scholarly journals Standard vs random dictator games: On the effects of role uncertainty and framing on generosity

2021 ◽  
pp. 109981
Author(s):  
Ernesto Mesa-Vázquez ◽  
Ismael Rodriguez-Lara ◽  
Amparo Urbano
Keyword(s):  
Dictator Games

Supernatural norm enforcement: Thinking about Karma and God reduces selfishness among believers

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cindel White ◽  
John Michael Kelly ◽  
Azim Shariff ◽  
Ara Norenzayan
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Framing Effects ◽  
Demographic Variables ◽  
Exclusion Criteria ◽  
Total N ◽  
Norm Enforcement ◽  
Dictator Games ◽  
Within Subjects

Four experiments (total N = 3591) examined how thinking about Karma and God increases adherence to social norms that prescribe fairness in anonymous dictator games. We found that (1) thinking about Karma decreased selfishness among karmic believers across religious affiliations, including Hindus, Buddhists, Christians, and non-religious Americans; (2) thinking about God also decreased selfishness among believers in God (but not among non-believers), replicating previous findings; and (3) thinking about both karma and God shifted participants’ initially selfish offers towards fairness (the normatively prosocial response), but had no effect on already fair offers. These supernatural framing effects were obtained and replicated in high-powered, pre-registered experiments and remained robust to several methodological checks, including hypothesis guessing, game familiarity, demographic variables, between- and within-subjects designs, and variation in data exclusion criteria. These results support the role of culturally-elaborated beliefs about supernatural justice as a motivator of believer’s adherence to prosocial norms.

scholarly journals People from lower social classes elicit greater prosociality: Compassion and deservingness matter

2021 ◽  
pp. 136843022098207
Author(s):  
Niels J. Van Doesum ◽  
Paul A. M. Van Lange ◽  
Joshua M. Tybur ◽  
Ana Leal ◽  
Eric Van Dijk
Keyword(s):  
Social Class ◽  
The Netherlands ◽  
Prosocial Behavior ◽  
Family Background ◽  
Lower Class ◽  
Social Classes ◽  
Target Class ◽  
Dictator Games ◽  
The Uk

People are quick to form impressions of others’ social class, and likely adjust their behavior accordingly. If social class is linked to prosociality, as literature suggests, then an interaction partner’s class should affect prosocial behavior, especially when costs or investments are low. We test this expectation using social mindfulness (SoMi) and dictator games (DG) as complementary measures of prosociality. We manipulate target class by providing information regarding a target’s (a) position on a social class ladder, and (b) family background. Three studies using laboratory and online approaches ( Noverall = 557) in two nations (the Netherlands [NL], the UK), featuring actual and hypothetical exchanges, reveal that lower class targets are met with greater prosociality than higher class targets, even when based on information about the targets’ parents (Study 3). The effect of target class was partially mediated by compassion (Studies 2 and 3) and perceived deservingness of the target (Study 3). Implications and limitations are discussed.

scholarly journals Individual Preferences for Giving

2007 ◽  
Vol 97 (5) ◽  
pp. 1858-1876 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raymond Fisman ◽  
Shachar Kariv ◽  
Daniel Markovits
Keyword(s):  
Utility Maximization ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Graphical Representations ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Individual Preferences ◽  
Dictator Games ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Budget Sets ◽  
Baseline Experiment

We utilize graphical representations of Dictator Games which generate rich individual-level data. Our baseline experiment employs budget sets over feasible payoff-pairs. We test these data for consistency with utility maximization, and we recover the underlying preferences for giving (trade-offs between own payoffs and the payoffs of others). Two further experiments augment the analysis. An extensive elaboration employs three-person budget sets to distinguish preferences for giving from social preferences (trade-offs between the payoffs of others). And an intensive elaboration employs step-shaped sets to distinguish between behaviors that are compatible with well-behaved preferences and those compatible only with not well-behaved cases. (JEL C72, D64)

scholarly journals Learning to be selfish? A large-scale longitudinal analysis of Dictator games played on Amazon Mechanical Turk

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonio Alonso Arechar ◽  
David Gertler Rand
Keyword(s):  
Longitudinal Analysis ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Mechanical Turk ◽  
Amazon Mechanical Turk ◽  
Social Setting ◽  
Negative Effects ◽  
Dictator Games

We investigate whether experience playing the Dictator Game (DG) affects prosociality by aggregating data from 37 experiments run on Amazon Mechanical Turk over a six-year period. While prior evidence has shown a correlation between experience on Amazon Mechanical Turk and selfishness, it is unclear to what extent this is the result of selection versus learning. Examining a total of 27,266 decisions made by 17,791 unique individuals, our data shows evidence of significant negative effects of both selection and learning. First, people who participated in a greater total number of our experiments were more selfish, even in their first game – indicating that people who are more likely to select into our experiments are more selfish. Second, a given individual tends to transfer less money over successive experiments – indicating that experience with the DG leads to greater selfishness. These results provide clear evidence of learning even in this non-strategic social setting.

Affinity, Antipathy and Political Participation: How Our Concern For Others Makes Us Vote

2010 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 661-687 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter John Loewen
Keyword(s):  
Political Participation ◽  
Online Survey ◽  
Formal Model ◽  
Empirical Results ◽  
Dictator Games ◽  
Concern For Others ◽  
Satisfactory Account ◽  
The Face

Abstract.Some citizens differ in their levels of concern for the supporters of various parties. I demonstrate how such concerns can motivate citizens to vote. I first present a simple formal model that incorporates concern for others and election benefits to explain the decision to vote. By predicting substantial turnout, this model overcomes the “paradox of participation.” I then verify the model empirically. I utilize a series dictator games in an online survey of more than 2000 Canadians to measure the concern of individuals for other partisans. I show how the preferences revealed in these games can predict the decision to vote in the face of several conventional controls. Taken together, the formal model and empirical results generate a more fulsome and satisfactory account of the decision to vote than an explanation which relies solely on duty.Résumé.Les citoyens ne se préoccupent pas tous des partisans des divers partis politiques. Je démontre comment de telles préoccupations peuvent motiver les citoyens à participer aux élections. Je présente d'abord un modèle formel qui explique la décision de voter en intégrant les préoccupations à l'égard des autres électeurs et les bénéfices associés à une élection. En prédisant une part substantielle de la participation, ce modèle surmonte le paradoxe de la participation électorale. Ensuite, le modèle est vérifié empiriquement. J'emploie à cette fin une série de jeux du dictateur insérés dans une enquête menée en ligne auprès de 2000 Canadiens afin de mesurer leur degré de préoccupation à l'égard des autres partisans. Je montre comment les préférences révélées dans ces jeux peuvent prédire la décision de voter. Ensemble, le modèle formel et les résultats empiriques produisent une explication plus éloquente et plus satisfaisante de la décision de voter lors d'une élection que les explications qui s'appuient seulement sur le sens du devoir.

Chapter 49 Social Distance and Reciprocity in Dictator Games

2008 ◽  
pp. 429-435 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Hoffman ◽  
Kevin McCabe ◽  
Vernon Smith
Keyword(s):  
Social Distance ◽  
Dictator Games
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