scholarly journals The behavior strategies between the government and power generation enterprises considering the learning mechanism based on evolutionary game

2019 ◽  
Vol 118 ◽  
pp. 01061
Author(s):  
Jianling Jiao ◽  
He Sun ◽  
Ranran Yang
Keyword(s):  
Power Generation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Energy System ◽  
Renewable Portfolio Standard ◽  
System Transformation ◽  
Learning Mechanism ◽  
Behavior Strategies ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
The Government ◽  
Reward And Punishment

The Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) as a policy tool to promote renewable energy development has gone through more than ten years in China. In order to research the strategic interaction between governments and power generation enterprises under the background of energy system transformation and upgrading, a learning mechanism was introduced based on the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism, and an evolutionary game model between the government and power generation enterprises was established. The results showed that the evolutionary stability strategy depended on the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism, which is conducive to the gradual stability of the system. The existence of learning mechanism not only reduced the cost of wind power, but also reduced the probability of government supervision.

scholarly journals Evolutionary game analysis of environmental pollution control under the government regulation

2022 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kui Zhou ◽  
Qi Wang ◽  
Junnan Tang
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Pollution ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Incentive Strategies ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Reward And Punishment

AbstractThis paper studied a tripartite evolutionary game of stakeholders in environmental pollution control. Most previous studies on this issue are limited to a focus on system dynamics with two-party game problems and lack a spatial analysis of strategy evolution. The parameters adopted are too few, and the influencing factors considered are too simple. The purpose of the paper is to introduce more parameters to study, which will have an important impact on the strategy choices of participants and the evolution path of the strategy over time. We construct a tripartite evolutionary game model of sewage enterprises, governments and the public. We establish a payment matrix and replicator equations as our method, and we also implement parameter simulations in MATLAB. In summary, we found that the reward and punishment mechanism plays an important role in environmental pollution control. Specifically: intensifying rewards and penalties will help encourage sewage enterprises to meet the discharge standard and the public to participate in pollution control action. However, increased rewards will reduce government's willingness to adopt incentive strategies; Government's reward for public's participation in the action must be greater than the increased cost of participation; Reducing the cost of sewage enterprise can also encourage them to implement standard emissions. The research presented in this paper further improves standard emissions and designs reasonable reward and punishment mechanism.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Process of Promoting Construction Safety Education to Avoid Construction Safety Accidents in China

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (19) ◽  
pp. 10392
Author(s):  
Feng Guo ◽  
Junwu Wang ◽  
Denghui Liu ◽  
Yinghui Song
Keyword(s):  
Construction Projects ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Process ◽  
Construction Safety ◽  
Construction Workers ◽  
Safety Education ◽  
Behavior Strategies ◽  
The Government ◽  
Government Construction ◽  
Reward And Punishment

Construction safety is related to the life and health of construction workers and has always been a hot issue of concern for government and construction units. The government can use “construction safety education” to reduce the probability of safety accidents in the construction process and avoid the loss of life and property of construction workers. To encourage construction units to provide safety education for construction workers before construction starts and promote construction workers to actively participate in safety education. In this paper, a tripartite evolutionary game model of government–construction units–construction workers is established, and the factors affecting each party’s behavior strategy are comprehensively analyzed. Firstly, evolutionary game theory is used to investigate the influence of different behavior strategies among government, construction units, and construction workers on the behavior strategies of the other two parties. Secondly, according to the events in different situations, the influence of critical factors on the evolution process of the model is analyzed. On this basis, combined with the construction experience and construction data of actual construction projects, the established model and preliminary conclusions are verified. Finally, a sensitivity analysis of all parameters is carried out. The results show that: (1) The government’s enhancement of reward and punishment is conducive to promoting the choice of "providing safety education" for construction orders and the choice of “actively participating in safety education” for construction workers, but the excessive reward will lead to the government’s unwillingness of participation; (2) The reasonable reward and punishment mechanism set by the government must meet the condition that the sum of rewards and punishments for all parties is more significant than their speculative gains, to ensure the construction safety under the evolutionary stability; (3) Increasing welfare subsidies for construction workers who choose to participate in safety education actively is an effective way to avoid unwilling participation of construction workers.

scholarly journals Evolutionary game of green manufacturing mode of enterprises under the influence of government reward and punishment

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 416-430
Author(s):  
A.L. Awaga ◽  
W. Xu ◽  
L. Liu ◽  
Y. Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Market Competition ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Green Product ◽  
Production Mode ◽  
Manufacturing Enterprises ◽  
Green Production ◽  
Regulation Strategies ◽  
The Government ◽  
Manufacturing Mode ◽  
Reward And Punishment

