scholarly journals Research on Optimization of Array Honeypot Defense Strategies Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (8) ◽  
pp. 805
Author(s):  
Leyi Shi ◽  
Xiran Wang ◽  
Huiwen Hou
Keyword(s):  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Defense Strategies ◽  
Active Defense ◽  
Defense Technology ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

Honeypot has been regarded as an active defense technology that can deceive attackers by simulating real systems. However, honeypot is actually a static network trap with fixed disposition, which is easily identified by anti-honeypot technology. Thus, honeypot is a “passive” active defense technology. Dynamic honeypot makes up for the shortcomings of honeypot, which dynamically adjusts defense strategies with the attack of hackers. Therefore, the confrontation between defenders and attackers is a strategic game. This paper focuses on the non-cooperative evolutionary game mechanism of bounded rationality, aiming to improve the security of the array honeypot system through the evolutionarily stable strategies derived from the evolutionary game model. First, we construct a three-party evolutionary game model of array honeypot, which is composed of defenders, attackers and legitimate users. Secondly, we formally describe the strategies and revenues of players in the game, and build the three-party game payoff matrices. Then the evolutionarily stable strategy is obtained by analyzing the Replicator Dynamics of various parties. In addition, we discuss the equilibrium condition to get the influence of the number of servers N on the stability of strategy evolution. MATLAB and Gambit simulation experiment results show that deduced evolutionarily stable strategies are valid in resisting attackers.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Theory: A Generalization of the ESS Definition

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (04) ◽  
pp. 1950005
Author(s):  
Elvio Accinelli ◽  
Filipe Martins ◽  
Jorge Oviedo
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Strategic Planning ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Previous Literature ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Symmetric Games ◽  
Two Populations ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

In this paper, we study the concept of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESSs) for symmetric games with [Formula: see text] players. The main properties of these games and strategies are analyzed and several examples are provided. We relate the concept of ESS with previous literature and provide a proof of finiteness of ESS in the context of symmetric games with [Formula: see text] players. We show that unlike the case of [Formula: see text], when there are more than two populations an ESS does not have a uniform invasion barrier, or equivalently, it is not equivalent to the strategy performing better against all strategies in a neighborhood. We also construct the extended replicator dynamics for these games and we study an application to a model of strategic planning of investment.

scholarly journals Packet Forwarding Strategies in Multiagent Systems: An Evolutionary Game Approach

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Yuanjie Li ◽  
Xiaojun Wu
Keyword(s):  
Multiagent Systems ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Packet Forwarding ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Incentive Mechanisms ◽  
Average Probability ◽  
Save Energy ◽  
Stable Points

In multiagent systems (MASs), agents need to forward packets to each other to accomplish a target task. In this paper, we study packet forwarding among agents using evolutionary game theory under the mechanisms of Carrier Sense Multiple Access/Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA). Packet forwarding among agents plays a key role to stabilize the whole MAS. We study the transfer probability of packet forwarding of agents at the idle state or the busy state and computer the probability of the packet forwarding for a MAS. When agents make their decisions to select Forward or No-Forward strategy, a packet forwarding evolutionary game model is built to reflect the utilities of different packet forwarding strategies. Two incentive mechanisms are introduced into the game model. One is to motivate agents to strengthen cooperation; the other is to encourage agents to select the No-Forward strategy to save energy while they are in the busy state. The parameter value that encourages an agent to select the No-Forward strategy is inversely proportional to the average probability of the packet forwarding. The replicator dynamics of agent packet forwarding strategy evolution are given. We propose and prove the theorems indicating that evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) can be attained. The results of simulation experiments verify the correctness of the proposed theorems and the effects of the two incentive mechanisms and the probability of packet forwarding, which assures the robustness of evolutionary stable points among agents in MASs.

scholarly journals Habit or Utility: A Key Choice Point in Promoting the Adoption of Telehealth in China

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Yun Fan ◽  
Sifeng Liu ◽  
Jun Liu ◽  
Saad Ahmed Javed ◽  
Zhigeng Fang
Keyword(s):  
Influencing Factors ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Choice Point ◽  
Model Solution ◽  
Government Policies ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Adoption Rate ◽  
Patient Behaviour ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

Telehealth, as an indispensable means of technical support in the Healthy China Strategy, currently has less than 20 percent adoption rate in China despite a great deal of government policies and investments. In the current study, to analyse the influencing factors behind doctors’ and patients’ adoption of telehealth, an asymmetric dynamic evolutionary game model of doctor-patient behaviour selection was established. Based on the model solution, the evolutionarily stable strategies that emerge in different situations were analysed. The results show that it is difficult for the adoption of telehealth in China to keep pace with coverage due to the “dual low” nature of telehealth: both doctors’ utility from telehealth and patients’ telehealth cost threshold are too low to incentivize adoption. The strategy to promote the adoption of telehealth in China should include providing adequate training for doctors and patients on the use of telehealth technology, rewarding doctors who provide telehealth services and raising the threshold cost of patient’s telehealth adoption.

