scholarly journals United States Continues to Block New Appellate Body Members for the World Trade Organization, Risking the Collapse of the Appellate Process

2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (4) ◽  
pp. 822-831 ◽  

With only three remaining members of what is supposed to be a seven-member body, the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Appellate Body may soon cease to function. Since 2016, the United States has blocked the reappointment of Appellate Body members and rejected over a dozen proposals to launch selection processes that could fill the remaining vacancies. As a lead reason for these blocks, the United States has cited concerns about the practice whereby members whose terms have expired continue to serve on appeals to which they were previously appointed. On December 10, 2019, the terms of two Appellate Body members will expire, leaving only one member remaining. Because the WTO's dispute settlement process requires three Appellate Body members for each appeal, WTO members will be unable to make any new appeals by this year's end unless a solution emerges to the current impasse.

2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (3) ◽  
pp. 518-525

Over the last few years, the United States has been pressuring the World Trade Organization (WTO) to reform the Appellate Body by refusing proposals to fill vacancies. On December 10, 2019, the terms of two Appellate Body members expired, leaving one member left for the seven-member body. This has brought new appeals to a standstill, as an appeal from a panel established by the Dispute Settlement Body must be heard by three Appellate Body members. In February of 2020, the United States elaborated on its complaints about the Appellate Body in a report published by the Office of the United States Trade Representative. In the spring of 2020, in response to the continued U.S. resistance to filling vacancies on the Appellate Body, a group of WTO members established an interim arrangement to handle appeals through arbitration. Also in the spring of 2020, the United States described as invalid a recent Appellate Body report regarding a dispute between Canada and the United States, asserting that none of the three persons who issued the report were in fact bona fide Appellate Body members.


2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 316-321
Author(s):  
Richard H. Steinberg

The Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is facing a crisis. Appointment of AB members requires a consensus of the Dispute Settlement Body (comprised of all WTO members), and the United States has been blocking a consensus on further appointments since Donald J. Trump became the president. Without new appointments, the ranks of the AB have been diminishing as AB members’ terms have been expiring. If this continues (and many expect the United States to continue blocking a consensus on appointments), then in December 2019, through attrition, the number of AB members will fall below the threshold necessary to render decisions, at which point the AB will cease to function.


2013 ◽  
Vol 107 (1) ◽  
pp. 192-199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory Shaffer

In a Mexican challenge against U.S. criteria for labeling tuna products as “dolphin-safe,” the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO), on May 16, 2012, held against the United States while reversing various findings of the panel. The case was one of three WTO Appellate Body decisions issued in 2012 that interpreted and applied the key substantive provisions of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement or TBT) for the first time. Systemically, the decision is important for its interpretation of the TBT Agreement’s substantive obligations, the types of labeling that fall within the scope of the Agreement, the legitimacy of labeling based on foreign process and production methods (PPMs), and the relation of other international law to WTO law.


2005 ◽  
Vol 4 (S1) ◽  
pp. 78-87
Author(s):  
Gene M. Grossman ◽  
Petros C. Mavroidis

In United States – Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products from the European Communities (WTO Doc. WT/DS212/QB/R, henceforth Certain Products), the Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization was called upon to revisit the issue of whether the United States can legally impose countervailing duties following the privatization of state-owned enterprises that had received non-recurring subsidies. In twelve cases, the United States Department of Commerce (USDOC) had applied either the “gamma method” or the “same-person method” in assessing the impact of a change of ownership on the continued existence of a benefit from a countervailable subsidy. The European Communities challenged the legality of these methods.


2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 146-184 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tania Voon

Abstract Two of the four disputes against Australia’s tobacco plain packaging in the World Trade Organization (WTO) have been resolved, with the adoption of the Panel Reports upholding Australia’s tobacco plain packaging scheme with respect to Cuba and Indonesia. The fifth dispute, brought by Ukraine, was previously abandoned. The Panel’s decision deserves close examination, particularly regarding the balance between WTO Members’ legitimate policy objectives and restrictions on trade or on the use of trademarks. The Panel’s approach to the fundamental concepts of trade-restrictiveness and unjustifiability did not conform with the arguments of Australia or the complainants. These areas represent core aspects of the ongoing appeals by Honduras and the Dominican Republic. Although Australia did not appeal, its own arguments before the Panel provide further insights into the Panel’s approach. The significance of the Panel Reports is heightened by the continuing United States blockage of appointments to the WTO Appellate Body.


