The Effect of the Mandatory Adoption of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Executive Compensation

2011 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 138-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Constantinos G. Chalevas
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Mandatory Adoption

The Effects of Corporate Governance on CEO Compensation

2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-191
Author(s):  
Myoung Gi Lee ◽  
Jin San Kim
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Labor Union ◽  
Market Competition ◽  
Poor Performance ◽  
Control Mechanisms ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Top Executives ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms

The purpose of this study is to find the effects of corporate governance on executive compensation using the sample of Korean manufacturing firms listed on the Korea Exchange (KRX) from 2005 to 2012. In order to do that, this study extends empirical models of Core et al. (1999), Fahlenbrach (2009), Giroud and Mueller (2011), and finds the following results. First, internal corporate governance negatively affects executive compensation, implying that a good corporate governance can prevent outrageous compensation to top executives with poor performance. On the other hand, the interactions between internal and external corporate governance mechanisms have mixed results. While the first interaction has little impact on executive compensation, the second interaction among three different mechanisms has a positive and statistically significant impact. These results imply that while internal corporate governance and product market competition works against executive compensation, labor union may be in the same boat with managers in terms of compensation. Unlike most previous studies based on one-dimensional approach, this study investigates interactions among various corporate governance mechanisms. Overall results have a few important economic and social implications. Because internal corporate governance works as an effective mechanism, policymakers should find ways to make internal control mechanisms as independent as possible.

The effect of corporate governance and firm-specific characteristics on the incidence of financial restatement

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Suhaily Hasnan ◽  
Mardhiahtul Huda Mohd Razali ◽  
Alfiatul Rohmah Mohamed Hussain
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Significant Relationship ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Financial Restatement ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Firm Leverage

Purpose This paper aims to examine the effects of corporate governance and firm-specific characteristics on the incidence of financial restatement among Malaysian public listed firms. Design/methodology/approach The elements of corporate governance consist of board size, board independence, multiple directorships, audit committee expertise, external audit quality and executive compensation. Meanwhile, the firm-specific characteristics consist of firm age, firm performance, firm leverage and firm liquidity. The agency theory has been used to guide the study. This study used a matched-pair sample that consisted of a sample of 49 restatement firms and 98 non-restatement firms between the years 2011 and 2016. Univariate (t-test and Pearson correlation) and multivariate (logistic regression) statistical techniques were used to test the hypotheses. Findings The results show that there is a negative and significant relationship between executive compensation and firm performance, and the incidence of financial restatement. In addition, there is a positive and significant relationship between firm leverage and the incidence of financial restatement. However, the other corporate governance and firm-specific characteristic variables included in the study were found to be insignificant with the incidence of financial restatement. This paper provides evidence that some form of corporate governance mechanisms and firm-specific characteristics, particularly executive compensation, firm performance and firm leverage, may influence the direction and magnitude of the incidence of financial restatement. The findings indicate that optimal executive incentives may align management interests with those of shareholders. In addition, greater performance and lower leverage levels minimise firms’ financial pressure and debt covenant violation risk, which may reduce the management tendency to misstate the financial statement, and consequently, minimise the likelihood of financial restatement. Originality/value The main value of this paper is the effect of corporate governance and firm-specific characteristics on the likelihood of financial restatement in Malaysia. The findings of this study provide useful insights for regulators to improve and reconsider the current regulations on corporate governance mechanisms.

The relation between corporate governance mechanisms, executive compensation and audit fees

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 (8) ◽  
pp. 939-967 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mahdi Salehi ◽  
Hossein Tarighi ◽  
Samaneh Safdari
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Stock Option ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Board Ownership

Purpose This paper aims to investigate the effects of some corporate governance mechanisms and executive compensation on audit fees in an emerging market. Design/methodology/approach The study population consists of 540 observations and 90 listed companies on the Tehran Stock Exchange during the years 2009-2014. The statistical model used in this study is a multivariate regression model; besides, the statistical technique used to test the hypotheses proposed in this research is panel data. Findings The changes in the value of a CEO’s own firm stock option portfolio, in thousands of rials (Iran’s currency), for a 0.01 change in stock return volatility and stock price are defined as Vega and Delta, respectively. The results demonstrated that there is a positive association between audit fees and delta, but not Vega; this means that a fee premium is linked to CEO Delta incentives. The findings show that Iranian companies pay more audit fees when they give managers more rewards. In addition, the results show that there is not a significant relationship between fees resulting from audit risk and Delta and Vega incentives of the board. Inconsistent with agency theory, the authors found that the independence of board members did not have any effect on audit fees. As a final point, the outcomes of the paper demonstrate that managers who invest in companies under their own management do not have any impact on the amount of audit fee. To put it another way, there is not any significant connection between the board ownership and audit fees. Practical implications This is one of the most important studies that simultaneously surveys the impacts of corporate governance mechanisms and executive compensation in the Iranian audit market. The results of this study will reveal more than the role of corporate governance mechanisms for society and users of financial statements because as tools on the CEO actions, they always have to pay attention to the implementation of corporate principles in the economic entity’ operation. Originality/value The present study has examined the relationship between two cases of corporate governance mechanisms named the board independence and the board ownership with audit fees in a country where, to the authors’ knowledge as in most other developing markets, such a relationship has not been a subject of empirical research. Moreover, the use of a two-dimensional measure of executive compensation, namely, Delta and Vega incentives, primarily considering research undertaken in an emerging market, as a valuable contribution may be observed.

