Reciprocal reward promotes the evolution of cooperation in structured populations

2019 ◽  
Vol 119 ◽  
pp. 230-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yu’e Wu ◽  
Zhipeng Zhang ◽  
Shuhua Chang
Keyword(s):  
Structured Populations ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation

scholarly journals Ordering structured populations in multiplayer cooperation games

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorge Peña ◽  
Bin Wu ◽  
Arne Traulsen
Keyword(s):  
Population Structure ◽  
Spatial Structure ◽  
Structured Populations ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Multiplayer Games ◽  
Spatial Games ◽  
Population Structures ◽  
Single Structure ◽  
Containment Order ◽  
Update Rules

AbstractSpatial structure greatly affects the evolution of cooperation. While in two-player games the condition for cooperation to evolve depends on a single structure coefficient, in multiplayer games the condition might depend on several structure coefficients, making it difficult to compare different population structures. We propose a solution to this issue by introducing two simple ways of ordering population structures: the containment order and the volume order. If population structure 𝒮1 is greater than population structure 𝒮2 in the containment or the volume order, then 𝒮1 can be considered a stronger promoter of cooperation. We provide conditions for establishing the containment order, give general results on the volume order, and illustrate our theory by comparing different models of spatial games and associated update rules. Our results hold for a large class of population structures and can be easily applied to specific cases once the structure coefficients have been calculated or estimated.

scholarly journals Evolution of cooperation in an epithelium

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (152) ◽  
pp. 20180918 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jessie Renton ◽  
Karen M. Page
Keyword(s):  
Social Interactions ◽  
Voronoi Tessellation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Cellular Level ◽  
Structured Populations ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Animal Kingdom ◽  
Population Structures ◽  
Fixation Probabilities ◽  
Evolutionary Graph Theory

Cooperation is prevalent in nature, not only in the context of social interactions within the animal kingdom but also on the cellular level. In cancer, for example, tumour cells can cooperate by producing growth factors. The evolution of cooperation has traditionally been studied for well-mixed populations under the framework of evolutionary game theory, and more recently for structured populations using evolutionary graph theory (EGT). The population structures arising due to cellular arrangement in tissues, however, are dynamic and thus cannot be accurately represented by either of these frameworks. In this work, we compare the conditions for cooperative success in an epithelium modelled using EGT, to those in a mechanical model of an epithelium—the Voronoi tessellation (VT) model. Crucially, in this latter model, cells are able to move, and birth and death are not spatially coupled. We calculate fixation probabilities in the VT model through simulation and an approximate analytic technique and show that this leads to stronger promotion of cooperation in comparison with the EGT model.

scholarly journals Negotiation and appeasement can be more effective drivers of sociality than kin selection

2016 ◽  
Vol 371 (1687) ◽  
pp. 20150089 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrés E. Quiñones ◽  
G. Sander van Doorn ◽  
Ido Pen ◽  
Franz J. Weissing ◽  
Michael Taborsky
Keyword(s):  
Genetic Relatedness ◽  
Structured Populations ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
Negotiation Strategies ◽  
Structured Population ◽  
The Face ◽  
Kin Structure ◽  
Invasion Analysis ◽  
Individual Based Simulation

Two alternative frameworks explain the evolution of cooperation in the face of conflicting interests. Conflicts can be alleviated by kinship, the alignment of interests by virtue of shared genes, or by negotiation strategies, allowing mutually beneficial trading of services or commodities. Although negotiation often occurs in kin-structured populations, the interplay of kin- and negotiation-based mechanisms in the evolution of cooperation remains an unresolved issue. Inspired by the biology of a cooperatively breeding fish, we developed an individual-based simulation model to study the evolution of negotiation-based cooperation in relation to different levels of genetic relatedness. We show that the evolution of negotiation strategies leads to an equilibrium where subordinates appease dominants by conditional cooperation, resulting in high levels of help and low levels of aggression. This negotiation-based equilibrium can be reached both in the absence of relatedness and in a kin-structured population. However, when relatedness is high, evolution often ends up in an alternative equilibrium where subordinates help their kin unconditionally. The level of help at this kin-selected equilibrium is considerably lower than at the negotiation-based equilibrium, and it corresponds to a level reached when responsiveness is prevented from evolving in the simulations. A mathematical invasion analysis reveals that, quite generally, the alignment of payoffs due to the relatedness of interaction partners tends to impede selection for harsh but effective punishment of defectors. Hence kin structure will often hamper rather than facilitate the evolution of productive cooperation.

scholarly journals Non-Vertical Cultural Transmission, Assortment, and the Evolution of Cooperation

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dor Cohen ◽  
Ohad Lewin-Epstein ◽  
Marcus W. Feldman ◽  
Yoav Ram
Keyword(s):  
Social Interactions ◽  
Cultural Evolution ◽  
Cultural Transmission ◽  
Horizontal Transmission ◽  
Structured Populations ◽  
Stochastic Simulations ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Population Mean ◽  
Mean Fitness ◽  
Lower Population

