scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Theoretic Analysis of Low Carbon Investment in Supply Chains under Governmental Subsidies

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (11) ◽  
pp. 2465 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guang Zhu ◽  
Gaozhi Pan ◽  
Weiwei Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chains ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Investment Strategy ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable ◽  
Profit Growth

With the rapid development of global industry and economy, excessive carbon dioxide emission has emerged as a critical issue in both developed and developing countries. Using an evolutionary game framework in which game players can adjust their strategies constantly, this paper investigates how to optimize the strategy of low carbon investment for suppliers and manufacturers in supply chains, and discuss the impacts of various factors on evolutionarily stable strategies. Additionally, we examine an incentive mechanism based on governmental subsidies to eliminate free riding and motivate co-investment. Furthermore, a case study and numerical examples are provided for illustration and simulation purposes, leading to several countermeasures and suggestions. Our analytical results show that the strategic choice of low carbon investment is correlated with profit growth coefficients, investment costs and profits from free riding. Investment costs have more significant impacts than other factors on evolutionarily stable strategies, while profit growth coefficients are more important at initial stages in the evolutionary process. The incentive mechanism based on governmental subsidies is an effective solution to motivate co-investment, and governments should take some measures to improve the assess accuracy and supervisory efficiency of investment strategy.

scholarly journals Sustainable tourism modeling: Pricing decisions and evolutionarily stable strategies for competitive tour operators

2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (5) ◽  
pp. 779-799 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yong He ◽  
Peng He ◽  
Feifei Xu ◽  
Chunming (Victor) Shi
Keyword(s):  
Sustainable Tourism ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Innovation Strategy ◽  
Cost Advantage ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Environment Friendly ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Green Tourism ◽  
The Government ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

In this article, we investigate two competitive tour operators (TOs) who choose between traditional tourism strategy (strategy T) and green tourism innovation strategy (strategy G). Our article attempts to address the following important issues using evolutionary game models: when would TOs facing environment-friendly tourists adopt the strategy G? How do TOs set product prices under different strategy combinations? How can the government effectively motivate TOs to pursue green tourism? Our research results show that a green tourism innovation pioneer could monopolize the market under certain conditions. Furthermore, when the environmental preference of tourists is sufficiently low, no TOs would adopt the strategy G; when it is moderate, only the TO with cost advantage (stronger TO) would adopt the strategy G; when it is sufficiently high, both TOs would select the strategy G. Our research also demonstrates that the stronger TO implements the strategy G mostly independent of the rival’s decisions, but the opposite is true for the TO with cost disadvantage (weaker TO). We further investigate potential government subsidies that can motivate TOs to carry out green tourism simultaneously. Our results suggest that to be more effective, the government first offer the green subsidy to highly competitive tourism locations and/or more innovative TOs.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Theory: A Generalization of the ESS Definition

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (04) ◽  
pp. 1950005
Author(s):  
Elvio Accinelli ◽  
Filipe Martins ◽  
Jorge Oviedo
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Strategic Planning ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Previous Literature ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Symmetric Games ◽  
Two Populations ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

In this paper, we study the concept of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESSs) for symmetric games with [Formula: see text] players. The main properties of these games and strategies are analyzed and several examples are provided. We relate the concept of ESS with previous literature and provide a proof of finiteness of ESS in the context of symmetric games with [Formula: see text] players. We show that unlike the case of [Formula: see text], when there are more than two populations an ESS does not have a uniform invasion barrier, or equivalently, it is not equivalent to the strategy performing better against all strategies in a neighborhood. We also construct the extended replicator dynamics for these games and we study an application to a model of strategic planning of investment.

Resource Allocation as an Evolving Strategy

1996 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sverrir Olafsson
Keyword(s):  
Network Management ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Network Services ◽  
Efficient Utilization ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Network Utilization ◽  
Function Network ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

The efficient utilization of resources is an issue of essential importance in modern network management. The emergence of increasingly complicated and continuously changing network services requires softer and fuzzier methods in network management. In this paper we demonstrate how evolutionary game theory can be used for an efficient allocation of service requirements onto an ensemble of heterogeneous network components. By incorporating differentiated pricing structures into a system utility function, network agents are encouraged to increase their usage of those components that are presently badly utilized. It is demonstrated how this approach can enhance network utilization significantly. Some new results regarding evolutionarily stable strategies in nonlinear evolutionary games are also reported.

The distribution of evolutionarily stable strategies

1988 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Haigh
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Random Variables ◽  
Complete Picture ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Underlying Distribution ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable ◽  
Independent Identically Distributed

Suppose the n × n matrix A gives the payoffs for some evolutionary game, and its entries are the values of independent, identically distributed, continuous random variables. The distribution of the pattern of evolutionarily stable strategies for A will depend, if n ≧ 3, on this underlying distribution. A fairly complete picture for n = 3 is found, and some results are obtained for n ≧ 4.

scholarly journals Trust Dynamics in WSNs: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Approach

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shigen Shen ◽  
Longjun Huang ◽  
En Fan ◽  
Keli Hu ◽  
Jianhua Liu ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Trust Management ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Process ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Trust Mechanism ◽  
The Incentive Mechanism

A sensor node (SN) in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) can decide whether to collaborate with others based on a trust management system (TMS) by making a trust decision. In this paper, we study the trust decision and its dynamics that play a key role to stabilize the whole network using evolutionary game theory. When SNs are making their decisions to select actionTrustorMistrust, a WSNs trust game is created to reflect their utilities. An incentive mechanism bound with one SN’s trust degree is incorporated into this trust game and effectively promotes SNs to select actionTrust. The replicator dynamics of SNs’ trust evolution, illustrating the evolutionary process of SNs selecting their actions, are given. We then propose and prove the theorems indicating that evolutionarily stable strategies can be attained under different parameter values, which supply theoretical foundations to devise a TMS for WSNs. Moreover, we can find out the conditions that will lead SNs to choose actionTrustas their final behavior. In this manner, we can assure WSNs’ security and stability by introducing a trust mechanism to satisfy these conditions. Experimental results have confirmed the proposed theorems and the effects of the incentive mechanism.

