scholarly journals An Evolutionary Game Research on Cooperation Mode of the NEV Power Battery Recycling and Gradient Utilization Alliance in the Context of China’s NEV Power Battery Retired Tide

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (8) ◽  
pp. 4165
Author(s):  
Xichen Lyu ◽  
Yingying Xu ◽  
Dian Sun
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Sustainability ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
The Sustainable Development ◽  
Competition And Cooperation ◽  
Battery Recycling ◽  
Power Battery ◽  
New Energy ◽  
Single Strategy ◽  
The Government ◽  
New Energy Vehicle

Recycling and gradient utilization (GU) of new energy vehicle (NEV) power batteries plays a significant role in promoting the sustainable development of the economy, society and environment in the context of China’s NEV power battery retirement tide. In this paper, the battery recycling subjects and GU subjects were regarded as members in an alliance, and an evolutionary game model of competition and cooperation between the two types of subjects was established. Evolution conditions and paths of the stable cooperation modes between these two were explored. Suggestions were proposed to avoid entering a state of deadlock and promote the alliance to achieve the “win-win” cooperation mode of effective resource recovery and environmental sustainability. The results revealed four types of certain situations, two types of uncertain situations, and one type of deadlock situation for the evolution of alliance cooperation. The factors of the market environment are evident in not only changing the evolution paths and steady-states of the alliance but also in breaking the evolution deadlock. However, the sensitivity of the members in the alliance to different types of parameters varies greatly. It is difficult for the government to guide the formation of an ideal steady-state of cooperation or break the deadlock of evolution by a single strategy, such as subsidies or supervision. The combination of subsidy-and-supervision or phased regulation should be adopted. Only increasing subsidies is likely to weaken the function of the market and have a counterproductive effect.

scholarly journals The behavior of consumer buying new energy vehicles based on stochastic evolutionary game

Filomat ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 30 (15) ◽  
pp. 3987-3997 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xin Guan ◽  
Guoxing Zhang ◽  
Diyi Liu ◽  
Xu Tan ◽  
Dong Wu
Keyword(s):  
External Disturbance ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Stability ◽  
Government Support ◽  
New Energy ◽  
The Government ◽  
New Energy Vehicle ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Support Cost ◽  
New Energy Vehicles

China?s current vehicle emissions caused by air pollution problems have become increasingly prominent. How to improve new energy vehicle market share, and effectively guide the consumer buying behavior become a problem, which the government and social have to be solved. In this paper, according to establish the stochastic evolutionary game model between the government and consumers in the car market, introducing of random factors analysis on the impact of evolutionary stability ,will obtain the stable strategy of government and automotive consumers. And on the basis of it, we study the government support, cost of vehicles, the use of cost, the utility of automobile use for the ways of evolutionary stability, with case further illustrates the external disturbance factors on consumer purchase of new energy vehicles in evolutionary game process stability. Studies show that: the increasing government subsidy policy, the reducing life cycle costs of new energy vehicles and the improving effectiveness of new energy vehicles will lead the model?s evolution to the orientation of consumer purchasing new energy vehicles.

scholarly journals Research on the effect of industrial policy on the development of China’s new energy vehicle power battery recycling industry chain

2021 ◽  
Vol 292 ◽  
pp. 01006
Author(s):  
Qiao Shuang ◽  
Liu Yingqi ◽  
Zhang Lei
Keyword(s):  
Industrial Policy ◽  
Analytic Hierarchy ◽  
Recycling Industry ◽  
Industry Chain ◽  
Stage Of Development ◽  
Battery Recycling ◽  
Power Battery ◽  
New Energy ◽  
New Energy Vehicle ◽  
The Impact

With the increasing attention to ecological environmental protection and the rapid consumption of global energy resources, the new energy vehicle industry is attracting more and more attention from all over the world, and the vehicle power battery has ushered in the stage of mass scrapping. China's power battery recycling industry is in the primary stage of development. In order to analyze the impact of relevant industrial policies on the development of the industry chain, this paper describes the development status of the power battery recycling industry by drawing the panorama of the industry chain of power battery recycling. At last, the industrial policy of power battery recycling was evaluated qualitatively and quantitatively by analytic hierarchy process, and on this basis, some policy suggestions to promote the development of industrial chain were put forward.

scholarly journals The impacts of subsidy policies and channel encroachment on the power battery recycling of new energy vehicles

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai Liu ◽  
Chuanxu Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Battery Recycling ◽  
Power Battery ◽  
New Energy ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact ◽  
New Energy Vehicles

