How do government subsidies promote new energy vehicle diffusion in the complex network context? A three-stage evolutionary game model

Energy ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 120899
Author(s):  
Dan Zhao ◽  
Shou-feng Ji ◽  
He-ping Wang ◽  
Li-wen Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Complex Network ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
New Energy ◽  
New Energy Vehicle

scholarly journals System Dynamics Model for the Evolutionary Behaviour of Government Enterprises and Consumers in China’s New Energy Vehicle Market

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 1578 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hongxia Sun ◽  
Yao Wan ◽  
Huirong Lv
Keyword(s):  
System Dynamics ◽  
Motor Vehicle ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Practical Significance ◽  
Subsidy Policy ◽  
New Energy ◽  
New Energy Vehicle ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Vehicle Market

Exhaust pollution and energy crises are worsening worldwide. China has become the largest motor vehicle producer; thus, promoting the use of new energy vehicles (NEVs) in China has important practical significance. In this paper, considering the limited rationality of governments, NEV enterprises and consumers, we study the subsidy policy of the China NEV market using the evolutionary game and system dynamics (SD) methods. First, a tripartite evolutionary game model is developed and the replicator dynamics equations and Jacobian matrix are obtained. A SD simulation of the model was conducted to further clarify the impact of the initial market proportion and three variables used in the model. The results show that the initial market proportion affects the evolution speed but does not affect the evolution result when the three group players all choose a mixed strategy. For governments, they should not hastily cancel price subsidies provided to consumers; rather, they should dynamically adjust the rate of the subsidy decrease and increase the consumers’ extra cost for purchasing fuel vehicles (FVs). NEV enterprises should appropriately increase their investments in the research and development (R&D) of NEVs.

scholarly journals Profit Distribution and Stability Analysis of Joint Distribution Alliance Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game Theory Under the Background of Green and Low-Carbon

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Renbin Han ◽  
Mengke Yang
Keyword(s):  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Joint Distribution ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Environmental Benefit ◽  
Logistics Industry ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Profit Distribution ◽  
The Government

Abstract Joint distribution is an advanced logistics organization model for improving the quality and efficiency of express logistics industry and achieve high-quality development of logistics, but the distribution of common profit has always been a key obstacle to the effective development of joint distribution. Based on the background of green and low-carbon, this paper explores a fairer and more reasonable profit distribution scheme. The profit game between the government and the two types of member enterprises is analyzed. By focusing on how the government plays a role in inducing the joint distribution alliance to bring the green and low-carbon requirements into the profit distribution, the strategy evolution process of the three parties, the factors affecting the profit distribution and the stability of alliance are discussed through the establishment of "government-member enterprise A-member enterprise B" tripartite evolutionary game model. Finally, the evolutionary game model is numerically simulated based on system dynamics. It is found that: (1) It is necessary for the government to guide and motivate the alliance to create internal incentives and constraints. The effect of government subsidies and rewards to member enterprises is greater than the penalties for member enterprises. (2) The member enterprises are likely to conspire together to defraud government subsidies and rewards, carry out "free riding" and other speculative activities, which makes it necessary for the government and the alliance to establish supervision mechanism, information disclosure mechanism, and property rights protection system. (3) The willingness of member enterprise to positively cooperate will increase with the increase of the additional benefit coefficient, the proportion of profit distribution and the importance of environmental benefit factor; and will decrease with the increase of the cost of promoting green distribution operations.

scholarly journals The Impact of Financial Support on Innovation Efficiency of Government Subsidies From the Perspective of DEA-Tobit——An Empirical Study Based on Chinese New Energy Vehicle Enterprises

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sha Zhang ◽  
Fang Chen
Keyword(s):  
Financial Support ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Reference Value ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Operating Cycle ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
New Energy ◽  
New Energy Vehicle ◽  
The Impact

Abstract The new energy vehicle enterprises is a strategic emerging industry in China, so more and more government subsidies to promote innovative development are being accepted by new energy vehicle enterprises. What is the innovation efficiency of new energy vehicle enterprises receiving government subsidies? With the acceleration of the process of global economic financialization, whether financial support can promote the innovation efficiency of government subsidies and how enterprises should allocate financial assets have become issues that need to be deeply considered. Based on the annual report data of China's domestic listed new energy vehicle enterprises from 2015 to 2020, the relationship between government subsidies and enterprise innovation efficiency is empirically tested, and the impact of financial support on enterprise R&D innovation efficiency is investigated. The empirical results show that government subsidies are wasteful and fail to effectively promote R&D innovation, and the innovation efficiency of government subsidies is positively influenced by firm nature and firm age, while the total asset turnover ratio, operating cycle and firm size have a negative impact on innovation efficiency. Further research found that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between financial support and the innovation efficiency of government subsidies. A certain degree of financial support has a positive impact on the innovation efficiency of government subsidies, but excessive financial support has a negative impact on the innovation efficiency of government subsidies. The conclusion provides empirical evidence for the Chinese government to improve the subsidy policy and standardize the development of new energy vehicle enterprises, and has a certain reference value for guiding new energy vehicle enterprises to reasonably allocate financial support.

scholarly journals An Evolutionary Game Research on Cooperation Mode of the NEV Power Battery Recycling and Gradient Utilization Alliance in the Context of China’s NEV Power Battery Retired Tide

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (8) ◽  
pp. 4165
Author(s):  
Xichen Lyu ◽  
Yingying Xu ◽  
Dian Sun
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Sustainability ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
The Sustainable Development ◽  
Competition And Cooperation ◽  
Battery Recycling ◽  
Power Battery ◽  
New Energy ◽  
Single Strategy ◽  
The Government ◽  
New Energy Vehicle

Recycling and gradient utilization (GU) of new energy vehicle (NEV) power batteries plays a significant role in promoting the sustainable development of the economy, society and environment in the context of China’s NEV power battery retirement tide. In this paper, the battery recycling subjects and GU subjects were regarded as members in an alliance, and an evolutionary game model of competition and cooperation between the two types of subjects was established. Evolution conditions and paths of the stable cooperation modes between these two were explored. Suggestions were proposed to avoid entering a state of deadlock and promote the alliance to achieve the “win-win” cooperation mode of effective resource recovery and environmental sustainability. The results revealed four types of certain situations, two types of uncertain situations, and one type of deadlock situation for the evolution of alliance cooperation. The factors of the market environment are evident in not only changing the evolution paths and steady-states of the alliance but also in breaking the evolution deadlock. However, the sensitivity of the members in the alliance to different types of parameters varies greatly. It is difficult for the government to guide the formation of an ideal steady-state of cooperation or break the deadlock of evolution by a single strategy, such as subsidies or supervision. The combination of subsidy-and-supervision or phased regulation should be adopted. Only increasing subsidies is likely to weaken the function of the market and have a counterproductive effect.

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