestibular stimulation (GVS) was applied in five-minute blocks interleaved with five minutes of no stimulation for a total of 40 min. We confirmed the self-advantage under no stimulation (31 ms). In the presence of disruptive GVS this advantage disappeared and there was no longer a difference in performance between perspectives. The threshold delay for the ‘other’ perspective was not affected by the GVS. These results suggest that an intact vestibular signal is required to distinguish ‘self’ from ‘other’ and to maintain a sense of body ownership.

The Pathogenic and Therapeutic Potential of the Gaze of the Other in the Clinic of “Eating Disorders”

2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 291-297
Author(s):  
Cecilia Maria Esposito ◽  
Giovanni Stanghellini
Keyword(s):  
Eating Disorders ◽  
Therapeutic Potential ◽  
The Self ◽  
Self Control ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Gaze ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
Embodied Self ◽  
Body Subject

Building on the optical-coenaesthetic disproportion model of so-called eating disorders, this paper provides a framework for the psychotherapy of people affected by these conditions. This model characterizes “eating disorders” as disorders of embodiment and identity, where a sense of unfamiliarity with one’s own flesh, experienced as shifting and incomprehensible, leads to an impairment in the constitution of the Self and thus of one’s own identity. Since there is a deficit of the coenaesthetic experience of the embodied Self, greater importance is assumed by body perception conveyed from without. To these persons, their corporeality is principally given as a body-object “to be seen” from a third-person perspective, rather than as a body-subject “to be felt” from a first-person perspective. The Other’s look serves as an optical prosthesis to cope with dis-coenaesthesia and as a device through which these persons can define themselves. They are unable to accept the hiatus between “being a body” and “having a body,” constitutively present in every human being, forcibly trying to recouple it, and finally ending up objectifying themselves to succeed. The external foundation of the Self thus takes the form of a constriction one can never be completely free of. Psychotherapy should thus accompany persons affected by eating disorders in their encounter with the miscarried dialectic between feeling oneself from within and seeing oneself from without through the gaze of the Other, so keenly feared by people desperately in search of self-control. Tactfully, the clinician accompanies the patient in taking a stance towards her symptom as the outcome of this miscarried dialectics, which is one premise for overcoming it. The clinician’s gaze becomes the herald of recognition, allowing the patient to feel accepted in terms of her individuality. Feeling themselves touched by a gaze that waives its alienating potential in order to signify acceptance reactivates the identity-forming dialectics. Their body is thus revealed as the receiver of gazes, but also rediscovers its own possibility for self-determination starting out from these gazes. This intersubjective resonance between the clinician’s gaze and the patient reactivates the identity-making dialectics between body-subject and body-object, creating the relational premises for overcoming the symptom.

Reduction: The Solution to Mind Representation?

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 303-315
Author(s):  
Yanying Cui ◽  
Yidong Wei
Keyword(s):  
Chemical Elements ◽  
The Other ◽  
Natural Phenomenon ◽  
First Person ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Naturalistic Methodology ◽  
Leading Position ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
The Mind

Abstract Chomsky is an evolutionary figure in linguistics. His greatest contribution lies in transformational generative grammar, which put an end to the leading position structuralism had held in language for more than 30 years. His naturalistic methodology has greatly influenced the research of both linguistics and psychology, and he is also considered to be the first to study language from the cognitive perspective. He insists on a naturalistic methodology; therefore, he was even considered by some to be a physicalist. However, this is not the case. On the contrary, TGG, as a critique of the behaviorist view of language, is intertwined with a critique of physicalism. On the one hand, he thinks the mind, like chemical elements and electrons, can be approached from a third-person perspective; on the other hand, he again admits there exists consciousness, which can be merely approached in terms of a first-person authority, which, therefore, is a fatal challenge to his core theory. Now there remains a new solution to this dilemma, that is, to admit that the mind is a special natural phenomenon with two means of existence: one is involved in physical aspects with the brain, and the other is concerned with something mental, with the former approached by a third-person perspective and the latter better researched via a first-person authority.

