THE OIL SPILL FIELD OPERATIONS GUIDE (FOG)-NEW AND IMPROVED1

2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (2) ◽  
pp. 987-990
Author(s):  
Kristy Plourde ◽  
Jean R. Cameron ◽  
Vickie Huyck

ABSTRACT The original oil spill Field Operations Guide (FOG) was a product of the Standard Oil Spill Response Management System (STORMS) Task Force comprised of representatives of the U. S. Coast Guard, California Department of Fish and Game Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR), other states, the petroleum industry, oil spill response organizations, and local government. The STORMS Task Force produced this first version of the “oilized” Incident Command System (ICS) FOG and Incident Action Plan (IAP) forms in 1994 and made subsequent revisions in 1995 and 1996. With 2 more years of ICS experience and facilitated by the States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force, a new group of representatives from federal and state governments, the petroleum industry, and oil spill response professionals met to review and update the 1996 FOG and IAP forms in October 1998. The overall goal was to remain consistent with the National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS) yet reflect the experience gained using ICS at actual oil spills and drills. The group met quarterly over an 18-month period, working collaboratively to reach a consensus on numerous changes. Some of the changes included adding an Environmental Unit to the Planning Section, revising the planning cycle diagram for the oil spill IAP process, and revising the IAP forms as appropriate to reflect the way oil spills are managed. All significant revisions/improvements will be highlighted in this paper and poster.

1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 761-765
Author(s):  
William Boland ◽  
Pete Bontadelli

ABSTRACT The Marine Safety Division of the 11th Coast Guard District and the California Office of Oil Spill Prevention and Response are pursuing new avenues to assure that federal, state, and local efforts in California achieve the goals of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and the Lempert-Keene-Seastrand Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act of 1990. Coordination of the seven California area committees, publishing detailed area contingency plans, and the implemention of a memorandum of agreement on oil spill prevention and response highlight recent cooperative successes. In 1994 a joint Coast Guard/state/industry incident command system task force drafted an ICS field operations guide and incident action plan forms that meet National Interagency Incident Management System and fire scope ICS requirements.


1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 737-742
Author(s):  
LT Tina M. Burke ◽  
LT John P. Flynn

ABSTRACT In recent years, the usefulness of the incident command system (ICS) has received much attention. Much of the oil industry and several government agencies involved in all types of emergency response have been using ICS for many years. In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard formally adopted the national interagency incident management system (NIIMS) ICS as the response management system of choice in February of 1996. The response to the tank barge North Cape grounding was a complex multiagency effort that brought with it many of the issues and problems responders face when dealing with crisis situations. This paper describes the ICS-based organization that was established to respond to the major North Cape oil spill, analyzes the organization compared to standard ICS, and discusses how the ICS framework and principles contributed to the success of the response. It also explains how closer conformity to standard ICS could have remedied many of the issues that later surfaced as lessons learned, resulting in improved response efficiency. The North Cape response provides a vivid example of how ICS is a helpful management tool that, if rigorously learned and applied in a widespread fashion, can greatly enhance the nation's oil spill response posture.


Author(s):  
Tim Gunter ◽  
Ty Farrell

ABSTRACT Swift water oil spill response (SWSR) has many different aspects that present more of a challenge than slow moving or static water oil spills. The American Petroleum Institute (API)/Association of Oil Pipelines (AOPL) Emergency Response Work Group's inland SWSR Guide will be a compilation of industry best practices describing initial spill response management and operational tactics in these uniquely challenging conditions. This paper will summarize the API Guide which focuses on the highest priorities of spill response including people, environment, and assets. The intended audience for this paper are responders that have baseline spill response knowledge. Operations managers will be able to use the API Guide to develop timely Incident Command System (ICS) 201 briefs, organizational structures, and Incident Action Plan (IAP) operational work assignments. Safety of responders will be emphasized, particularly site safety, and personal protective equipment (PPE). Site safety and job specific hazard identification best practices will inform responders, managers, and Incident Commanders of the important aspects of overall safety management. Site evaluation topics will cover the following areas: access, staging area, boat launches, shoreline composition, and wildlife considerations. Response strategies involving equipment for containment and recovery will be described for effective SWSR. Additional factors that must be considered include riverbed composition, current velocity, flow pattern, water depth, water course width, and obstructions. There is a limited amount of literature on the unique response techniques of SWSR developed by industry groups or governmental agencies.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 104-123
Author(s):  
Yvonne Najah Addassi ◽  
Julie Yamamoto ◽  
Thomas M. Cullen

