Integration of a shoreline response program (SRP) and shoreline assessment surveys into an Incident Management System for oil spill response

2021 ◽  
Vol 279 ◽  
pp. 111637
Author(s):  
Edward Owens ◽  
Richard Santner
1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 737-742
Author(s):  
LT Tina M. Burke ◽  
LT John P. Flynn

ABSTRACT In recent years, the usefulness of the incident command system (ICS) has received much attention. Much of the oil industry and several government agencies involved in all types of emergency response have been using ICS for many years. In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard formally adopted the national interagency incident management system (NIIMS) ICS as the response management system of choice in February of 1996. The response to the tank barge North Cape grounding was a complex multiagency effort that brought with it many of the issues and problems responders face when dealing with crisis situations. This paper describes the ICS-based organization that was established to respond to the major North Cape oil spill, analyzes the organization compared to standard ICS, and discusses how the ICS framework and principles contributed to the success of the response. It also explains how closer conformity to standard ICS could have remedied many of the issues that later surfaced as lessons learned, resulting in improved response efficiency. The North Cape response provides a vivid example of how ICS is a helpful management tool that, if rigorously learned and applied in a widespread fashion, can greatly enhance the nation's oil spill response posture.


2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (2) ◽  
pp. 987-990
Author(s):  
Kristy Plourde ◽  
Jean R. Cameron ◽  
Vickie Huyck

ABSTRACT The original oil spill Field Operations Guide (FOG) was a product of the Standard Oil Spill Response Management System (STORMS) Task Force comprised of representatives of the U. S. Coast Guard, California Department of Fish and Game Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR), other states, the petroleum industry, oil spill response organizations, and local government. The STORMS Task Force produced this first version of the “oilized” Incident Command System (ICS) FOG and Incident Action Plan (IAP) forms in 1994 and made subsequent revisions in 1995 and 1996. With 2 more years of ICS experience and facilitated by the States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force, a new group of representatives from federal and state governments, the petroleum industry, and oil spill response professionals met to review and update the 1996 FOG and IAP forms in October 1998. The overall goal was to remain consistent with the National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS) yet reflect the experience gained using ICS at actual oil spills and drills. The group met quarterly over an 18-month period, working collaboratively to reach a consensus on numerous changes. Some of the changes included adding an Environmental Unit to the Planning Section, revising the planning cycle diagram for the oil spill IAP process, and revising the IAP forms as appropriate to reflect the way oil spills are managed. All significant revisions/improvements will be highlighted in this paper and poster.


2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (1) ◽  
pp. 703-705
Author(s):  
Christopher J. Hall ◽  
Walter J. Henry

ABSTRACT The Alaska North Slope region is a challenging operating environment. During spill response operations, worksite hazards are magnified and ensuring safety of response personnel becomes more difficult. In the Incident Management Team, the Safety Officer develops a Site Safety Plan to identify hazards and establish guidelines for safe operations. This information is typically communicated to the field workers when they check-in at the Staging Area or other assigned location. The Site Safety Plan alone, however, fails to address specific behaviors of the personnel that lead to unsafe activities. Behavior-Based Safety Processes fill in this missing piece. The PIRATE Process is an example of behavior-based safety at work. PIRATE - Personal Involvement Reduces Accidents to Everyone - is a fundamental part of the safety culture in the Greater Prudhoe Bay operating area. The March 2006 Gathering Center 2 (GC-2) Transit Line oil spill response presented significant challenges to all involved: extreme weather conditions, congested work areas, spilled oil on frozen lake and tundra environments, and complex field operations competing for personnel and resources. Daily involvement with PIRATE (and similar North Slope Behavior-Based Safety Processes) has made the workforce acutely aware of each individuar'S role in workplace safety, enhancing the overall safety performance of the organization. This poster shows some of the difficulties of a complex arctic oil spill response, and the application of Behavior-Based Safety Processes to enable safe and efficient operations in the face of these challenges.