scholarly journals The Stability of Two-Community Replicator Dynamics with Discrete Multi-Delays

Mathematics ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (12) ◽  
pp. 2120
Author(s):  
Jinxiu Pi ◽  
Hui Yang ◽  
Yadong Shu ◽  
Chongyi Zhong ◽  
Guanghui Yang
Keyword(s):  
Time Delays ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Linear Matrix ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Two Delays ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Delay Dependent ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

This article investigates the stability of evolutionarily stable strategy in replicator dynamics of two-community with multi-delays. In the real environment, players interact simultaneously while the return of their choices may not be observed immediately, which implies one or more time-delays exists. In addition to using the method of classic characteristic equations, we also apply linear matrix inequality (i.e., LMI) to discuss the stability of the mixed evolutionarily stable strategy in replicator dynamics of two-community with multi-delays. We derive a delay-dependent stability and a delay-independent stability sufficient conditions of the evolutionarily stable strategy in the two-community replicator dynamics with two delays, and manage to extend the sufficient condition to n time delays. Lastly, numerical trials of the Hawk–Dove game are given to verify the effectiveness of the theoretical consequences.

scholarly journals Stability of Replicator Dynamics with Bounded Continuously Distributed Time Delay

Mathematics ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 431
Author(s):  
Chongyi Zhong ◽  
Hui Yang ◽  
Zixin Liu ◽  
Juanyong Wu
Keyword(s):  
Time Delay ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Stability Conditions ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Distributed Time Delay ◽  
Player Game ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

In this paper, we consider evolutionary games and construct a model of replicator dynamics with bounded continuously distributed time delay. In many circumstances, players interact simultaneously while impacts of their choices take place after some time, which implies a time delay exists. We consider the time delay as bounded continuously distributed other than some given constant. Then, we investigate the stability of the evolutionarily stable strategy in the replicator dynamics with bounded continuously distributed time delay in two-player game contexts. Some stability conditions of the unique interior Nash equilibrium are obtained. Finally, the simple but important Hawk–Dove game is used to verify our results.

scholarly journals Sustainable tourism modeling: Pricing decisions and evolutionarily stable strategies for competitive tour operators

2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (5) ◽  
pp. 779-799 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yong He ◽  
Peng He ◽  
Feifei Xu ◽  
Chunming (Victor) Shi
Keyword(s):  
Sustainable Tourism ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Innovation Strategy ◽  
Cost Advantage ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Environment Friendly ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Green Tourism ◽  
The Government ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

In this article, we investigate two competitive tour operators (TOs) who choose between traditional tourism strategy (strategy T) and green tourism innovation strategy (strategy G). Our article attempts to address the following important issues using evolutionary game models: when would TOs facing environment-friendly tourists adopt the strategy G? How do TOs set product prices under different strategy combinations? How can the government effectively motivate TOs to pursue green tourism? Our research results show that a green tourism innovation pioneer could monopolize the market under certain conditions. Furthermore, when the environmental preference of tourists is sufficiently low, no TOs would adopt the strategy G; when it is moderate, only the TO with cost advantage (stronger TO) would adopt the strategy G; when it is sufficiently high, both TOs would select the strategy G. Our research also demonstrates that the stronger TO implements the strategy G mostly independent of the rival’s decisions, but the opposite is true for the TO with cost disadvantage (weaker TO). We further investigate potential government subsidies that can motivate TOs to carry out green tourism simultaneously. Our results suggest that to be more effective, the government first offer the green subsidy to highly competitive tourism locations and/or more innovative TOs.

scholarly journals Evolution of populations with strategy-dependent time delays

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacek Miȩkisz ◽  
Marek Bodnar
Keyword(s):  
Stationary State ◽  
Time Delays ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Small Time ◽  
Stochastic Perturbations ◽  
New Type ◽  
Novel Behavior

