scholarly journals The evolution of indirect reciprocity under action and assessment generosity

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Schmid ◽  
Pouya Shati ◽  
Christian Hilbe ◽  
Krishnendu Chatterjee
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Social Norm ◽  
Relevant Information ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
Good Reputation ◽  
Group Members ◽  
To Receive ◽  
Full Cooperation

AbstractIndirect reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation based on social norms. This mechanism requires that individuals in a population observe and judge each other’s behaviors. Individuals with a good reputation are more likely to receive help from others. Previous work suggests that indirect reciprocity is only effective when all relevant information is reliable and publicly available. Otherwise, individuals may disagree on how to assess others, even if they all apply the same social norm. Such disagreements can lead to a breakdown of cooperation. Here we explore whether the predominantly studied ‘leading eight’ social norms of indirect reciprocity can be made more robust by equipping them with an element of generosity. To this end, we distinguish between two kinds of generosity. According to assessment generosity, individuals occasionally assign a good reputation to group members who would usually be regarded as bad. According to action generosity, individuals occasionally cooperate with group members with whom they would usually defect. Using individual-based simulations, we show that the two kinds of generosity have a very different effect on the resulting reputation dynamics. Assessment generosity tends to add to the overall noise and allows defectors to invade. In contrast, a limited amount of action generosity can be beneficial in a few cases. However, even when action generosity is beneficial, the respective simulations do not result in full cooperation. Our results suggest that while generosity can favor cooperation when individuals use the most simple strategies of reciprocity, it is disadvantageous when individuals use more complex social norms.

From whom do we learn group norms? Low-ranking group members are perceived as the best sources

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer E Dannals ◽  
Emily Reit ◽  
Dale T. Miller
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Correlation Study ◽  
Team Members ◽  
Norm Perception ◽  
Lower Ranking ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Groups And Teams ◽  
Or Team ◽  
And Behavior ◽  
To Receive

Social norm perception is ubiquitous in small groups and teams, but how individuals approach this process is not well understood. When individuals wish to perceive descriptive social norms in a group or team, whose ad- vice and behavior do they prefer to rely on? Four lab studies and one Teld survey demonstrate that when in- dividuals seek information about a team’s social norms they prefer to receive advice from lower-ranking indi- viduals (Studies 1–4) and give greater weight to the observed behavior of lower-ranking individuals (Study 5). Results from correlation (Study 3) and moderation (Study 4) approaches suggest this preference stems from the assumption that lower-ranking team members are more attentive to and aware of the descriptive social norms of their team. Alternative mechanisms (e.g., perceived similarity to lower-ranking team members, greater honesty of lower-ranking team members) were also examined, but no support for these was found.

scholarly journals Dynamic modulation of social influence by indirect reciprocity

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua Zonca ◽  
Anna Folsø ◽  
Alessandra Sciutti
Keyword(s):  
Social Influence ◽  
Information Transmission ◽  
Social Group ◽  
Social Norm ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Perceptual Task ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
Dynamic Modulation ◽  
Human Partner ◽  
Good Reputation

AbstractIndirect reciprocity is a pervasive social norm that promotes human cooperation. Helping someone establishes a good reputation, increasing the probability of receiving help from others. Here we hypothesize that indirect reciprocity regulates not only cooperative behavior but also the exchange of opinions within a social group. In a novel interactive perceptual task (Experiment 1), we show that participants relied more on the judgments of an alleged human partner when a second alleged peer had been endorsing participants’ opinions. By doing so, participants did not take into account the reliability of their partners’ judgments and did not maximize behavioral accuracy and monetary reward. This effect declined when participants did not expect future interactions with their partners, suggesting the emergence of downstream mechanisms of reciprocity linked to the management of reputation. Importantly, all these effects disappeared when participants knew that the partners’ responses were computer-generated (Experiment 2). Our results suggest that, within a social group, individuals may weight others’ opinions through indirect reciprocity, highlighting the emergence of normative distortions in the process of information transmission among humans.

scholarly journals Indirect reciprocity can overcome free-rider problems on costly moral assessment

2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (7) ◽  
pp. 20160341 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tatsuya Sasaki ◽  
Isamu Okada ◽  
Yutaka Nakai
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
Accurate Evaluation ◽  
Assessment Systems ◽  
Moral Assessment