AbstractCultural evolution of cooperation under vertical and non-vertical cultural transmission is studied, and conditions are found for fixation and coexistence of cooperation and defection. The evolution of cooperation is facilitated by its horizontal transmission and by an association between social interactions and horizontal transmission. The effect of oblique transmission depends on the horizontal transmission bias. Stable polymorphism of cooperation and defection can occur, and when it does, reduced association between social interactions and horizontal transmission evolves, which leads to a decreased frequency of cooperation and lower population mean fitness. The deterministic conditions are compared to outcomes of stochastic simulations of structured populations. Parallels are drawn with Hamilton’s rule incorporating assortment and effective relatedness.

scholarly journals Evolution of Cooperation for Multiple Mutant Configurations on All Regular Graphs with N ≤ 14 Players

Games ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 12
Author(s):  
Hendrik Richter
Keyword(s):  
Regular Graph ◽  
Good Predictor ◽  
Computational Approach ◽  
Structured Populations ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Regular Graphs ◽  
Weak Selection ◽  
Structure Coefficient ◽  
Low Degree ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation

We study the emergence of cooperation in structured populations with any arrangement of cooperators and defectors on the evolutionary graph. In a computational approach using structure coefficients defined for configurations describing such arrangements of any number of mutants, we provide results for weak selection to favor cooperation over defection on any regular graph with N ≤ 14 vertices. Furthermore, the properties of graphs that particularly promote cooperation are analyzed. It is shown that the number of graph cycles of a certain length is a good predictor for the values of the structure coefficient, and thus a tendency to favor cooperation. Another property of particularly cooperation-promoting regular graphs with a low degree is that they are structured to have blocks with clusters of mutants that are connected by cut vertices and/or hinge vertices.

Environmental feedback promotes the evolution of cooperation in the structured populations

2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (11) ◽  
pp. 113101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yu’e Wu ◽  
Zhipeng Zhang ◽  
Ming Yan ◽  
Shuhua Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Structured Populations ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Environmental Feedback

scholarly journals Interactive diversity promotes the evolution of cooperation in structured populations

2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (10) ◽  
pp. 103007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qi Su ◽  
Aming Li ◽  
Lei Zhou ◽  
Long Wang
Keyword(s):  
Structured Populations ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation

scholarly journals Parent-preferred dispersal promotes cooperation in structured populations

2019 ◽  
Vol 286 (1895) ◽  
pp. 20181949 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaojie Chen ◽  
Åke Brännström ◽  
Ulf Dieckmann
Keyword(s):  
Pairwise Comparison ◽  
Small World ◽  
Structured Populations ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Pair Approximation ◽  
Scale Free ◽  
Scale Free Networks ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Population Structures ◽  
Update Rules

Dispersal is a key process for the emergence of social and biological behaviours. Yet, little attention has been paid to dispersal's effects on the evolution of cooperative behaviour in structured populations. To address this issue, we propose two new dispersal modes, parent-preferred and offspring-preferred dispersal, incorporate them into the birth–death update rule, and consider the resultant strategy evolution in the prisoner's dilemma on random-regular, small-world, and scale-free networks, respectively. We find that parent-preferred dispersal favours the evolution of cooperation in these different types of population structures, while offspring-preferred dispersal inhibits the evolution of cooperation in homogeneous populations. On scale-free networks when the strength of parent-preferred dispersal is weak, cooperation can be enhanced at intermediate strengths of offspring-preferred dispersal, and cooperators can coexist with defectors at high strengths of offspring-preferred dispersal. Moreover, our theoretical analysis based on the pair-approximation method corroborates the evolutionary outcomes on random-regular networks. We also incorporate the two new dispersal modes into three other update rules (death-birth, imitation, and pairwise comparison updating), and find that similar results about the effects of parent-preferred and offspring-preferred dispersal can again be observed in the aforementioned different types of population structures. Our work, thus, unveils robust effects of preferential dispersal modes on the evolution of cooperation in different interactive environments.

Heterogeneous indirect reciprocity promotes the evolution of cooperation in structured populations

2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (12) ◽  
pp. 123108
Author(s):  
Yu’e Wu ◽  
Zhipeng Zhang ◽  
Shuhua Chang
Keyword(s):  
Structured Populations ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity

scholarly journals Ordering structured populations in multiplayer cooperation games

2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (114) ◽  
pp. 20150881 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorge Peña ◽  
Bin Wu ◽  
Arne Traulsen
Keyword(s):  
Population Structure ◽  
Spatial Structure ◽  
Structured Populations ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Multiplayer Games ◽  
Spatial Games ◽  
Population Structures ◽  
Single Structure ◽  
Containment Order ◽  
Update Rules

Spatial structure greatly affects the evolution of cooperation. While in two-player games the condition for cooperation to evolve depends on a single structure coefficient, in multiplayer games the condition might depend on several structure coefficients, making it difficult to compare different population structures. We propose a solution to this issue by introducing two simple ways of ordering population structures: the containment order and the volume order. If population structure is greater than population structure in the containment or the volume order, then can be considered a stronger promoter of cooperation. We provide conditions for establishing the containment order, give general results on the volume order, and illustrate our theory by comparing different models of spatial games and associated update rules. Our results hold for a large class of population structures and can be easily applied to specific cases once the structure coefficients have been calculated or estimated.

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