Evolutionary game analysis on the behavior strategies of power producers in renewable portfolio standard

Energy ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 162 ◽  
pp. 505-516 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhao Xin-gang ◽  
Ren Ling-zhi ◽  
Zhang Yu-zhuo ◽  
Wan Guan
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Renewable Portfolio Standard ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Behavior Strategies

scholarly journals The behavior strategies between the government and power generation enterprises considering the learning mechanism based on evolutionary game

2019 ◽  
Vol 118 ◽  
pp. 01061
Author(s):  
Jianling Jiao ◽  
He Sun ◽  
Ranran Yang
Keyword(s):  
Power Generation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Energy System ◽  
Renewable Portfolio Standard ◽  
System Transformation ◽  
Learning Mechanism ◽  
Behavior Strategies ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
The Government ◽  
Reward And Punishment

The Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) as a policy tool to promote renewable energy development has gone through more than ten years in China. In order to research the strategic interaction between governments and power generation enterprises under the background of energy system transformation and upgrading, a learning mechanism was introduced based on the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism, and an evolutionary game model between the government and power generation enterprises was established. The results showed that the evolutionary stability strategy depended on the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism, which is conducive to the gradual stability of the system. The existence of learning mechanism not only reduced the cost of wind power, but also reduced the probability of government supervision.

Evolutionary game analysis of information sharing by institutional investors

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Hua Li ◽  
Qingqing Lou ◽  
Qiubai Sun ◽  
Bowen Li
Keyword(s):  
Information Sharing ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Information Exchange ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Relationship Network ◽  
The Relationship

In order to solve the conflict of interests of institutional investors, this paper uses evolutionary game model. From the point of view of information sharing, this paper discusses four different situations. Only when the sum of risk and cost is less than the penalty of free riding, the evolution of institutional investors will eventually incline to the stable state of information sharing. That is, the phenomenon of hugging. The research shows that the institutional investors are not independent of each other, but the relationship network of institutional investors for the purpose of information exchange. The content of this paper enriches the research on information sharing of institutional investors.

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