scholarly journals Indirect reciprocity can overcome free-rider problems on costly moral assessment

2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (7) ◽  
pp. 20160341 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tatsuya Sasaki ◽  
Isamu Okada ◽  
Yutaka Nakai
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
Accurate Evaluation ◽  
Assessment Systems ◽  
Moral Assessment

Indirect reciprocity is one of the major mechanisms of the evolution of cooperation. Because constant monitoring and accurate evaluation in moral assessments tend to be costly, indirect reciprocity can be exploited by cost evaders. A recent study crucially showed that a cooperative state achieved by indirect reciprocators is easily destabilized by cost evaders in the case with no supportive mechanism. Here, we present a simple and widely applicable solution that considers pre-assessment of cost evaders. In the pre-assessment, those who fail to pay for costly assessment systems are assigned a nasty image that leads to them being rejected by discriminators. We demonstrate that considering the pre-assessment can crucially stabilize reciprocal cooperation for a broad range of indirect reciprocity models. In particular for the most leading social norms, we analyse the conditions under which a prosocial state becomes locally stable.

scholarly journals The evolution of indirect reciprocity under action and assessment generosity

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Schmid ◽  
Pouya Shati ◽  
Christian Hilbe ◽  
Krishnendu Chatterjee
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Social Norm ◽  
Relevant Information ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
Good Reputation ◽  
Group Members ◽  
To Receive ◽  
Full Cooperation

AbstractIndirect reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation based on social norms. This mechanism requires that individuals in a population observe and judge each other’s behaviors. Individuals with a good reputation are more likely to receive help from others. Previous work suggests that indirect reciprocity is only effective when all relevant information is reliable and publicly available. Otherwise, individuals may disagree on how to assess others, even if they all apply the same social norm. Such disagreements can lead to a breakdown of cooperation. Here we explore whether the predominantly studied ‘leading eight’ social norms of indirect reciprocity can be made more robust by equipping them with an element of generosity. To this end, we distinguish between two kinds of generosity. According to assessment generosity, individuals occasionally assign a good reputation to group members who would usually be regarded as bad. According to action generosity, individuals occasionally cooperate with group members with whom they would usually defect. Using individual-based simulations, we show that the two kinds of generosity have a very different effect on the resulting reputation dynamics. Assessment generosity tends to add to the overall noise and allows defectors to invade. In contrast, a limited amount of action generosity can be beneficial in a few cases. However, even when action generosity is beneficial, the respective simulations do not result in full cooperation. Our results suggest that while generosity can favor cooperation when individuals use the most simple strategies of reciprocity, it is disadvantageous when individuals use more complex social norms.

scholarly journals Adherence to public institutions that foster cooperation

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Arunas L. Radzvilavicius ◽  
Taylor A. Kessinger ◽  
Joshua B. Plotkin
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Model ◽  
Social Behavior ◽  
Social Norms ◽  
Public Institutions ◽  
Social Contagion ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
Moral Good ◽  
Moral Assessment ◽  
Public Monitoring

AbstractHumans typically consider altruism a moral good and condition their social behavior on the moral reputations of others. Indirect reciprocity explains how social norms and reputations support cooperation: individuals cooperate with others who are considered good. Indirect reciprocity works when an institution monitors and publicly broadcasts moral reputations. Here we develop a theory of adherence to public monitoring in societies where individuals are, at first, independently responsible for evaluating the reputations of their peers. Using a mathematical model, we show that adherence to an institution of moral assessment can evolve and promote cooperation under four different social norms, including norms that previous studies found to perform poorly. We determine how an institution’s size and its degree of tolerance towards anti-social behavior affect the rate of cooperation. Public monitoring serves to eliminate disagreements about reputations, which increases cooperation and payoffs, so that adherence evolves by social contagion and remains robust against displacement.

scholarly journals Hybrid Assessment Scheme Based on the Stern- Judging Rule for Maintaining Cooperation under Indirect Reciprocity

Games ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Isamu Okada ◽  
Hitoshi Yamamoto ◽  
Satoshi Uchida
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Assessment System ◽  
Threshold Probability ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
Assessment Systems ◽  
Notice Board ◽  
Expected Payoffs

Intensive studies on indirect reciprocity have explored rational assessment rules for maintaining cooperation and several have demonstrated the effects of the stern-judging rule. Uchida and Sasaki demonstrated that the stern-judging rule is not suitable for maintaining cooperative regimes in private assessment conditions while a public assessment system has been assumed in most studies. Although both assessment systems are oversimplified and society is most accurately represented by a mixture of these systems, little analysis has been reported on their mixture. Here, we investigated how much weight on the use of information originating from a public source is needed to maintain cooperative regimes for players adopting the stern-judging rule when players get information from both public and private sources. We did this by considering a hybrid-assessment scheme in which players use both assessment systems and by using evolutionary game theory. We calculated replicator equations using the expected payoffs of three strategies: unconditional cooperation, unconditional defection, and stern-judging rule adoption. Our analysis shows that the use of the rule helps to maintain cooperation if reputation information from a unique public notice board is used with more than a threshold probability. This hybrid-assessment scheme can be applied to other rules, including the simple-standing rule and the staying rule.