Green production mode is an advanced manufacturing mode. However, due to the environmental externality of green production, it is different for a pure market mechanism to promote the evolution of green operation mode of manufacturing enterprises. Government regulation is very important. This paper establishes an evolutionary game model of whether manufacturing enterprises choose to implement green production mode when the government implements two different mechanisms of reward and punishment. Considering the complexity of strategy selection of enterprises' green production behaviour under market competition, the method constructs the simulation analysis model of enterprises' green product production behaviour with multi-subject participation. We can simulate the influence of these factors on the strategic choice of both parties (enterprises and governments) by changing the different influence factors, and studying the evolutionary law of different government guidance and regulation strategies on the production behaviour of green products. These factors include government incentives, penalties, reputations, costs, differences in the cost of implementing green production on the corporate side, corporate reputation, and false rewards or penalties. By the computer implementation of multi-subject modelling, the results show that enterprises' green product production behaviour needs the government's guidance and regulation. When formulating relevant policies, the government should combine various guidance and regulation strategies and fully consider the influence of market competition.

scholarly journals Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Coal Mining Safe Production Supervision under the Chinese Central Government’s Reward and Punishment Mechanism

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Kui Zhou ◽  
Qi Wang ◽  
Junnan Tang
Keyword(s):  
Coal Mining ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Economic Incentives ◽  
Safe Production ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
Reward And Punishment

In recent years, although coal mine accidents in China have decreased, they still occur frequently. Most previous studies on the evolutionary game of safety mining are limited to a focus on system dynamics and two-party game problems and lack a spatial graphic analysis of strategy evolution. The parameters adopted are too few, and the influencing factors considered are too simple. The purpose of the paper is to introduce more parameters to study which will have an important impact on the strategy choices of participants and the evolution path of the strategy over time. We construct a tripartite evolutionary game model of coal mining enterprises, local governments, and central governments. As our method, a payment matrix of participants and replicated dynamic equations is established, and we also implement parameter simulation in MATLAB. In summary, we found that the reward and punishment mechanism plays an important role in safe coal mining. Specifically, (1) intensifying rewards and penalties for coal mining enterprises and local governments will help encourage coal mining enterprises to implement safe production measures and local governments to implement central government safety supervision policies. However, increased rewards will reduce central government’s willingness to adopt incentive strategies. (2) The central government’s reward for coal mining enterprises’ safe production must be greater than the increased cost of safe production to encourage enterprises to implement such production. Economic incentives for local governments must be greater than the benefits of rent-seeking; only then will local governments choose to strictly implement supervision policies. (3) Increasing sales revenue and rent-seeking costs of coal mining enterprises can also encourage them to implement safe production. Therefore, a well-designed reward and punishment mechanism will change the behaviour of coal enterprises and improve the probability of safe production. The research presented in this paper further works on improving safe coal mining production and designing reasonable reward and punishment mechanisms.

scholarly journals Could China Declare a “Coal Phase-Out”? An Evolutionary Game and Empirical Analysis Involving the Government, Enterprises, and the Public

Energies ◽  
2022 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 531
Author(s):  
Jingna Kou ◽  
Fengjun Sun ◽  
Wei Li ◽  
Jie Jin
Keyword(s):  
Local Governments ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Carbon Capture And Storage ◽  
Energy System ◽  
Entropy Method ◽  
The Public ◽  
Development Level ◽  
Carbon Neutral ◽  
The Government ◽  
Phase Out

There is a global move toward being “carbon neutral”. Reducing the use of coal to generate power has become an inevitable choice for many countries when transforming their energy structures. Many countries have proposed phasing out coal. China is a major energy producing and consuming country and intends to reach a carbon peak by 2030 and become carbon neutral by 2060. China has repeatedly emphasized coal reduction, but has not explicitly proposed phasing out coal, due to the influence of local governments, coal-related enterprises, and the public. This paper explores whether China could declare a “coal phase-out”, and the possible reasons for doing so, by constructing an evolutionary game model with two correlations. MATLAB was used to simulate the model results to determine the effectiveness of the fractal results of the model, and the entropy method was used to calculate the development level of “coal phase-out” related indicators in China and Germany. The results show that: (1) The government can phase out coal only when coal-related enterprises and the public can benefit from reducing coal production and consumption. In addition, these benefits are needed to ensure stable economic and social development without affecting people’s daily lives; (2) The development level of relevant indicators of “coal retreat” in China is lower than that in Germany. Based on these results, it is concluded that it is difficult for China to announce a “coal phase-out” at present. Faced with this reality, China should improve the efficiency of coal use, install carbon capture and storage facilities, vigorously develop renewable energy and reduce the share of coal in the energy system.