scholarly journals Human Enhancements and Voting: Towards a Declaration of Rights and Responsibilities of Beings

Philosophies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 5
Author(s):  
S. J. Blodgett-Ford
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Voting Rights ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
The Other ◽  
First Person ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
First Person Perspective ◽  
To Come ◽  
Additional Option

The phenomenon and ethics of “voting” will be explored in the context of human enhancements. “Voting” will be examined for enhanced humans with moderate and extreme enhancements. Existing patterns of discrimination in voting around the globe could continue substantially “as is” for those with moderate enhancements. For extreme enhancements, voting rights could be challenged if the very humanity of the enhanced was in doubt. Humans who were not enhanced could also be disenfranchised if certain enhancements become prevalent. Voting will be examined using a theory of engagement articulated by Professor Sophie Loidolt that emphasizes the importance of legitimization and justification by “facing the appeal of the other” to determine what is “right” from a phenomenological first-person perspective. Seeking inspiration from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948, voting rights and responsibilities will be re-framed from a foundational working hypothesis that all enhanced and non-enhanced humans should have a right to vote directly. Representative voting will be considered as an admittedly imperfect alternative or additional option. The framework in which voting occurs, as well as the processes, temporal cadence, and role of voting, requires the participation from as diverse a group of humans as possible. Voting rights delivered by fiat to enhanced or non-enhanced humans who were excluded from participation in the design and ratification of the governance structure is not legitimate. Applying and extending Loidolt’s framework, we must recognize the urgency that demands the impossible, with openness to that universality in progress (or universality to come) that keeps being constituted from the outside.

scholarly journals EXPRESS: Embodied Mental Imagery Improves Memory

2021 ◽  
pp. 174702182110092
Author(s):  
Quentin Marre ◽  
Nathalie Huet ◽  
Elodie Labeye
Keyword(s):  
Motor Imagery ◽  
Mental Imagery ◽  
Visual Imagery ◽  
First Person ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Memory Efficiency ◽  
Third Person ◽  
First Person Perspective ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Emotional Systems

According to embodied cognition theory, cognitive processes are grounded in sensory, motor and emotional systems. This theory supports the idea that language comprehension and access to memory are based on sensorimotor mental simulations, which does indeed explain experimental results for visual imagery. These results show that word memorization is improved when the individual actively simulates the visual characteristics of the object to be learned. Very few studies, however, have investigated the effectiveness of more embodied mental simulations, that is, simulating both the sensory and motor aspects of the object (i.e., motor imagery) from a first-person perspective. The recall performances of 83 adults were analysed in four different conditions: mental rehearsal, visual imagery, third-person motor imagery, and first-person motor imagery. Results revealed a memory efficiency gradient running from low-embodiment strategies (i.e., involving poor perceptual and/or motor simulation) to high-embodiment strategies (i.e., rich simulation in the sensory and motor systems involved in interactions with the object). However, the benefit of engaging in motor imagery, as opposed to purely visual imagery, was only observed when participants adopted the first-person perspective. Surprisingly, visual and motor imagery vividness seemed to play a negligible role in this effect of the sensorimotor grounding of mental imagery on memory efficiency.

scholarly journals Awareness is in the Eye of the Observer: Preserved Third-Person Awareness of Deficit in Anosognosia for Hemiplegia

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sahba Besharati ◽  
Paul Jenkinson ◽  
Michael Kopelman ◽  
Mark Solms ◽  
Valentina Moro ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Perspective Taking ◽  
Right Hemisphere ◽  
First Person ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Right Hemisphere Damage ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
Anosognosia For Hemiplegia

