An empirical investigation on the time-series behavior of the U.S.-China trade deficit

1998 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 467-485 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yangru Wu ◽  
Junxi Zhang
2014 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Myeong Hwan Kim
Keyword(s):  

FEDS Notes ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (2945) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hunter L. Clark ◽  
◽  
Anna Wong ◽  

The United States' bilateral goods trade deficit with China appeared to have narrowed substantially since the escalation of the U.S.-China trade conflict in 2018, or so U.S. trade data suggest. By contrast, the Chinese data tell a much different story: the deficit, as implied by China's bilateral surplus, nearly reached historical highs by the end of 2020.


2018 ◽  
Vol 79 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel C.K. Chow ◽  
William McGuire ◽  
Ian Sheldon

The administration of President Donald J. Trump has warned that it supports an aggressive across the board tariff of 45% on all imports from China to neutralize the effects of China’s currency manipulation. However, such a tariff cannot withstand an economic and legal analysis. Fundamental economic principles indicate that China’s alleged currency devaluation cannot create a real long-term trade advantage and that the effects of currency devaluation have no real effect on the U.S.-China trade balance. Not only is currency manipulation not a cause of the U.S. trade deficit with China but the proposed remedy of a draconian 45% tariff will only create a grievous self-inflicted wound on the U.S. and global economy. From a legal perspective, a 45% tariff cannot be justified under the legal regime of the World Trade Organization as such a tariff runs afoul of the tightly regulated regime of authorized trade sanctions. As the proposed tariff cannot be justified from a legal or economic perspective it is not an advisable or appropriate response to China’s trade practices.


2013 ◽  
Vol 46 (6) ◽  
pp. 80-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kan Yue ◽  
Kevin Honglin Zhang
Keyword(s):  

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