2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 321-328
Author(s):  
Julian Roberts ◽  
Alain Lamarche

ABSTRACT The Maritime Safety Authority of New Zealand (MSA) has a mandate to promote a safe and clean marine environment and to provide an effective marine pollution response capability. As part of its obligations, the MSA is responsible for the New Zealand Marine Oil Spill Response Strategy and the preparation of a National Marine Oil Spill Contingency Plan for Tier 3 spill events (Maritime Transport Act 1994, S.283). The MSA is currently working on the design of an extensive coastal information database—including information such as marine and natural resource inventories and coastal human-built infrastructures—that can be mapped in a GIS system. A customised toolset is also being developed to streamline the management of the database. The benefits of GIS-based information management systems in oil spill response have been demonstrated by a number of overseas response agencies. However, many of these rely on discrete components or only fulfil specific individual requirements, such as the provision of coastal resource information. Having reviewed these approaches, New Zealand has embarked on the development of a more integrated and comprehensive oil spill information management system that will deliver a broad range of applications and serve to provide a framework for the seamless management and reporting of all the types of data that are generated throughout the life cycle of an oil spill response. The system combines GIS and database technology. It includes field survey management support, as well as automated treatment mechanisms to produce reports and maps to support planning and operations. The system also integrates a pre-spill shoreline segmentation database. The benefits of such a system will include the recording and presentation of all types of response data that is more responsive to the needs of operational decision makers; the ability to better track the progress of spill cleanup activities in both a temporal and spatial context; and the generation of customised reports to assist in cost recovery claims on termination of response activities.


Author(s):  
Jessica Garron ◽  
Jereme M. Altendorf

ABSTRACT> (PS1-02) Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) have a high potential value to support oil spill response activities due to their capabilities to provide real-time situational awareness. A variety of UAS are available to support response activities, and determining the precise aircraft, sensor payload and flight patterns will depend on the operational need for surveillance. In support of UAS integration into America's airspace, the FAA has defined general protocols for the commercial use of small UAS (less than 55 lbs. total take-off weight) in 14 CFR Part 107. However, these regulations do not address any other concerns associated with flight of these small aircraft, such as shared operational airspace within a temporary flight restriction area, or regulations for flight over animals that fall under state or federal management. To address this lack of policy, a UAS protocol for flights of small UAS during oil spill response activities was developed and integrated into a series of tabletop oil spill exercises conducted in Alaska during 2018. The UAS protocol was vetted with state and federal agencies responsible for wildlife management both on and offshore, was modified for execution in remote as well as urban locations, and has been integrated into Area Contingency Plans in Alaska. This presentation will highlight the operational components of the UAS operational protocol, as well as the challenges, both perceived and actual, to UAS integration into the incident management structure of an oil spill response.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 2017120
Author(s):  
Jeff Williams ◽  
Kevin Hand ◽  
Christian Haselwimmer

Field testing small unmanned air systems (UAS) in marine oil spill response exercises began in 2006. Soon afterward there were multiple credible examples where uas's could complement the traditional roles which manned aircraft filled for oil spill observation. Testing stopped abruptly in 2007 when the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration changed rules for the commercial use of uas's. Testing resumed in 2013 after the U.S. Congress mandated that the FAA finalize operating rules for uas commercial use. Exercise tests validated oil spill observation by uas's when an experienced aerial oil spill observer confirmed that properly equipped uas platforms and cameras could offer results equal to manned aircraft flights. Today there are a much wider variety of uas's and increasingly more capable sensors which can be utilized for creating highly detailed maps or data collection for geographic information system applications such as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Environmental Response Management Application (ERMA). Radio technology advances have also improved the ability to transfer video/data over greater distance and faster speeds than initial tests. Mobile ad hoc networks of multiple radios can transfer uas data streams beyond line of sight and connect with the internet for even broader distribution. This same network can also be used by responders in the field to exchange video, voice and location data and be linked real time with command post map displays and data feeds creating a true common operating picture across the entire response effort. From an organizational perspective, uas's are not discussed in the 2014 USCG Incident Management Handbook. Despite this however, their activities need coordinated with manned aircraft through Air Operations for regulations and safety. Staging them at airports serves little purpose given their flexibility and small size. Better utilization would be achieved placing the uas and operators near the command posts or at staging sites alongside the boats or vehicles they would work from. Their unique differences would also support creating a UAS Group Supervisor in Air Operations to clarify their requirements and tasking. The Situation Unit would typically be the best central receiving point for incoming data and from there aerial observers and data specialists can route video / data to operations, gis users and display operators managing the common operating picture. Additional topics for final presentation:*See and avoid capabilities*Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast (ADS-B) transmitters/receivers*Night flights approval*New operator regulations not requiring pilot's license


