scholarly journals An algorithm of evolutionarily stable strategies for the single-population evolutionary game

2008 ◽  
Vol 217 (1) ◽  
pp. 157-165 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhi Lin
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Single Population ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

scholarly journals Sustainable tourism modeling: Pricing decisions and evolutionarily stable strategies for competitive tour operators

2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (5) ◽  
pp. 779-799 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yong He ◽  
Peng He ◽  
Feifei Xu ◽  
Chunming (Victor) Shi
Keyword(s):  
Sustainable Tourism ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Innovation Strategy ◽  
Cost Advantage ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Environment Friendly ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Green Tourism ◽  
The Government ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

In this article, we investigate two competitive tour operators (TOs) who choose between traditional tourism strategy (strategy T) and green tourism innovation strategy (strategy G). Our article attempts to address the following important issues using evolutionary game models: when would TOs facing environment-friendly tourists adopt the strategy G? How do TOs set product prices under different strategy combinations? How can the government effectively motivate TOs to pursue green tourism? Our research results show that a green tourism innovation pioneer could monopolize the market under certain conditions. Furthermore, when the environmental preference of tourists is sufficiently low, no TOs would adopt the strategy G; when it is moderate, only the TO with cost advantage (stronger TO) would adopt the strategy G; when it is sufficiently high, both TOs would select the strategy G. Our research also demonstrates that the stronger TO implements the strategy G mostly independent of the rival’s decisions, but the opposite is true for the TO with cost disadvantage (weaker TO). We further investigate potential government subsidies that can motivate TOs to carry out green tourism simultaneously. Our results suggest that to be more effective, the government first offer the green subsidy to highly competitive tourism locations and/or more innovative TOs.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Theory: A Generalization of the ESS Definition

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (04) ◽  
pp. 1950005
Author(s):  
Elvio Accinelli ◽  
Filipe Martins ◽  
Jorge Oviedo
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Strategic Planning ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Previous Literature ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Symmetric Games ◽  
Two Populations ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

In this paper, we study the concept of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESSs) for symmetric games with [Formula: see text] players. The main properties of these games and strategies are analyzed and several examples are provided. We relate the concept of ESS with previous literature and provide a proof of finiteness of ESS in the context of symmetric games with [Formula: see text] players. We show that unlike the case of [Formula: see text], when there are more than two populations an ESS does not have a uniform invasion barrier, or equivalently, it is not equivalent to the strategy performing better against all strategies in a neighborhood. We also construct the extended replicator dynamics for these games and we study an application to a model of strategic planning of investment.

Resource Allocation as an Evolving Strategy

1996 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sverrir Olafsson
Keyword(s):  
Network Management ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Network Services ◽  
Efficient Utilization ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Network Utilization ◽  
Function Network ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

The efficient utilization of resources is an issue of essential importance in modern network management. The emergence of increasingly complicated and continuously changing network services requires softer and fuzzier methods in network management. In this paper we demonstrate how evolutionary game theory can be used for an efficient allocation of service requirements onto an ensemble of heterogeneous network components. By incorporating differentiated pricing structures into a system utility function, network agents are encouraged to increase their usage of those components that are presently badly utilized. It is demonstrated how this approach can enhance network utilization significantly. Some new results regarding evolutionarily stable strategies in nonlinear evolutionary games are also reported.

The distribution of evolutionarily stable strategies

1988 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Haigh
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Random Variables ◽  
Complete Picture ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Underlying Distribution ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable ◽  
Independent Identically Distributed

Suppose the n × n matrix A gives the payoffs for some evolutionary game, and its entries are the values of independent, identically distributed, continuous random variables. The distribution of the pattern of evolutionarily stable strategies for A will depend, if n ≧ 3, on this underlying distribution. A fairly complete picture for n = 3 is found, and some results are obtained for n ≧ 4.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Theoretic Analysis of Low Carbon Investment in Supply Chains under Governmental Subsidies

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (11) ◽  
pp. 2465 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guang Zhu ◽  
Gaozhi Pan ◽  
Weiwei Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chains ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Investment Strategy ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable ◽  
Profit Growth

With the rapid development of global industry and economy, excessive carbon dioxide emission has emerged as a critical issue in both developed and developing countries. Using an evolutionary game framework in which game players can adjust their strategies constantly, this paper investigates how to optimize the strategy of low carbon investment for suppliers and manufacturers in supply chains, and discuss the impacts of various factors on evolutionarily stable strategies. Additionally, we examine an incentive mechanism based on governmental subsidies to eliminate free riding and motivate co-investment. Furthermore, a case study and numerical examples are provided for illustration and simulation purposes, leading to several countermeasures and suggestions. Our analytical results show that the strategic choice of low carbon investment is correlated with profit growth coefficients, investment costs and profits from free riding. Investment costs have more significant impacts than other factors on evolutionarily stable strategies, while profit growth coefficients are more important at initial stages in the evolutionary process. The incentive mechanism based on governmental subsidies is an effective solution to motivate co-investment, and governments should take some measures to improve the assess accuracy and supervisory efficiency of investment strategy.