The distribution of evolutionarily stable strategies

1988 ◽  
Vol 25 (02) ◽  
pp. 233-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Haigh
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Random Variables ◽  
Complete Picture ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Underlying Distribution ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable ◽  
Independent Identically Distributed

Suppose the n × n matrix A gives the payoffs for some evolutionary game, and its entries are the values of independent, identically distributed, continuous random variables. The distribution of the pattern of evolutionarily stable strategies for A will depend, if n ≧ 3, on this underlying distribution. A fairly complete picture for n = 3 is found, and some results are obtained for n ≧ 4.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Games of Low-Carbon Behaviors of Construction Stakeholders under Carbon Taxes

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 508
Author(s):  
Qiang Du ◽  
Yunqing Yan ◽  
Youdan Huang ◽  
Chanchan Hao ◽  
Jiao Wu
Keyword(s):  
Construction Industry ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Taxes ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
The Real

The development of low-carbon buildings (LCBs) in China has not reached its expected status, although the Chinese government has formulated many relevant regulations. The real estate developers and consumers are essential participants in the development of LCBs. This paper explores whether the government’s implementation of the carbon tax will change their choices of LCBs. Evolutionary game models between developers and consumers are established under static and dynamic carbon taxes. Their evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) are deduced in different situations. According to the real scenarios in China, numerical simulations are further conducted to show that carbon tax influences the low-carbon behaviors of stakeholders in the construction industry. Under a static carbon tax, the two players cannot reach an equilibrium state, while the game system is stable under a dynamic tax. The probability of the developers constructing LCBs is positively related to the carbon tax, while its degree is gradually weakened as the tax rate increases. Therefore, an appropriate tax should be set to promote the development of LCBs effectively. Finally, policy implications are put forwarded to guide the participants’ low-carbon behaviors and reduce the carbon emissions in the Chinese construction industry.

scholarly journals Habit or Utility: A Key Choice Point in Promoting the Adoption of Telehealth in China

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Yun Fan ◽  
Sifeng Liu ◽  
Jun Liu ◽  
Saad Ahmed Javed ◽  
Zhigeng Fang
Keyword(s):  
Influencing Factors ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Choice Point ◽  
Model Solution ◽  
Government Policies ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Adoption Rate ◽  
Patient Behaviour ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

Telehealth, as an indispensable means of technical support in the Healthy China Strategy, currently has less than 20 percent adoption rate in China despite a great deal of government policies and investments. In the current study, to analyse the influencing factors behind doctors’ and patients’ adoption of telehealth, an asymmetric dynamic evolutionary game model of doctor-patient behaviour selection was established. Based on the model solution, the evolutionarily stable strategies that emerge in different situations were analysed. The results show that it is difficult for the adoption of telehealth in China to keep pace with coverage due to the “dual low” nature of telehealth: both doctors’ utility from telehealth and patients’ telehealth cost threshold are too low to incentivize adoption. The strategy to promote the adoption of telehealth in China should include providing adequate training for doctors and patients on the use of telehealth technology, rewarding doctors who provide telehealth services and raising the threshold cost of patient’s telehealth adoption.

scholarly journals Sustainability of Information Security Investment in Online Social Networks: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Approach

Mathematics ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (10) ◽  
pp. 177 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guang Zhu ◽  
Hu Liu ◽  
Mining Feng
Keyword(s):  
Social Networks ◽  
Information Security ◽  
Online Social Networks ◽  
Service Providers ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Security Investment ◽  
Information Security Investment ◽  
Profit Growth

With the rapid development of information technologies, security violations in online social networks (OSN) have emerged as a critical issue. Traditional technical and organizational approaches do not consider economic factors, which are increasingly important to sustain information security investment. In this paper, we develop an evolutionary game model to study the sustainability of information security investment in OSN, and propose a quantitative approach to analyze and optimize security investment. Additionally, we examine a contract with an incentive mechanism to eliminate free riding, which helps sustain the security investment. Numerical examples are provided for illustration and simulation purposes, leading to several countermeasures and suggestions. Our analytical results show that the optimal strategy of information security investment not only is correlated with profit growth coefficients and investment costs, but is also influenced significantly by the profits from free riding. If the profit growth coefficients are prohibitively small, both OSN service providers and online platforms will not choose to sustain investment based on small profits. As profit growth coefficients increase, there is a higher probability that game players will invest. Another major finding is that the (Invest, Invest) profile is much less sensitive to the change of profit growth coefficients and the convergent speed of this scenario is faster than the other profiles. The government agency can use the proposed model to determine a proper incentive or penalty to help both parties reach the optimal strategies and thus improve OSN security.

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