Abstract With the rapid development of new energy vehicles (NEVs), the recycling and reuse of retired power batteries has attracted extensive attention from the society and scholars. In this paper, we establish a closed-loop supply chain model composed of the government, one power battery supplier and one NEV manufacturer. Based on game theory, considering whether the battery supplier encroaches on the power battery recycling channel, we study the optimal decisions of the government and supply chain members under different government subsidy policies (no subsidy, subsidy for the NEV manufacturer and subsidy for consumers) and their impact on profits and social welfare. The results show that, whether the battery supplier encroaches on the recycling channel or not, compared with the no subsidy policy, subsidy for the NEV manufacturer is more conducive to the improvement of enterprise profits and social welfare. In addition, whether the battery collection quantity is constrained by the NEV sales quantity, when the recycling channel cost is lower than a certain threshold, the encroachment is always beneficial to the battery supplier. When the recycling channel cost is within a certain threshold range, the encroachment will achieve a win–win situation; otherwise, win–lose. When the recycling channel cost is higher than a certain threshold, the encroachment behavior has no impact on the NEV manufacturer and the battery supplier. Finally, we investigate the impact of key parameters on the enterprise profits and social welfare through numerical experiments. We also find that the environmental awareness of consumers have significant impacts on social welfare.

scholarly journals System Dynamics Model for the Evolutionary Behaviour of Government Enterprises and Consumers in China’s New Energy Vehicle Market

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 1578 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hongxia Sun ◽  
Yao Wan ◽  
Huirong Lv
Keyword(s):  
System Dynamics ◽  
Motor Vehicle ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Practical Significance ◽  
Subsidy Policy ◽  
New Energy ◽  
New Energy Vehicle ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Vehicle Market

Exhaust pollution and energy crises are worsening worldwide. China has become the largest motor vehicle producer; thus, promoting the use of new energy vehicles (NEVs) in China has important practical significance. In this paper, considering the limited rationality of governments, NEV enterprises and consumers, we study the subsidy policy of the China NEV market using the evolutionary game and system dynamics (SD) methods. First, a tripartite evolutionary game model is developed and the replicator dynamics equations and Jacobian matrix are obtained. A SD simulation of the model was conducted to further clarify the impact of the initial market proportion and three variables used in the model. The results show that the initial market proportion affects the evolution speed but does not affect the evolution result when the three group players all choose a mixed strategy. For governments, they should not hastily cancel price subsidies provided to consumers; rather, they should dynamically adjust the rate of the subsidy decrease and increase the consumers’ extra cost for purchasing fuel vehicles (FVs). NEV enterprises should appropriately increase their investments in the research and development (R&D) of NEVs.

scholarly journals Traceability Management Strategy of the EV Power Battery Based on the Blockchain

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Yanjin Cheng ◽  
Hao Hao ◽  
Shipeng Tao ◽  
Yanjun Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Utilization Rate ◽  
Recycling Rate ◽  
Target Recycling ◽  
Traceability System ◽  
Battery Recycling ◽  
Power Battery ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Safety And Reliability ◽  
The Government

Regulating and supervising the energy vehicle (EV) power battery recycling market, improving the utilization rate of EV power battery recycling, and guaranteeing the safety and control of all aspects of recycling treatment require the establishment of an effective traceability system. The decentralization and tamper-proof characteristics of the blockchain can ensure the safety and reliability of relevant data while realizing traceability management. This study establishes the Stackelberg game model to compare and analyze the effects of different government mechanisms on the profits of each subject before and after participating in power battery traceability management. The study further uses the model to explore strategies to improve the enthusiasm of EV power battery recycling subjects to participate in traceability management. The results show that (1) the participation of each recycling subject in EV power battery blockchain traceability can help move more spent power batteries into formal recycling channels; (2) the government should adopt appropriate mechanisms to promote its participation in EV power battery blockchain traceability, the best result being when the government adopts a subsidy mechanism for consumers; and (3) the profit of the EV power battery manufacturer is inversely proportional to the target recycling rate set by the government. Furthermore, the pursuit of a very high target recycling rate is not conducive to the normal implementation of initial EV power battery blockchain traceability management. Therefore, it is crucial for the government to set a reasonable target recycling rate.