Evolutionary game analysis on the behavior strategies of power producers in renewable portfolio standard

Energy ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 162 ◽  
pp. 505-516 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhao Xin-gang ◽  
Ren Ling-zhi ◽  
Zhang Yu-zhuo ◽  
Wan Guan
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Renewable Portfolio Standard ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Behavior Strategies

Study on Participant Behavior Game of Electronic Products Reverse Supply Chain Based on ECP

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (5) ◽  
pp. 411-434 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mingbao Wang ◽  
Zhiping Du ◽  
Hong Duan
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Simulation Method ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Reverse Supply Chain ◽  
Electronic Products ◽  
The Government ◽  
Differential Equation Method ◽  
Reward And Punishment

Abstract In this paper, a game model composed of three subjects — government, manufacturer and consumer has been built by using Evolutionary Game Theory on the basis of analyzing the trilateral game strategy of waste mobile reverse supply chain based on ECP; an evolutionary equilibrium model is to be sought for by utilizing the replication dynamic differential equation method; and the trilateral game strategy’s revolutionary trend and consistency have been analyzed by means of SD simulation method when government implements the static or dynamic reward and punishment strategy. The finding results reveal that, under the static reward and punishment strategy, the revolutionary process of trilateral game strategy is always unstable whether the initial behavior strategy is unitary or mixed. Therefore, it is more reasonable for the government to adopt the strategy of dynamic reward and punishment, and it is also stable and reciprocal for all the stakeholders when implementing this strategy.

scholarly journals Subject Behavior of Collaborative Innovation in Civil-Military Integration: An Evolutionary Game Analysis

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Xiaodi Xu ◽  
Zilong Wang ◽  
Yongfeng Zhu ◽  
Xiaochun Luo
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Absorption Capacity ◽  
Technology Spillover ◽  
Key Factors ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Government

Based on the evolutionary game mode, this study constructs the evolutionary game model of collaborative innovation in civil-military integration considering the reward-punishment mechanism of the government. The subject behavior of core enterprises and noncore enterprises in the collaborative innovation of civil-military integration is investigated from a microperspective. The results suggest that the key factors influencing the enthusiasm of enterprises to participate in collaborative innovation are the level of technology spillover, technology absorption capacity, the share of excess benefits, the reward for active participation in collaborative innovation, and the punishment for passive participation. The game evolution result of the two parties will converge to (actively participate in collaborative innovation, actively participate in collaborative innovation) when the government rewards obtained by the party actively participating in collaborative innovation exceed the technology spillover loss and the excess benefits exceed the difference between the acquired technology spillover and the penalty for passive participation. These findings may provide a decision-making reference for the government to formulate the strategy of collaborative innovation in civil-military integration.

Analysis of generation cost changes during China’s energy transition

2018 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 456-472 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wenli Qiang ◽  
Shuwen Niu ◽  
Xiaojie Liu ◽  
Xiang Wang ◽  
Zhuo Jia ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Emission Trading ◽  
Energy Transition ◽  
Clean Energy ◽  
Energy System ◽  
System Transformation ◽  
Generation Cost ◽  
The Government ◽  
Carbon Emission Trading ◽  
The Cost

How to cut down power generation cost is an important issue during energy system transformation. This study examines the pathway of China’s coal-fired and clean power’s unit generation cost changes during 2007–2015 and predicts the change trends of each type of power between 2016 and 2025. The results show that the cost of coal-fired power will increase to 0.50–0.73 Yuan/kWh in 2025 because of the stricter environmental regulations and the establishment of a nationwide carbon emission trading market. Conversely, the cost of clean energy power, with the exception of hydropower, shows a decreasing trend between 2007 and 2025, with the costs of nuclear power, solar power, and wind power declining from 0.40, 4.34, and 0.56 Yuan/kWh to 0.33, 0.31, and 0.49 Yuan/kWh, respectively. However, the cost of hydropower displays an increasing trend from 0.22 to 0.26 Yuan/kWh during 2007–2025 due to increases in construction costs. Considering the external cost increases applying to coal-fired power and the declining trend caused by the learning rates of renewable power, the cost of all the clean energy power will be lower than the costs of coal-fired power before 2025. The cost sharing of coal-fired power is also analyzed in this study. However, there are a number of relevant economic and policy measures that are needed to be taken by the government to fulfill this transformation.

scholarly journals Study on Multi-Agent Evolutionary Game of Emergency Management of Public Health Emergencies Based on Dynamic Rewards and Punishments

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (16) ◽  
pp. 8278
Author(s):  
Ruguo Fan ◽  
Yibo Wang ◽  
Jinchai Lin
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Emergency Management ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Behavioral Strategies ◽  
Public Health Emergencies ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
And Control ◽  
Reward And Punishment

In the context of public health emergency management, it is worth studying ways to mobilize the enthusiasm of government, community, and residents. This paper adopts the method of combining evolutionary game and system dynamics to conduct a theoretical modeling and simulation analysis on the interactions of the behavioral strategies of the three participants. In response to opportunistic behavior and inadequate supervision in the static reward and punishment mechanism, we introduced a dynamic reward and punishment mechanism that considers changes in the social environment and the situation of epidemic prevention and control. This paper proves that the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism can effectively suppress the fluctuation problem in the evolutionary game process under static scenarios and achieve better supervision results through scenario analysis and simulation experiments.

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