Indirect reciprocity is one of the major mechanisms of the evolution of cooperation. Because constant monitoring and accurate evaluation in moral assessments tend to be costly, indirect reciprocity can be exploited by cost evaders. A recent study crucially showed that a cooperative state achieved by indirect reciprocators is easily destabilized by cost evaders in the case with no supportive mechanism. Here, we present a simple and widely applicable solution that considers pre-assessment of cost evaders. In the pre-assessment, those who fail to pay for costly assessment systems are assigned a nasty image that leads to them being rejected by discriminators. We demonstrate that considering the pre-assessment can crucially stabilize reciprocal cooperation for a broad range of indirect reciprocity models. In particular for the most leading social norms, we analyse the conditions under which a prosocial state becomes locally stable.

Paying Back People Who Harmed Us but Not People Who Helped Us: Direct Negative Reciprocity Precedes Direct Positive Reciprocity in Early Development

2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (9) ◽  
pp. 1273-1286 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nadia Chernyak ◽  
Kristin L. Leimgruber ◽  
Yarrow C. Dunham ◽  
Jingshi Hu ◽  
Peter R. Blake
Keyword(s):  
Young Children ◽  
Social Norms ◽  
Early Development ◽  
Social Exchange ◽  
Social Norm ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Critical Component ◽  
Negative Reciprocity ◽  
Positive Direct ◽  
Positive Reciprocity

The principle of direct reciprocity, or paying back specific individuals, is assumed to be a critical component of everyday social exchange and a key mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. Young children know the norm of reciprocity, but it is unclear whether they follow the norm for both positive and negative direct reciprocity or whether reciprocity is initially generalized. Across five experiments ( N = 330), we showed that children between 4 and 8 years of age engaged in negative direct reciprocity but generalized positive reciprocity, despite recalling benefactors. Children did not endorse the norm of positive direct reciprocity as applying to them until about 7 years of age (Study 4), but a short social-norm training enhanced this behavior in younger children (Study 5). Results suggest that negative direct reciprocity develops early, whereas positive reciprocity becomes targeted to other specific individuals only as children learn and adopt social norms.

scholarly journals Paying back those who harmed us but not those who helped us: Direct negative reciprocity precedes direct positive reciprocity in early development

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nadia Chernyak ◽  
Kristin Leimgruber ◽  
Yarrow Dunham ◽  
Jingshi Hu ◽  
Peter Blake
Keyword(s):  
Young Children ◽  
Social Norms ◽  
Early Development ◽  
Social Exchange ◽  
Social Norm ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Critical Component ◽  
Negative Reciprocity ◽  
Positive Direct ◽  
Positive Reciprocity

The principle of direct reciprocity, or paying back specific individuals, is assumed to be a critical component of everyday social exchange and a key mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. Young children know the norm of reciprocity, but it is unclear whether they follow the norm for both positive and negative direct reciprocity or whether reciprocity is initially generalized. Across 5 experiments (N=330), we show that children between 4 and 8 years of age engaged in negative direct reciprocity but generalized positive reciprocity, despite recalling benefactors. Children did not endorse the norm of positive direct reciprocity as applying to them until about 7 years of age (Study 4), but a short social norm training enhanced this behavior in younger children (Study 5). Results suggest that negative direct reciprocity develops early, whereas positive reciprocity only becomes targeted to specific others as children learn and adopt social norms.

Social Norms in Organizations

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer E. Dannals ◽  
Dale T. Miller
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Social Norm ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Descriptive Norms ◽  
Negative Behaviors ◽  
Positive Externalities ◽  
The Social ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Norm Emergence ◽  
Over Time

Social norms are a powerful force in organizations. While different literatures across fields have developed differing definitions and categories, social norms are commonly defined as and divided into descriptive norms, i.e., the most commonly enacted behavior, and prescriptive norms, i.e., the behavior most commonly viewed as acceptable or appropriate. Different literatures have also led to differing focuses of investigation for social norms research. Economic theorists have tended to examine social norm emergence by studying how social norms evolve to reduce negative or create positive externalities in situations. Organizational theorists and sociologists have instead focused on the social pressures which maintain social norms in groups over time, and eventually can lead group members to internalize the social norm. In contrast, social psychologists have tended to focus on how to use social norms in interventions aimed at reducing negative behaviors. Integrating these divergent streams of research proves important for future research.

