The leading eight: Social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity

2006 ◽  
Vol 239 (4) ◽  
pp. 435-444 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hisashi Ohtsuki ◽  
Yoh Iwasa
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity

scholarly journals Indirect reciprocity can overcome free-rider problems on costly moral assessment

2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (7) ◽  
pp. 20160341 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tatsuya Sasaki ◽  
Isamu Okada ◽  
Yutaka Nakai
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
Accurate Evaluation ◽  
Assessment Systems ◽  
Moral Assessment

Indirect reciprocity is one of the major mechanisms of the evolution of cooperation. Because constant monitoring and accurate evaluation in moral assessments tend to be costly, indirect reciprocity can be exploited by cost evaders. A recent study crucially showed that a cooperative state achieved by indirect reciprocators is easily destabilized by cost evaders in the case with no supportive mechanism. Here, we present a simple and widely applicable solution that considers pre-assessment of cost evaders. In the pre-assessment, those who fail to pay for costly assessment systems are assigned a nasty image that leads to them being rejected by discriminators. We demonstrate that considering the pre-assessment can crucially stabilize reciprocal cooperation for a broad range of indirect reciprocity models. In particular for the most leading social norms, we analyse the conditions under which a prosocial state becomes locally stable.

scholarly journals Social norms in indirect reciprocity with ternary reputations

2022 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yohsuke Murase ◽  
Minjae Kim ◽  
Seung Ki Baek
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Evolutionary Stability ◽  
Reputation Systems ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
Crude Approximation ◽  
Special Case

AbstractIndirect reciprocity is a key mechanism that promotes cooperation in social dilemmas by means of reputation. Although it has been a common practice to represent reputations by binary values, either ‘good’ or ‘bad’, such a dichotomy is a crude approximation considering the complexity of reality. In this work, we studied norms with three different reputations, i.e., ‘good’, ‘neutral’, and ‘bad’. Through massive supercomputing for handling more than thirty billion possibilities, we fully identified which norms achieve cooperation and possess evolutionary stability against behavioural mutants. By systematically categorizing all these norms according to their behaviours, we found similarities and dissimilarities to their binary-reputation counterpart, the leading eight. We obtained four rules that should be satisfied by the successful norms, and the behaviour of the leading eight can be understood as a special case of these rules. A couple of norms that show counter-intuitive behaviours are also presented. We believe the findings are also useful for designing successful norms with more general reputation systems.

scholarly journals The evolution of indirect reciprocity under action and assessment generosity

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Schmid ◽  
Pouya Shati ◽  
Christian Hilbe ◽  
Krishnendu Chatterjee
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Social Norm ◽  
Relevant Information ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
Good Reputation ◽  
Group Members ◽  
To Receive ◽  
Full Cooperation

AbstractIndirect reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation based on social norms. This mechanism requires that individuals in a population observe and judge each other’s behaviors. Individuals with a good reputation are more likely to receive help from others. Previous work suggests that indirect reciprocity is only effective when all relevant information is reliable and publicly available. Otherwise, individuals may disagree on how to assess others, even if they all apply the same social norm. Such disagreements can lead to a breakdown of cooperation. Here we explore whether the predominantly studied ‘leading eight’ social norms of indirect reciprocity can be made more robust by equipping them with an element of generosity. To this end, we distinguish between two kinds of generosity. According to assessment generosity, individuals occasionally assign a good reputation to group members who would usually be regarded as bad. According to action generosity, individuals occasionally cooperate with group members with whom they would usually defect. Using individual-based simulations, we show that the two kinds of generosity have a very different effect on the resulting reputation dynamics. Assessment generosity tends to add to the overall noise and allows defectors to invade. In contrast, a limited amount of action generosity can be beneficial in a few cases. However, even when action generosity is beneficial, the respective simulations do not result in full cooperation. Our results suggest that while generosity can favor cooperation when individuals use the most simple strategies of reciprocity, it is disadvantageous when individuals use more complex social norms.

scholarly journals Adherence to public institutions that foster cooperation

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Arunas L. Radzvilavicius ◽  
Taylor A. Kessinger ◽  
Joshua B. Plotkin
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Model ◽  
Social Behavior ◽  
Social Norms ◽  
Public Institutions ◽  
Social Contagion ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
Moral Good ◽  
Moral Assessment ◽  
Public Monitoring

AbstractHumans typically consider altruism a moral good and condition their social behavior on the moral reputations of others. Indirect reciprocity explains how social norms and reputations support cooperation: individuals cooperate with others who are considered good. Indirect reciprocity works when an institution monitors and publicly broadcasts moral reputations. Here we develop a theory of adherence to public monitoring in societies where individuals are, at first, independently responsible for evaluating the reputations of their peers. Using a mathematical model, we show that adherence to an institution of moral assessment can evolve and promote cooperation under four different social norms, including norms that previous studies found to perform poorly. We determine how an institution’s size and its degree of tolerance towards anti-social behavior affect the rate of cooperation. Public monitoring serves to eliminate disagreements about reputations, which increases cooperation and payoffs, so that adherence evolves by social contagion and remains robust against displacement.

scholarly journals How to design institutions that foster cooperation

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arunas Radzvilavicius ◽  
Taylor Kessinger ◽  
Joshua B. Plotkin
Keyword(s):  
Social Behavior ◽  
Social Norms ◽  
Antisocial Behavior ◽  
Social Contagion ◽  
Public Institution ◽  
Top Down ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
Moral Good ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Monitoring