scholarly journals Is corporate governance of private equity targets more effective for risk mitigation?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vladimiro Marini ◽  
Massimo Caratelli ◽  
Gian Paolo Stella ◽  
Ilaria Barbaraci
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Financial Distress ◽  
Private Equity ◽  
Risk Mitigation ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Active Monitoring ◽  
Industry Expert ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms

AbstractPrivate equity is a source of finance and a governance device characterised by active monitoring through sponsors that intervene in targets’ corporate governance. As sponsors are skilled and motivated acquirors, we investigated whether corporate governance mechanisms mitigate leveraged targets’ risk of financial distress differently compared to non-acquired companies through the lenses of agency theory and resource-based theories. We found that targets and non-acquired companies are not significantly different in terms of corporate governance features, but sponsors are skilled enough to choose corporate governance members to mitigate risk more, especially when boards are smaller, have busier industry expert directors, and mandate execution to more managers. These results can be useful to targets, targets’ investors and lenders, and policymakers.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VIRTUAL-NETWORK PARADIGM OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AT THE ENTERPRISES OF THE FUEL AND ENERGY COMPLEX

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (8) ◽  
pp. 58-62
Author(s):  
Kamila Zagidullina ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Economic Development ◽  
Functional Approach ◽  
Process Approach ◽  
Virtual Network ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Theoretical Substantiation ◽  
Energy Complex ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Market Transformation

The relevance is increasing due to the need for a theoretical substantiation of the directions and mechanism of further market transformation of the fuel and energy complex, taking into account the dependence of the processes and results of its economic development on the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms. Key words:economics, fuel and energy complex, corporate governance, functional approach, process approach, virtual-network paradigm, mechanism

scholarly journals Corporate governance and conglomerate diversification strategy – evidence from Vietnam

2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (6) ◽  
pp. 1578-1596 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thi Xuan Trang Nguyen
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Board Composition ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Unrelated Diversification ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Control Devices ◽  
Interest Alignment ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of internal corporate governance mechanisms, including interest alignment and control devices, on the unrelated diversification level in Vietnam. Additionally, the moderation of free cash flow (FCF) on these relationships is also tested. Design/methodology/approach The study is based on a balanced panel data set of 70 listed companies in both stock markets, Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange and Hanoi Stock Exchange, in Vietnam for the years 2007–2014, which gives 560 observations in total. Findings The results show that if executive ownership for CEOs is increased, then the extent of diversification is likely to be reduced. However, the link between unrelated diversification level and executive stock option, another interest alignment device, cannot be confirmed. Among three control devices (level of blockholder ownership, board composition and separation of CEO and chairman positions), the study finds a positive connection between diversification and blockholder ownership, and statistically insignificant relations between the conglomerate diversification level and board composition, or CEO duality. Additionally, this study discovers a negative link between diversification and state ownership, although there is no evidence to support the change to the effect of each internal corporate governance mechanism on the diversification level of a firm between high and low FCF. Practical implications The research can be a useful reference not only for investors and managers but also for policy makers in Vietnam. This study explores the relationship among corporate governance, diversification and firm value in Vietnam, where the topics related to effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms to public companies has been increasingly attractive to researchers since the default of Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Group (Vinashin) happened in 2010 and the Circular No. 121/2012/TT-BTC on 26 July 2012 of the Vietnamese Ministry of Finance was issued with regulations on corporate governance applicable to listed firms in this country. Originality/value This research, first, enriches current literature on the relationship between corporate governance and firm diversification. It can be considered as a contribution to the related topic with an example of Vietnam, a developing country in Asia. Second, the research continues to prove non-unification in results showing the relationship between corporate governance and conglomerate diversification among different nations. Third, it provides a potential input for future research works on the moderation of FCF to the effects of corporate governance on diversification.

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