The Analysis of the Current Situation and Countermeasures of New Energy Vehicles

2014 ◽  
Vol 686 ◽  
pp. 639-642
Author(s):  
Wei Li ◽  
Ming Yuan Ma
Keyword(s):  
Social Capital ◽  
Management Mechanism ◽  
Pollution Problem ◽  
The Social ◽  
New Energy ◽  
Environmental Pollution Problem ◽  
The Government ◽  
New Energy Vehicle ◽  
Battery Technology ◽  
New Energy Vehicles

With pm2.5 and environmental pollution problem of urban smog, energy conservation and environmental protection has become an important subject in the current car development, so the new energy vehicles get more and more favor from the government and enterprises. But the new energy vehicles’ market share in our country is still small and the technology is not mature. This paper summarizes the experience and lessons in the development of new energy vehicles at home and abroad, and then based on which analyses the reasons that restrict the development of the new energy vehicles, finally puts forward the countermeasures of new energy vehicles development from the government's macro policy, battery technology, management mechanism, public participation and so on. In addition, it also puts forward a new opinion that encourages and guides the social capital to participate in the operation of the new energy vehicle infrastructure construction and operation, then provides a model for our country’s new energy vehicles future development.

Government subsidies in the power battery recycling industry

2020 ◽  
Vol 120 (6) ◽  
pp. 1059-1083 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peiqi Ding ◽  
Zhiying Zhao ◽  
Xiang Li
Keyword(s):  
Peer Review ◽  
Vital Role ◽  
Raw Material ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Recycling Industry ◽  
Power Battery ◽  
New Energy ◽  
New Energy Vehicle ◽  
Collection Strategies

PurposeThe power battery is the core of a new energy vehicle and plays a vital role in the rise of the new energy vehicle industry. As the number of waste batteries increases, firms involved in the industry need to properly dispose them, but what party is responsible remains unclear. To reduce environmental impacts, governments introduce two subsidy policies, i.e. collection subsidies, which are provided to the collecting firms, and dismantling subsidies, which are provided to the dismantling firms.Design/methodology/approachBased on the different characteristics of the subsidies, we develop a stylized model to examine the collection strategies and the preferences over the subsidies.FindingsWe derive several insights from analysis. First, the collection strategies depend on the fixed collection cost. Second, the key factor determining the firm's subsidy preference is the efficiency of dismantling. Finally, if the primary target is the collection rate, governments prefer to provide collection subsidies. If consider the environmental impact, the choice of subsidies has to do with the efficiency of dismantling. Moreover, from a social welfare perspective, the raw material cost and the efficiency of dismantling are core indicators of decision.Originality/valueThis work develops the first analytical model to study two power battery subsidies and investigate the optimal collecting strategies and subsidy preferences. The insights are compelling not only for the manufacturer and the third party but also for policymakers.Peer reviewThe peer review history for this article is available at: https://publons.com/publon/10.1108/IMDS-08-2019-0450

Evolutionary game analysis of land income distribution in tourism development

2020 ◽  
pp. 135481661989807
Author(s):  
Pang Qingyun ◽  
Zhang Mu
Keyword(s):  
Income Distribution ◽  
Local Community ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Tourism Development ◽  
The Sustainable Development ◽  
Land Prices ◽  
Land Transfer ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Tourism Destinations ◽  
The Government

Social stability is the key to the sustainable development of tourism destinations. And reasonable distribution of land revenue during tourism development can effectively avoid social conflicts at these destinations. This study explores the dynamic nature and stabilization of land revenue distribution for tourism development. It does so by developing an evolutionary game model. In this model, the main stakeholders include the government, developers and local communities, and analysis of the model indicates that the process of distributing land revenue is profoundly influenced by land transfer methods. Specifically, a developer chooses land transfer methods by weighing the land cost (consisting of land prices and taxes) or the benefit under non-cooperation with different land transfer methods. Meanwhile, the local community chooses whether to cooperate by considering the land income (consisting of land prices) or non-cooperative benefits. With different game sequences, the stakeholders will consider different conditions. Moreover, government taxation and subsidization policies are found to have little influence on the land transfer market in the long run. Instead, to avoid potential conflicts and social instability, the government should provide a good political environment for community participation. This study offers important implications for policymaking involving land income distribution for tourism destinations.

scholarly journals Research on Online Insulation Testing of Power Battery of New Energy Vehicles

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (01) ◽  
pp. 001-005
Author(s):  
Yuan Xu ◽  
Huazhang Wang ◽  
Jiacheng Li
Keyword(s):  
Detection System ◽  
Experimental Results ◽  
Normal Operation ◽  
Python Language ◽  
Power Battery ◽  
New Energy ◽  
Injection Type ◽  
New Energy Vehicle ◽  
Insulation Performance ◽  
New Energy Vehicles

The insulation performance of new energy vehicles is an important factor in the normal operation of vehicles. This paper designs a voltage injection-type insulation detection based on the traditional detection.Based on the python language combined with the library provided by NI-visa, it can achieve high integration and meet the national GB/T 18384.1-2015 standard. Experimental results show that the insulation detection system can accurately test the insulation performance of new energy vehicles and meet the new energy vehicle offline detection standards.

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