scholarly journals Model Three-Level Dual-Channel Supply Chain pada Sistem Sentralisasi dengan Memertimbangkan Waktu Tunggu Pengiriman

d'CARTESIAN ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 72
Author(s):  
Shinta Nur Pratiwi Ramadhani ◽  
Ririn Setiyowati ◽  
Titin Sri Martini
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Lead Time ◽  
Nonlinear Function ◽  
Optimal Solution ◽  
Global Market ◽  
Centralize System ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Total Profit ◽  
Online Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

AbstrakEra pasar global telah mengubah kebiasaan konsumen dalam membeli produk, sehingga konsumen dapat membeli produk melalui media online. Oleh karena itu, produsen mengembangkan media penjualannya melalui media online dan offline. Pada penelitian ini dikembangkan model three-level dual-channel supply chain dengan memertimbangkan waktu tunggu pengiriman pada penjualan melalui media online yang dilakukan oleh produsen serta mengembangkan media penjualan distributor sehingga distributor dapat menjual produk secara langsung ke konsumen. Konstruksi model bertujuan untuk mengoptimalkan keuntungan gabungan produsen, distributor, dan pengecer dengan sistem sentralisasi. Fungsi keuntungan gabungan merupakan fungsi nonlinear tanpa kendala dengan tiga variabel keputusan yaitu harga jual produsen pada media online, harga jual distributor langsung ke konsumen, dan harga jual pengecer ke konsumen. Selanjutnya, ditentukan solusi optimal model berdasarkan syarat perlu dan syarat cukup untuk fungsi multivariabel tanpa kendala. Berdasarkan simulasi numerik dan analisis sensitivitas dapat dilihat pengaruh faktor waktu tunggu pengiriman terhadap fungsi keuntungan gabungan yang optimal. Ditunjukkan bahwa lamanya waktu tunggu pengiriman sangat berpengaruh pada besarnya keuntungan optimal gabungan produsen, distributor, dan pengecer.Kata Kunci: Sentralisasi, Three-Level, Waktu TungguAbstractThe global market era changes the consumer behavior to shop the product, so the consumer can buy through online channel. Therefore, the producer develop the selling channel to sell their products through online channel and offline channel. In this research, we develop the three-level dual-channel supply chain by notice delivery lead time in the online channel used by the producer and develop selling channel from distributors so distributors can sell their product to consumer with direct selling. We construct the model with profit maximization motive of the system that consists producer, distributors, and retailer in the centralize system. The total profit function is nonlinear function without constrains with three decision variables. Furthermore, we determine the optimal solution of the model based on necessary and sufficient condition. Based on numerical simulations and sensitivity analysis we analyze the effect of delivery lead time strongly influences the optimal total profit system.Keywords: Centralize, Lead Time, Three-Level

scholarly journals Optimal channel decision of retailers in the dual-channel supply chain considering consumer preference for delivery lead time

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 453-466
Author(s):  
Y.S. Hu ◽  
L.H. Zeng ◽  
Z.L. Huang ◽  
Q. Cheng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Lead Time ◽  
Time Preference ◽  
Consumer Preference ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Online Retail ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Retail Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
Preference Coefficient

Facing competition from manufacturers' online direct channels, how retailers make sales channel decisions to increase consumer stickiness has become the core concern of the industry and academia. Empirical research showed that delivery lead time is a key factor that affects consumers' preference for online channels. To analyze the impact of consumer delivery time preference on channel selection and pricing strategy of retailers, consumer delivery lead time preference function was improved from a linear function to an exponential function and consumer demand under the mixed dual-channel supply chain of manufacturer and retailer was derived. Then, the Stackelberg game models under different channel strategies of retailer were established and solved. Results show that consumer preference for delivery lead time has four implications on the channel decision of retailers under manufacturer encroachment in the dual-channel supply chain. First, the dual retail channels strategy is the optimal choice for retailers, and the profit margins that a retailer obtains from dual retail channels supply chain and single online retail channel supply chain will increase as consumers' delivery lead time preference coefficient increases. Second, the optimal pricing of online retail channel and offline retail channel is positively related to consumers' delivery lead time preference coefficient. By contrast, the optimal pricing of online direct channel is negatively related to consumers' delivery lead time preference coefficient. Third, the optimal pricing of online retail channel is higher than that of offline retail and online direct channels. Fourth, a retailer and a manufacturer can adopt a compensation-based whole price contract to address the conflict brought about by the optimal channel choice of the retailer. This study introduces consumer delivery lead time preference into retailer channel decision making and provides a theoretical reference for retailer's mixed channel construction in practice.

scholarly journals Managing a Dual-Channel Supply Chain with Fairness and Channel Preference

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Xianjin Du ◽  
Weijie Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Supply Chain Design ◽  
Operational Strategies ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Channel Preference ◽  
Online Channel ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

This paper investigates a dual-channel supply chain in which a manufacturer sells the product via an offline retailer or online store. The manufacturer sets the wholesale and online price, and the retailer decides the retail price with the retailer’s fairness preference and consumer’s online channel preference. Through investigating the combined impacts of fairness preference and channel preference on the enterprises’ operational strategies, this paper obtains some meaningful results. If a manufacturer thinks over the fairness preference, he decreases the wholesale price to mitigate a loss of retailer and benefit the supply chain design. The manufacturer intends to set up the online channel with a lower acceptance as the fairness preference grows. However, the gains from enhanced online channel acceptance cannot compensate for the manufacturer’s loss by the fairness effect that benefits the retailer. Moreover, the manufacturer cannot neglect the retailer’s fairness preference generating a “lose-lose” case for both members.