ABSTRACT The Refugio Oil Spill occurred on May 19, 2015, due to the failure of an underground pipeline, owned and operated by a subsidiary of Plains All-American Pipeline near Highway 101 in Santa Barbara County. The Responsible Party initially estimated the amount of crude oil released at about 104,000 gallons, with 21,000 gallons reaching the ocean. A Unified Command (UC) was established consisting of Incident Commanders from the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), California Department of Fish and Wildlife (CDFW) Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR), Santa Barbara County, and Plains Pipeline with additional participation by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and California State Parks. Within hours, the CDFW closed fisheries and the following day Governor Brown declared a state of emergency for Santa Barbara County. The released oil caused heavy oiling of both on and offshore areas at Refugio State Beach and impacted other areas of Santa Barbara and Ventura. A number of factors created unique challenges for the management of this response. In addition to direct natural resource impacts, the closure of beaches and fisheries occurred days before the Memorial Day weekend resulting in losses for local businesses and lost opportunities for the public. The Santa Barbara community, with its history with oil spills and environmental activism, was extremely concerned and interested in involvement, including the use of volunteers on beaches. Also this area of the coast has significant tribal and archeologic resources that required sensitive handling and coordination. Finally, this area of California’s coast is a known natural seep area which created the need to distinguish spilled from ‘naturally occurring’ oil. Most emergency responses, including oil spills, follow a similar pattern of command establishment, response and cleanup phases, followed by non-response phase monitoring, cleanup and restoration. This paper will analyze the Refugio oil spill response in three primary focus areas: 1) identify the ways in which this spill response was unique and required innovative and novel solutions; 2) identify the ways in which this response benefited from the ‘lessons’ learned from both the Deepwater Horizon and Cosco Busan oil spills; and 3) provide a summary of OSPR’s response evaluation report for Refugio, with specific focus on how the lessons learned and best practices will inform future planning efforts within California.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 2726-2742
Author(s):  
Ståle Jensen

ABSTRACT How can we continuously develop and improve large scale emergency preparedness, such as oil spill response, in times of low oil prices, budget cuts and downsizing? NOFO (Norwegian Clean Seas Association For Operating Companies) has found its path, through modernization and cooperation. When there are spills of crude oil from the petroleum industry at the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) NOFO will perform the oil spill response (OSR) on behalf of the owner of the spill, in practical terms becoming the company’s OSR branch during the incident. NOFO was founded in 1978, as a response to the large blowout at the Bravo field the previous year. Focus on offshore OSR technology and combat strategies has been the main motivation during our almost 40 year’s existence. The last decade has included a significant improvement in our competence and training on near-shore and beach OSR, simultaneously maintaining the unique offshore segment. As part of improving NOFO capacity within large scale, and / or long duration spill situations (e.g. Macondo), NOFO have embraced and implemented ICS (Incident Command System), thus improving our capabilities and capacities through the whole range from offshore to shoreline OSR. Through 2015 and 2016 ICS training and ICS adaptions of previous organizational systems has been prioritized, and new ones have been developed. NOFO personnel have participated in numerous training sessions and exercises with our member companies (operators on the Norwegian continental shelf) nationally and internationally. Through strategic choices of planning and collaboration both internally in NOFO and between NOFO and the Norwegian Coastal Administration (NCA), Global Response Network (GRN), other oil spill Response Organizations (OSROs) and cooperating partners, the number of exercises has increased, the value and output of exercises is improved, and thus the capacity and capability of NOFOs whole range OSR in improved. At the same time, on behalf of our members, NOFO have consumed less money year after year. NOFO is developing and improving our proven OSR capacity and competence, from offshore to shoreline, through increased efficiency, high focus on exercise training, and cooperation with other OSR agencies.


2012 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 681
Author(s):  
Nick Quinn

In the post-Montara/Macondo world, the Australian petroleum industry has been actively represented on various working groups focused on the prevention, preparedness and response to significant oil spill incidents. Through the Australian Marine Oil Spill Centre (AMOSC) based in Geelong, Victoria, cooperation and coordination with other international associations has been occurring to ensure ‘reasonable steps’ are taken to develop preparedness and response arrangements commensurate with the risks associated with industry activities.Concurrently and here in Australia, a thorough review of the National Plan has allowed industry to work with government to develop or amend a range of initiatives aimed at ensuring that industry and government strategies are integrated for maximum efficiency in all circumstances. The scene has been set by a reviewed national risk assessment focusing on all activities of hydrocarbon movement around the Australian coastline. So what has Australian industry actually achieved post-Montara in prevention, preparedness and response to oil spills? This extended abstract shares and explains the practical outcomes of the industry initiatives of oil spills in Australia. The outcomes are planning requirements, equipment location, mutual aid arrangements, training programs and the extended services of industry oil spill response organisations in Australia and overseas.