The distribution of evolutionarily stable strategies

1988 ◽  
Vol 25 (02) ◽  
pp. 233-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Haigh
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Random Variables ◽  
Complete Picture ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Underlying Distribution ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable ◽  
Independent Identically Distributed

Suppose the n × n matrix A gives the payoffs for some evolutionary game, and its entries are the values of independent, identically distributed, continuous random variables. The distribution of the pattern of evolutionarily stable strategies for A will depend, if n ≧ 3, on this underlying distribution. A fairly complete picture for n = 3 is found, and some results are obtained for n ≧ 4.

scholarly journals Habit or Utility: A Key Choice Point in Promoting the Adoption of Telehealth in China

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Yun Fan ◽  
Sifeng Liu ◽  
Jun Liu ◽  
Saad Ahmed Javed ◽  
Zhigeng Fang
Keyword(s):  
Influencing Factors ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Choice Point ◽  
Model Solution ◽  
Government Policies ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Adoption Rate ◽  
Patient Behaviour ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

Telehealth, as an indispensable means of technical support in the Healthy China Strategy, currently has less than 20 percent adoption rate in China despite a great deal of government policies and investments. In the current study, to analyse the influencing factors behind doctors’ and patients’ adoption of telehealth, an asymmetric dynamic evolutionary game model of doctor-patient behaviour selection was established. Based on the model solution, the evolutionarily stable strategies that emerge in different situations were analysed. The results show that it is difficult for the adoption of telehealth in China to keep pace with coverage due to the “dual low” nature of telehealth: both doctors’ utility from telehealth and patients’ telehealth cost threshold are too low to incentivize adoption. The strategy to promote the adoption of telehealth in China should include providing adequate training for doctors and patients on the use of telehealth technology, rewarding doctors who provide telehealth services and raising the threshold cost of patient’s telehealth adoption.

scholarly journals Chris Cannings: A Life in Games

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 591-617
Author(s):  
D. Timothy Bishop ◽  
Mark Broom ◽  
Richard Southwell
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Segregation Analysis ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Multiplayer Games ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Matrix Games ◽  
War Of Attrition ◽  
Important Field ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable ◽  
John Maynard Smith

AbstractChris Cannings was one of the pioneers of evolutionary game theory. His early work was inspired by the formulations of John Maynard Smith, Geoff Parker and Geoff Price; Chris recognized the need for a strong mathematical foundation both to validate stated results and to give a basis for extensions of the models. He was responsible for fundamental results on matrix games, as well as much of the theory of the important war of attrition game, patterns of evolutionarily stable strategies, multiplayer games and games on networks. In this paper we describe his work, key insights and their influence on research by others in this increasingly important field. Chris made substantial contributions to other areas such as population genetics and segregation analysis, but it was to games that he always returned. This review is written by three of his students from different stages of his career.

scholarly journals Research on Optimization of Array Honeypot Defense Strategies Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (8) ◽  
pp. 805
Author(s):  
Leyi Shi ◽  
Xiran Wang ◽  
Huiwen Hou
Keyword(s):  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Defense Strategies ◽  
Active Defense ◽  
Defense Technology ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

Honeypot has been regarded as an active defense technology that can deceive attackers by simulating real systems. However, honeypot is actually a static network trap with fixed disposition, which is easily identified by anti-honeypot technology. Thus, honeypot is a “passive” active defense technology. Dynamic honeypot makes up for the shortcomings of honeypot, which dynamically adjusts defense strategies with the attack of hackers. Therefore, the confrontation between defenders and attackers is a strategic game. This paper focuses on the non-cooperative evolutionary game mechanism of bounded rationality, aiming to improve the security of the array honeypot system through the evolutionarily stable strategies derived from the evolutionary game model. First, we construct a three-party evolutionary game model of array honeypot, which is composed of defenders, attackers and legitimate users. Secondly, we formally describe the strategies and revenues of players in the game, and build the three-party game payoff matrices. Then the evolutionarily stable strategy is obtained by analyzing the Replicator Dynamics of various parties. In addition, we discuss the equilibrium condition to get the influence of the number of servers N on the stability of strategy evolution. MATLAB and Gambit simulation experiment results show that deduced evolutionarily stable strategies are valid in resisting attackers.

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