Impact of wholesale price discrimination by the manufacturer on the profit of supply chain members

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rofin TM ◽  
Biswajit Mahanty
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Price Strategy ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Channel Preference ◽  
Online Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
The Impact

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of wholesale price discrimination by a manufacturer in a retailer–e-tailer dual-channel supply chain for different product categories based on their online channel preference.Design/methodology/approachThis paper considers a dual-channel supply chain comprising of a retailer and an e-tailer engaged in competition. Game-theoretic models are developed to model the competition between the retailer and e-tailer and to derive their optimal price, optimal order quantity and optimal profit under (1) equal wholesale price strategy and (2) discriminatory wholesale price strategy. Further, a numerical example was employed to quantify the results and to capture the variation with respect to online channel preference of the product.FindingsIt is beneficial for the manufacturer to adopt a discriminatory wholesale price strategy for products having both high online channel preference and low online channel preference. However, equal wholesale price strategy is beneficial for the e-tailer and the retailer in the case of products having high online channel preference and in the case of products having low online channel preference, respectively.Practical implicationsThe study helps the manufacturers to maximize their profit by adopting the right wholesale price strategy considering the online channel preference of the product when the manufacturers are supplying to heterogeneous retailers.Originality/valueThere is scant literature on the wholesale price strategy of the manufacturer considering the heterogeneous downstream retailers. This paper contributes the literature by bridging this gap. In addition, the study establishes a link between the wholesale price strategy and online channel preference of the product.

The study on price and lead time decisions in retailer-dominated dual-channel supply chain

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 805-819 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yi-Bin Li ◽  
Chun-Pei Lin ◽  
Tung-Ju Wu ◽  
Jin-Long Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Lead Time ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

scholarly journals Strategic Provision of Trade Credit in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Qin Wan ◽  
Yu Huang ◽  
Cuiting Yu ◽  
Meili Lu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Interest Rate ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Pricing Strategy ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Brick And Mortar ◽  
Online Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
Competitive Pricing

This study focuses on a a dual-channel supply chain that consists of a capital-constrained brick-and-mortar retailer and a manufacturer, where a manufacturer can simultaneously sell products through a traditional retail channel and a direct online channel. Supplementary pricing strategy and competitive pricing strategy are simulated in our model, and we find that the former one is the better choice for the manufacturer when the retailer suffers capital constraints. In our analysis, the capital constraint on retailer could mitigate the price competition between two channels, and it may be beneficial to the manufacturer under certain conditions. Our findings show that the manufacturer should strategically provide trade credit to retailers rather than unconditionally provide it. We present two trade-credit strategies (trade credit with positive interest rate and trade credit with zero interest rate) and suggest that the manufacturer should choose an appropriate trade-credit strategy according to the initial capital of the retailer. To guide the manufacturer when and how to provide trade credit, we conduct several numerical simulations based on our results and further plot out a graph to direct the manufacturer to an appropriate strategy of trade credit.

Quantity Leadership for a Dual-Channel Supply Chain with Retail Service

2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (02) ◽  
pp. 2050005
Author(s):  
Ciwei Dong ◽  
Liu Yang ◽  
Chi To Ng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
Optimal Solutions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Numerical Studies ◽  
Retail Service ◽  
Online Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

In a dual-channel supply, the manufacturer sells the products by both a traditional channel via the retailer and an online channel directly. Comparing with the direct channel, the retailer may provide additional services to the traditional channel. This paper studies the quantity leadership for a dual-channel supply chain with retail service. The manufacturer decides the wholesale price of the products and its selling quantity via the online channel, and the retailer decides the service level and its selling quantity via the traditional channel. We consider three Cournot competition games: Manufacturer-as-leader game, retailer-as-leader game, and simultaneous game. Optimal solutions are derived for these games. Based on the optimal solutions, we investigate the quantity leadership/followership decisions for the manufacturer and retailer, associated with the changes of some parameters. We observe that when the service sensitivity parameters are low, being a follower is a dominant strategy for the retailer; otherwise, both strategies of manufacturer-as-leader (retailer as the follower) and retailer-as-leader (manufacturer as the follower) are Nash equilibriums. We further conduct the numerical studies to investigate the impacts of parameters related to the retail service, and discuss the insights of the findings.

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