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 2017040
Author(s):  
Jonas Pålsson ◽  
Lawrence Hildebrand ◽  
Olof Lindén

The inadequacy of the Swedish national emergency management system has been highlighted during several large-scale national emergencies, including forest fires (Västmanland 2014) and storms (Gudrun 2005, Dagmar 2011, and Ivar 2013). The Swedish oil spill preparedness is part of the national emergency response system and was tested under real conditions during the 2003 Fu Shan Hai and 2011 Golden Trader oil spills. Fu Shan Hai spilled 1,200 tonnes of oil on the shorelines of southern Sweden and Golden Trader spilled 500 tonnes on the island of Tjörn. Lessons learned from these incidents and national exercises highlight problems with understanding and cooperation between the organisations responsible during the emergency phase. Complications in the decision-making process lead to confusing, conflicting, or delayed orders, impeding the effectiveness of the response. These difficulties were evident at local, regional, and national levels during the oil spill response. The Swedish oil spill preparedness system does not have a hierarchical structure. Network analysis and surveys of all coastal municipalities, County Administrative Boards and interviews with national oil spill experts were used to examine the characteristics of the oil spill network. This study shows that 80% of the involved organisations have explicit mandates for oil spill preparedness. An established management network exists, covering 83% of the maximum theoretical connections for contingency planning and 88% for response. The Swedish Coast Guard, Swedish Agency for Marine and Water Management, Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, and Oil Spill Advisory Service are central organisations. The roles of the Swedish Coast Guard are clear to the respondents, but the roles of the Swedish Transport Agency, Environmental Protection Agency, and Swedish Agency for Marine and Water Management are less clear. For planning, the municipalities, County Administrative Boards, Swedish Coast Guard, Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, and Oil Spill Equipment Depots are considered the most valuable. For response, the municipalities, Swedish Coast Guard, Oil Spill Equipment Depots, County Administrative Boards, Oil Spill Advisory Service, and Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency are considered the most valuable. The few connections between the counties and sometimes between neighbouring municipalities in the network, suggests a need to establish an Incident Management System for national cross-organisational emergencies, such as large oil spills. Most importantly, more cross-organisational exercises are needed to build capacity and the necessary inter-organisational relationships. The authors recommend the formation of an Incident Management System in Sweden in order to improve the management of large oil spills.


2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (1) ◽  
pp. 771-772
Author(s):  
Gabrielle McGrath

ABSTRACT In the National Incident Management System (NIMS) Document dated March 1, 2004, all federal, state, local, tribal, private sector and non-governmental personnel with a direct role in emergency management and response were required to be NIMS and Incident Command System (ICS) trained. National standards for qualification and certification of emergency response personnel were established under NIMS to ensure that personnel possess the minimum knowledge, skills, and experience necessary to execute incident management and emergency response activities safely and effectively. Most recently documented in the National Response Framework, all mid-level managers of federal, state, and local governmental personnel are encouraged to complete ICS-300 and ICS-400 training in fiscal year 2007. Although these standards will greatly improve the ability for governmental personnel to respond in emergencies, private sector personnel are not regulated to participate in the same qualification and certification process. At this time, NIMS has no legal authority to place these requirements on industry personnel, such as members of oil spill management teams. The resulting imbalance of qualification and certification requirements between these two groups could severely hinder oil spill response efforts in the near future by causing miscommunication in the Unified Command during critical points in the response, including when setting response objectives and sharing resources. However, the solution cannot be to pass further governmental regulations on an already highly-regulated community. The NIMS Integration Center should consider utilizing the existing partnerships in individual regions, particularly through the Area Committee and the Area Maritime Security Committee, to solve this issue before it becomes a significant problem in the middle of a large-scale response effort.