1977 ◽  
Vol 1977 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. H. Putnam

ABSTRACT In 1970, the National Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan was introduced. This plan, which imposed a planning sequence that flowed downward from the federal government, caused considerable confusion at local levels because of its failure to fully explain how local governments were to participate. To amplify the plan and overcome this shortcoming, the California Department of Fish and Game, the U.S. Coast Guard and the petroleum industry joined in 1974-75 to sponsor a series of oil spill workshops for local governments. The goal was to define the role of local jurisdictions in the planning process and illustrate through simulated problems how this role was to be carried out. The workshop described in this paper and a subsequent workshop in Santa Barbara dispelled the confusion of local governments over their roles in oil spill action and resulted in enthusiastic acceptance of the plan itself. A similar technique could be used in any other broadscale planning effort that is committed to seeking knowledgeable local participation.


1979 ◽  
Vol 1979 (1) ◽  
pp. 521-524 ◽  
Author(s):  
June Lindstedt Siva

ABSTRACT Clear goals are needed in formulating and applying oil spill response plans whether at the level of the individual company, the oil cleanup cooperative, or the federal or state agency. There are two primary goals which have been considered, and problems arise from the fact that, in practice, these goals may not always be compatible. The goals are: (1) minimize the overall ecological impacts of the oil spill; and (2) remove all visible spilled oil from the environment. The first goal is based on an ecological rationale, the second on an esthetic one. During actual spill experiences, the second goal has most often been the guiding force behind the response. There are a number of areas of conflict between these two philosophies; but, except in cases where life and limb are threatened, the first goal should be the prime directive in oil spill response. Application of goal (1) is most important in areas of high ecological value. Goal (2) may be applicable under certain conditions in high visibility areas such as beaches. This paper summarizes the findings of a task force of biologists organized by the Society of Petroleum Industry Biologists; reviews the ecological effects of various oil spill cleanup methods in several different habitat types; notes research needs; and recommends minimum-impact cleanup methods for specific environments.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 2017040
Author(s):  
Jonas Pålsson ◽  
Lawrence Hildebrand ◽  
Olof Lindén

The inadequacy of the Swedish national emergency management system has been highlighted during several large-scale national emergencies, including forest fires (Västmanland 2014) and storms (Gudrun 2005, Dagmar 2011, and Ivar 2013). The Swedish oil spill preparedness is part of the national emergency response system and was tested under real conditions during the 2003 Fu Shan Hai and 2011 Golden Trader oil spills. Fu Shan Hai spilled 1,200 tonnes of oil on the shorelines of southern Sweden and Golden Trader spilled 500 tonnes on the island of Tjörn. Lessons learned from these incidents and national exercises highlight problems with understanding and cooperation between the organisations responsible during the emergency phase. Complications in the decision-making process lead to confusing, conflicting, or delayed orders, impeding the effectiveness of the response. These difficulties were evident at local, regional, and national levels during the oil spill response. The Swedish oil spill preparedness system does not have a hierarchical structure. Network analysis and surveys of all coastal municipalities, County Administrative Boards and interviews with national oil spill experts were used to examine the characteristics of the oil spill network. This study shows that 80% of the involved organisations have explicit mandates for oil spill preparedness. An established management network exists, covering 83% of the maximum theoretical connections for contingency planning and 88% for response. The Swedish Coast Guard, Swedish Agency for Marine and Water Management, Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, and Oil Spill Advisory Service are central organisations. The roles of the Swedish Coast Guard are clear to the respondents, but the roles of the Swedish Transport Agency, Environmental Protection Agency, and Swedish Agency for Marine and Water Management are less clear. For planning, the municipalities, County Administrative Boards, Swedish Coast Guard, Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, and Oil Spill Equipment Depots are considered the most valuable. For response, the municipalities, Swedish Coast Guard, Oil Spill Equipment Depots, County Administrative Boards, Oil Spill Advisory Service, and Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency are considered the most valuable. The few connections between the counties and sometimes between neighbouring municipalities in the network, suggests a need to establish an Incident Management System for national cross-organisational emergencies, such as large oil spills. Most importantly, more cross-organisational exercises are needed to build capacity and the necessary inter-organisational relationships. The authors recommend the formation of an Incident Management System in Sweden in order to improve the management of large oil spills.


1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 743-746 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael de Bettencourt

ABSTRACT An act of terrorism resulting in an oil spill triggers a unique set of response considerations that bring diverse agencies together under crisis conditions. To manage such incidents effectively, a systematic approach is needed to standardize incident response, command, and control methods and to better define the planning process for these demanding scenarios. The National Interagency Incident Management System-Incident Command System (NIIMS-ICS) is the common denominator that has been adopted by the United States Coast Guard for oil spill response. This paper highlights recommendations to adopt the NIIMS-ICS nationally for combined law enforcement and environmental response incidents to ensure efficient and effective response methods.


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