In recent decades, the research traditions of (first-person) embodied cognition and of (third-person) social cognition have approached the study of self-awareness with relative independence. However, neurological disorders of self-awareness offer a unifying perspective to empirically investigate the contribution of embodiment and social cognition to self-awareness. This study focused on a neuropsychological disorder of bodily self-awareness following right-hemisphere damage, namely anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP). A previous neuropsychological study has shown AHP patients, relative to neurological controls, to have a specific deficit in third-person, allocentric inferences in a story-based, mentalisation task. However, no study has tested directly whether verbal awareness of motor deficits is influenced by either perspective-taking or centrism, and if these deficits in social cognition are correlated with damage to anatomical areas previously linked to mentalising, including the supramarginal and superior temporal gyri and related limbic white matter connections. Accordingly, two novel experiments were conducted with right-hemisphere stroke patients with (n = 17) and without AHP (n = 17) that targeted either their own (egocentric, experiment 1) or another stooge patient’s (experiment 2) motor abilities from a first-or-third person (allocentric in Experiment 2) perspective. In both experiments, neurological controls showed no significant difference between perspectives, suggesting that perspective-taking deficits are not a general consequence of right-hemisphere damage. More specifically, experiment 1 found AHP patients were more aware of their own motor paralysis when asked from a third compared to a first-person perspective, using both group level and individual level analysis. In experiment 2, AHP patients were less accurate than controls in making allocentric, third-person perspective judgements about the stooge patient, but with only a trend towards significance and with no within-group, difference between perspectives. Deficits in egocentric and allocentric third-person perspective taking were associated with lesions in the middle frontal gyrus, superior temporal and supramarginal gyri, with white matter disconnections more predominate in deficits in allocentricity. This study confirms previous clinical and empirical investigations on the selectivity of first-person motor awareness deficits in anosognosia for hemiplegia and experimentally demonstrates for the first time that verbal egocentric 3PP-taking can positively influence 1PP body awareness.

scholarly journals Exploring the Effects of Visual Perspective on the ERP Components of Empathy for Pain

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl Michael Orquiola Galang ◽  
Sukhvinder S. Obhi ◽  
Michael Jenkins
Keyword(s):  
Mean Amplitude ◽  
Event Related Potential ◽  
Visual Perspective ◽  
First Person ◽  
Affective Component ◽  
Cognitive Components ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Empathy For Pain ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Third Person Perspective

Previous neurophysiological research suggests that there are event-related potential (ERP) components are associated with empathy for pain: early affective component (N2) and two late cognitive components (P3/LPP). The current study investigated whether and how the visual perspective from which a painful event is observed affects these ERP components. Participants viewed images of hands in pain vs. not in pain from a first-person or third-person perspective. We found that visual perspective influences both the early and late components. In the early component (N2), there was a larger mean amplitude during observation of pain vs no-pain exclusively when images were shown from a first-person perspective. We suggest that this effect may be driven by misattributing the on-screen hand to oneself. For the late component (P3), we found a larger effect of pain on mean amplitudes in response to third-person relative to first-person images. We speculate that the P3 may reflect a later process that enables effective recognition of others’ pain in the absence of misattribution. We discuss our results in relation to self- vs other-related processing by questioning whether these ERP components are truly indexing empathy (an other-directed process) or a simple misattribution of another’s pain as one’s own (a self-directed process).

The Poverty of Philosophical Method

2019 ◽  
pp. 64-82
Author(s):  
William G. Lycan
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Philosophical Method ◽  
Good Argument ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
Interaction Problem

Cartesian mind–body dualism is widely thought to have been simply refuted by sound argument. This chapter maintains that the case against dualism is very weak. There is no very good argument for materialism, and the objections to dualism are convincing only to materialists. In particular, the dreaded Interaction problem is not notably hard for a committed dualist to handle; and the other standard objections simply presuppose a third-person perspective that would not be tolerated by the dualist in the first place. Materialism is not significantly better supported than dualism. In the process, the chapter sets out a number of sociophilosophical observations that explain our impression that dualism has been simply shown to be untenable. The sociophilosophical observations, more generally, explain how an illusion is created to the effect that purely philosophical reasoning can either prove or refute a significant doctrine or claim.

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