Can Humanism be the Social Norm?

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sharon D. Welch
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Social Norm ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Human Reasoning ◽  
Individual Freedom ◽  
Social Divisions ◽  
The Social

Assaults on truth and divisions about the nature of wise governance are not momentary political challenges, unique to particular moments in history. Rather, they demonstrate fundamental weaknesses in human reasoning and core dangers in ways of construing both individual freedom and cohesive communities. It will remain an ongoing challenge to learn to deal rationally with what is an intrinsic irrationality in human cognition and with what is an intrinsic tendency toward domination and violence in human collectivities. In times of intense social divisions, it is vital to consider the ways in which humanism might function as the social norm by, paradoxically, functioning in a way different from other social norms. Humanism is not the declaration that a certain set of values or norms are universally valid. At its best and most creative, humanism is not limited to a particular set of norms, but is, rather, the commitment to a certain process in which norms are continuously created, critically evaluated, implemented, sustained or revised. Humanism is a process of connection, perception, implementation, and critique, and it applies this process as much to itself as to other traditions.

scholarly journals Comparison of Different Analytical Methods for the On-Site Analysis of Traces at Clandestine Drug Laboratories

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (9) ◽  
pp. 3754
Author(s):  
René Reiss ◽  
Frank Hauser ◽  
Sven Ehlert ◽  
Michael Pütz ◽  
Ralf Zimmermann
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Ambient Pressure ◽  
Relevant Information ◽  
Information Value ◽  
Site Analysis ◽  
Complex Information ◽  
Skilled Operator ◽  
Validation Parameters ◽  
Clandestine Laboratories ◽  
To Receive

While fast and reliable analytical results are crucial for first responders to make adequate decisions, these can be difficult to establish, especially at large-scale clandestine laboratories. To overcome this issue, multiple techniques at different levels of complexity are available. In addition to the level of complexity their information value differs as well. Within this publication, a comparison between three techniques that can be applied for on-site analysis is performed. These techniques range from ones with a simple yes or no response to sophisticated ones that allows to receive complex information about a sample. The three evaluated techniques are immunoassay drug tests representing easy to handle and fast to explain systems, ion mobility spectrometry as state-of-the-art equipment that needs training and experience prior to use and ambient pressure laser desorption with the need for a highly skilled operator as possible future technique that is currently under development. In addition to the measurement of validation parameters, real case samples are investigated to obtain practically relevant information about the capabilities and limitations of these techniques for on-site operations. Results demonstrate that in general all techniques deliver valid results, but the bandwidth of information widely varies between the investigated techniques.

scholarly journals Local stability of cooperation in a continuous model of indirect reciprocity

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sanghun Lee ◽  
Yohsuke Murase ◽  
Seung Ki Baek
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Continuous Model ◽  
Cost Ratio ◽  
Continuous Variables ◽  
Perturbative Calculation ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
Benefit Cost Ratio ◽  
Good Reputation ◽  
Benefit Cost ◽  
Powerful Mechanism

AbstractReputation is a powerful mechanism to enforce cooperation among unrelated individuals through indirect reciprocity, but it suffers from disagreement originating from private assessment, noise, and incomplete information. In this work, we investigate stability of cooperation in the donation game by regarding each player’s reputation and behaviour as continuous variables. Through perturbative calculation, we derive a condition that a social norm should satisfy to give penalties to its close variants, provided that everyone initially cooperates with a good reputation, and this result is supported by numerical simulation. A crucial factor of the condition is whether a well-reputed player’s donation to an ill-reputed co-player is appreciated by other members of the society, and the condition can be reduced to a threshold for the benefit-cost ratio of cooperation which depends on the reputational sensitivity to a donor’s behaviour as well as on the behavioural sensitivity to a recipient’s reputation. Our continuum formulation suggests how indirect reciprocity can work beyond the dichotomy between good and bad even in the presence of inhomogeneity, noise, and incomplete information.

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