Humans typically consider altruism a moral good and condition their social behavior on the moral reputations of others. Indirect reciprocity explains how social norms and moral reputations can collectively support cooperation: members of the society cooperate who others who are considered good. But the theory of indirect reciprocity requires institutions that monitor and publicly broadcast moral reputations. Here we study evolution of adherence to public monitoring in societies where individuals are, at first, independently responsible for evaluating the moral reputations of their peers. We show that adherence to a public institution of moral assessment can evolve and promote cooperation under all simple social norms, depending upon the institution's tolerance to occasional antisocial behavior. We specify how an institution's size and its degree of tolerance towards antisocial behavior can be designed to dramatically increase cooperation rates, even for social norms that previous studies have found to perform poorly. Public monitoring serves to eliminate disagreements about reputations in the population, which in turn increases cooperation and individual payoffs, so that adherence to the public institution can evolve by social contagion. Adherence is then robust to invasion, and it tends to crowd out internal mechanisms that could alternatively support cooperation. These results help explain why societies tend to elect centralized institutions to provide top-down moral governance of their individual behavior.

scholarly journals Intermediaries in Trust: Indirect Reciprocity, Incentives, and Norms

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giangiacomo Bravo ◽  
Flaminio Squazzoni ◽  
Károly Takács
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Crucial Role ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
The Other ◽  
Monetary Incentives ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
Incentive Schemes ◽  
Investment Game ◽  
The One ◽  
Positive Effect

Any trust situation involves a certain amount of risk for trustors that trustees could abuse. In some cases, intermediaries exist who play a crucial role in the exchange by providing reputational information. To examine under what conditions intermediary opinion could have a positive impact on cooperation, we designed two experiments based on a modified version of the investment game where intermediaries rated the behaviour of trustees under various incentive schemes and different role structures. We found that intermediaries can increase trust if there is room for indirect reciprocity between the involved parties. We also found that the effect of monetary incentives and social norms cannot be clearly separable in these situations. If properly designed, monetary incentives for intermediaries can have a positive effect. On the one hand, when intermediary rewards are aligned with the trustor’s interest, investments and returns tend to increase. On the other hand, fixed monetary incentives perform less than any other incentive schemes and endogenous social norms in ensuring trust and fairness. These findings should make us reconsider the mantra of incentivization of social and public conventional policy.

scholarly journals Local reputation, local selection, and the leading eight norms

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Shirsendu Podder ◽  
Simone Righi ◽  
Károly Takács
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Local Information ◽  
Global Information ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
Global Evolution ◽  
Local Selection ◽  
High Level ◽  
Global Reputation

AbstractHumans are capable of solving cooperation problems following social norms. Social norms dictate appropriate behaviour and judgement on others in response to their previous actions and reputation. Recently, the so-called leading eight norms have been identified from many potential social norms that can sustain cooperation through a reputation-based indirect reciprocity mechanism. Despite indirect reciprocity being claimed to extend direct reciprocity in larger populations where direct experiences cannot be accumulated, the success of social norms have been analysed in models with global information and evolution. This study is the first to analyse the leading eight norms with local information and evolution. We find that the leading eight are robust against selfish players within most scenarios and can maintain a high level of cooperation also with local information and evolution. In fact, local evolution sustains cooperation under a wider set of conditions than global evolution, while local reputation does not hinder cooperation compared to global reputation. Four of the leading eight norms that do not reward justified defection offer better chances for cooperation with quick evolution, reputation with noise, larger networks, and when unconditional defectors enter the population.

Cooperation and obligation in early parent-child relationships

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ross A. Thompson
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Close Relationships ◽  
Social Agency ◽  
Infant Survival ◽  
Peer Experiences ◽  
Early Experiences ◽  
Early Parent ◽  
Collaborative Skills ◽  
Parent Child Relationships

Abstract Tomasello's moral psychology of obligation would be developmentally deepened by greater attention to early experiences of cooperation and shared social agency between parents and infants, evolved to promote infant survival. They provide a foundation for developing understanding of the mutual obligations of close relationships that contribute (alongside peer experiences) to growing collaborative skills, fairness expectations, and fidelity to social norms.

The Structure Among Measures of Personality, Social Attitudes, Values, and Social Norms

2007 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 240-251 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lazar Stankov
Keyword(s):  
Factor Analysis ◽  
Individual Differences ◽  
Social Norms ◽  
Social Interactions ◽  
Correlation Matrix ◽  
Social Attitudes ◽  
Group Differences ◽  
Factor Scores ◽  
Ethnic Group Differences ◽  
Inside Out

Abstract. This paper presents the results of a study that employed measures of personality, social attitudes, values, and social norms that have been the focus of recent research in individual differences. These measures were given to a sample of participants (N = 1,255) who were enrolled at 25 US colleges and universities. Factor analysis of the correlation matrix produced four factors. Three of these factors corresponded to the domains of Personality/Amoral Social Attitudes, Values, and Social Norms; one factor, Conservatism, cut across the domains. Cognitive ability showed negative correlation with conservatism and amoral social attitudes. The study also examined gender and ethnic group differences on factor scores. The overall interpretation of the findings is consistent with the inside-out view of human social interactions.

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