Eleven mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation

2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-230 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHAEL A. ZAGGL
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Social Life ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Selfish Behavior ◽  
Social Phenomena ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
Evolutionary Forces ◽  
Enormous Amount ◽  
Design Activities

Abstract:Cooperation is one of the basic elements of social life. It is essential for emergent social phenomena, such as the formation of families, groups, and societies. However, evolutionary forces counter cooperation. The trait of supporting others is dominated by selfish behavior. In the last few decades scientists, in particular biologists, achieved extraordinary progress regarding the question of how cooperation is possible despite of evolutionary forces. This produced an enormous amount of literature. This paper identifies and reviews the known solutions explaining cooperation under evolutionary forces. Using bibliometric methods in combination with extant review articles and traditional reviewing of original literature, it is possible to isolate 11 mechanisms of cooperation under the conditions of evolution. Developing a categorization of the mechanisms according to shared characteristics establishes a fundamental framework for institutional and mechanism design activities. Implications for future research paths are identified, in particular for the mechanism of indirect reciprocity.

scholarly journals Social norms in indirect reciprocity with ternary reputations

2022 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yohsuke Murase ◽  
Minjae Kim ◽  
Seung Ki Baek
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Evolutionary Stability ◽  
Reputation Systems ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
Crude Approximation ◽  
Special Case

AbstractIndirect reciprocity is a key mechanism that promotes cooperation in social dilemmas by means of reputation. Although it has been a common practice to represent reputations by binary values, either ‘good’ or ‘bad’, such a dichotomy is a crude approximation considering the complexity of reality. In this work, we studied norms with three different reputations, i.e., ‘good’, ‘neutral’, and ‘bad’. Through massive supercomputing for handling more than thirty billion possibilities, we fully identified which norms achieve cooperation and possess evolutionary stability against behavioural mutants. By systematically categorizing all these norms according to their behaviours, we found similarities and dissimilarities to their binary-reputation counterpart, the leading eight. We obtained four rules that should be satisfied by the successful norms, and the behaviour of the leading eight can be understood as a special case of these rules. A couple of norms that show counter-intuitive behaviours are also presented. We believe the findings are also useful for designing successful norms with more general reputation systems.

Paying Back People Who Harmed Us but Not People Who Helped Us: Direct Negative Reciprocity Precedes Direct Positive Reciprocity in Early Development

2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (9) ◽  
pp. 1273-1286 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nadia Chernyak ◽  
Kristin L. Leimgruber ◽  
Yarrow C. Dunham ◽  
Jingshi Hu ◽  
Peter R. Blake
Keyword(s):  
Young Children ◽  
Social Norms ◽  
Early Development ◽  
Social Exchange ◽  
Social Norm ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Critical Component ◽  
Negative Reciprocity ◽  
Positive Direct ◽  
Positive Reciprocity

The principle of direct reciprocity, or paying back specific individuals, is assumed to be a critical component of everyday social exchange and a key mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. Young children know the norm of reciprocity, but it is unclear whether they follow the norm for both positive and negative direct reciprocity or whether reciprocity is initially generalized. Across five experiments ( N = 330), we showed that children between 4 and 8 years of age engaged in negative direct reciprocity but generalized positive reciprocity, despite recalling benefactors. Children did not endorse the norm of positive direct reciprocity as applying to them until about 7 years of age (Study 4), but a short social-norm training enhanced this behavior in younger children (Study 5). Results suggest that negative direct reciprocity develops early, whereas positive reciprocity becomes targeted to other specific individuals only as children learn and adopt social norms.

Determinants of international cooperation : reciprocity, opportunity, and cooperative norms

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Jeremy Bowling
Keyword(s):  
Social Construction ◽  
International Relations ◽  
International Cooperation ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
International Conflict ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
University Of Missouri ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
The Social ◽  
The University

[ACCESS RESTRICTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI AT AUTHOR'S REQUEST.] This dissertation examines few of the determinants and effects of international cooperation. There are three broad themes that run throughout this dissertation, which are the ideas of reciprocity, opportunity, and cooperative norms. Reciprocity is a large part of the development of cooperation theory, particularly in the study of the evolution of cooperation. While it is mentioned across international relations scholarship, empirical testing of its existence in international politics is scarce. Opportunity is a ubiquitous concept across social science. The concept is used in this dissertation as a challenge to the notion that cooperation reduces the likelihood of conflict, which pervades the study of international conflict, particularly from those that study conflict from the theory of liberalism. Lastly, an exploratory analysis of cooperative norms is examined. Studying the social construction of cooperative norms is important for the broader study of international cooperation. I find that direct and indirect reciprocity are important indicators of cooperation, cooperation will increase the likelihood and severity of dyadic conflict unless both states are highly cooperative with each other, and domestic political institutions may be important for the development of cooperative norms that extend to the international level. Overall, international relations scholars should reexamine how cooperation in viewed and studied, particularly in relation to conflict.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document