AbstractWe address the issue of stability of coexistence of two strategies with respect to time delays in evolving populations. It is well known that time delays may cause oscillations. Here we report a novel behavior. We show that a microscopic model of evolutionary games with a unique mixed evolutionarily stable strategy (a globally asymptotically stable interior stationary state in the standard replicator dynamics) and with strategy-dependent time delays leads to a new type of replicator dynamics. It describes the time evolution of fractions of the population playing given strategies and the size of the population. Unlike in all previous models, an interior stationary state of such dynamics depends continuously on time delays and at some point it might disappear, no cycles are present. In particular, this means that an arbitrarily small time delay changes an interior stationary state. Moreover, at certain time delays, there may appear another interior stationary state.Author summarySocial and biological processes are usually described by ordinary or partial differential equations, or by Markov processes if we take into account stochastic perturbations. However, interactions between individuals, players or molecules, naturally take time. Results of biological interactions between individuals may appear in the future, and in social models, individuals or players may act, that is choose appropriate strategies, on the basis of the information concerning events in the past. It is natural therefore to introduce time delays into evolutionary game models. It was usually observed, and expected, that small time delays do not change the behavior of the system and large time delays may cause oscillations. Here we report a novel behavior. We show that microscopic models of evolutionary games with strategy-dependent time delays, in which payoffs appear some time after interactions of individuals, lead to a new type of replicator dynamics. Unlike in all previous models, interior stationary states of such dynamics depend continuously on time delays. This shows that effects of time delays are much more complex than it was previously thought.

scholarly journals Individual-Level and Population-Level Lateralization: Two Sides of the Same Coin

Symmetry ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (12) ◽  
pp. 739 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elisa Frasnelli ◽  
Giorgio Vallortigara
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Population Level ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Theoretical Point ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Functional Roles ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Social Species ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

Lateralization, i.e., the different functional roles played by the left and right sides of the brain, is expressed in two main ways: (1) in single individuals, regardless of a common direction (bias) in the population (aka individual-level lateralization); or (2) in single individuals and in the same direction in most of them, so that the population is biased (aka population-level lateralization). Indeed, lateralization often occurs at the population-level, with 60–90% of individuals showing the same direction (right or left) of bias, depending on species and tasks. It is usually maintained that lateralization can increase the brain’s efficiency. However, this may explain individual-level lateralization, but not population-level lateralization, for individual brain efficiency is unrelated to the direction of the asymmetry in other individuals. From a theoretical point of view, a possible explanation for population-level lateralization is that it may reflect an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) that can develop when individually asymmetrical organisms are under specific selective pressures to coordinate their behavior with that of other asymmetrical organisms. This prediction has been sometimes misunderstood as it is equated with the idea that population-level lateralization should only be present in social species. However, population-level asymmetries have been observed in aggressive and mating displays in so-called “solitary” insects, suggesting that engagement in specific inter-individual interactions rather than “sociality” per se may promote population-level lateralization. Here, we clarify that the nature of inter-individuals interaction can generate evolutionarily stable strategies of lateralization at the individual- or population-level, depending on ecological contexts, showing that individual-level and population-level lateralization should be considered as two aspects of the same continuum.

Evolutionarily Stable Strategies

Ecology ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael D. Breed
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Ecology ◽  
Interspecific Interactions ◽  
Developmental Time ◽  
Evolutionary Strategies ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

Evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) are phenotypes that persist in populations over evolutionary time and cannot be replaced by invading strategies. Cases in which alternative strategies coexist stand as being of particular interest. Evolutionary biologists were introduced to the concept of ESS through the efforts of John Maynard Smith and George R. Price, whose work remains the keystone expression of this concept. Maynard Smith and Price dealt with animal conflicts, in which combatants may have differing strategies and physical abilities. The stability of evolutionary strategies is often analyzed using the tools of game theory, which allows determination of the persistence of strategies when played against one another. Game theory also opens the door to assessing the potential success of novel strategies upon introduction into a population. ESS often coincide with the Nash equilibrium, a game theory concept that describes conditions under which cognitively aware players in a game cannot gain by changing their individual strategy. In addition to animal conflict, analyses of ESS have been applied in a wide variety of evolutionary contexts and indeed are applicable whenever alternative heritable phenotypes are present. One possibility is that ESS occur as alternative genotypes within populations and thus should be analyzed using population-genetic approaches. ESS can also be conditionally expressed by individuals, depending on environmental and social context. This second option also requires a genotypic basis for strategies but allows for more strategical complexity through responses that may shift over developmental time or with experience. Interspecific interactions are an additional context for ESS, in which ESS drive evolutionary arms races between predators and prey or hosts and diseases or parasites. Maynard Smith and Price built on a conceptual framework in evolutionary ecology developed by William D. Hamilton in studies of kin selection, sex ratios, and herding behavior, and by Geoff Parker, working on sperm competition. ESS offer convenient latticework for thinking about many ecological and evolutionary trade-offs in which organisms balance costs and benefits of potential strategic choices in development and behavior, either in within-generation decision-making or between-generation evolution.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document