2003 ◽  
Vol 2003 (1) ◽  
pp. 603-606
Author(s):  
Jerry A. Hubbard ◽  
William W. Whitson

ABSTRACT A review of the law and responsibilities for oil spill response reveals a need for taking oil spill response incident management planning beyond just describing what will be done, to a new level that describes specifically who will do it. Facilitating the development of an effective management team in the first 24–48 hours of a spill is critical to setting the response operations in a positive motion, and ultimate success. The development of a draft Incident Command System (ICS) structure to meet the expectations of a Type II incident and pre-identification of personnel for specific assignments will enable a more cohesive personnel qualification process, training and exercises focused on general incident management, and ultimately a better prepared cadre of response personnel. The vision for Coast Guard District Thirteen is a District Response Group that is organized into a defined and pre-approved ICS structure, with these expectations set. The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan requires the Coast Guard to form District Response Groups. By definition, this is all personnel and every asset the Coast Guard has within each District. However, this does not speak to the qualifications of these personnel, or address the tasking some units may receive, both of which are known. In the early hours of a major spill, confusion reigns and calls for help are made. This can be a call for help that is specific, such as the number of beach monitors, OPS Section Chiefs, or Check-in Recorders that are needed, or the more likely request is to send whoever is available. The latter is not likely to enable success if well intentioned but inexperienced management personnel show up. If we know who is available within the Coast Guard district, then we know our strengths. Therefore, we also know our weaknesses, and can identify gaps. By identifying our ICS structure, we can examine our resources, needs, and expectations; and have a plan that works while remaining flexible. There is no need to assemble a management team on the fly in the first 24 hours of a spill.


2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 747-753
Author(s):  
Kristy L. Plourde ◽  
LaDonn Hight-Allen ◽  
Denise L. Matthews ◽  
Martin L. Smith ◽  
CDR Jeff Gafkjen

ABSTRACT The United States faces a broad range of threats and hazards, both naturally occurring and manmade. Over the past few decades, efforts to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from these varied threats and hazards have evolved into a patchwork collection of special-purpose plans including the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). These plans govern U.S. policy toward hazardous materials releases and oil spill response. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), Management of Domestic Incidents, mandates the creation of a National Incident Management System (NIMS) and National Response Plan (NRP) to provide a single, comprehensive national approach to incident management. The NRP is intended to integrate the various prevention, preparedness, response and recovery plans into an all-discipline, all-hazard approach. NIMS provides a standard Incident Command System (ICS) for Federal, State, local and tribal government to work together to prepare for and respond to incidents. NIMS ICS includes a core set of concepts, principles, terminology, technologies, multi-agency coordination systems, unified command, training, identification/management of resources, qualification/certification, and the collection, tracking and reporting of incident information and incident resources. Together, the NRP and NIMS provide a standardized framework to ensure that Federal, State, local, and tribal governments, the private sector, and non-governmental organizations work in partnership to support domestic incident management regardless of cause, size, or complexity of the incident. How does this change what is being done in oil and hazardous materials response? The National Contingency Plan (NCP, 40 CFR 300) notes that “where practicable,” the framework for the response shall use ICS within a Unified Command (UC) system. OSHA regulations (29 CFR 1910.120) also require the use of ICS for emergency response. The response community (federal, state, local, and tribal governments, the private sector, and non-governmental organizations) has been using “ICS” in oil spill/HAZMAT response since the early 1990's in the United States. NIMS ICS will be used when responding to oil HAZMAT spills, however, there are differences in ICS implementation between responders in the response community and NIMS ICS will have stricter requirements to improve uniformity in application. These similarities and differences will be discussed at length in this paper.


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