2020 ◽  
Vol 64 (7-8) ◽  
pp. 1358-1389 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julia Gray ◽  
Philip Potter

How do countries settle disputes in the shadow of the law? Even in the presence of legalized dispute settlement, countries still rely on diplomatic channels to resolve conflicts. But it can be difficult to assess diplomacy’s impact on dispute resolution because those channels tend to be opaque. We present both an original theory of the impact of diplomacy on dispute resolution and a novel measure of diplomacy. If countries with close or, conversely, distant relationships use legal channels for dispute resolution, diplomacy will have little impact on dispute settlement; resorting to legal recourse among friends or adversaries likely means that the dispute is intractable. However, diplomacy can increase the chances of settlement between countries with moderate levels of affinity. We test this argument using a protocol-based proxy for diplomatic interactions—gifts given at the occasion of meetings between diplomatic counterparts—that would otherwise be difficult to observe. Using the case of the United States and its disputes in the World Trade Organization, we find support for our argument. This suggests that even when countries resort to legalized methods of dispute settlement, bilateral dealmaking still plays an important role.


2012 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 251-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benn McGrady

In September 2011, the World Trade Organization (WTO) released the report of a panel tasked with considering a complaint brought by Indonesia concerning prohibitions on certain flavored tobacco products implemented by the United States (US). The panel concluded that the US violated WTO law and recommended that the US be asked to bring its laws into conformity with WTO law.The US appealed the panel's decision. The Appellate Body of the WTO upheld the panel report on April 4, 2012. This case note gives a brief overview of the Appellate Body's report and examines the implications for tobacco control and public health more generally.


2021 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 133-150
Author(s):  
Montej Abida ◽  
◽  
Ilhem Gargouri ◽  

Today we are witnessing a serious crisis that could lead to the collapse of the World Trade Organization (WTO). This crisis is the consequence of the uncooperative behavior of the triad: the United States, the European Union and East Asia. When there is a confrontation between these three most powerful regional blocs, there is inevitably a blockage and a destructive trade war similar to that of the 1930s. In these times of crisis, each country tries to save its economy by relying on the strategy of protectionism. The negotiation and regulatory functions of the WTO are paralyzed: the Dispute Settlement Body is seriously affected by the refusal of the United States, since 2016, to renew the members of the Appellate Body (AB) whose mandates were expiring. This jeopardizes international rules negotiated since 1947, when the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was created. The existence of liberalization fatigue and a growing rejection of globalization raises questions about the future of the WTO.


2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 104
Author(s):  
Asif khan ◽  
Ahmad Arafa Abd Elrhim ◽  
Nishan-E-Hyder Soomro ◽  
Muhammad Abid Hussain Shah Jillani

In recent years, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the multilateral trading system, has faced many difficulties and challenges due to the great vows of anti-globalisation and trade protectionism. The appellate body, as a significant portion of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSU) of the WTO, has been suffering from an unprecedented crisis of suspension because the United States continues to prevent the appointment of vacant members. Now to save the World Trade Organization from an unprecedented crisis of survival reform has become a consensus. However, each member has a different opinion concerning the basic principle and specific contents of WTO reforms. In general, it is proposed to increase the flexibility of the negotiation mechanism and break the deadlock in multilateral negotiations caused by "consensus" and advocate the system in terms of substantive rules. It is proposed to establish new trade regulations, strengthen trade fairness, and eliminate investment Obstacles; in terms of disciplinary constraints, it advocates better use of the WTO's review and supervision functions and strengthens the constraints on members' compliance with transparency and notification obligations. In dispute settlement, it proposes to amend the relevant agreements as soon as possible To break the deadlock in the selection of judges of the Appellate Body and ensure the regular operation of the World Trade Organization. China clarifies its primary position and fundamental concerns, based on the existing paper, and introducing specific reform programs to participate more effectively in the WTO reform process. Qualitative research methodology has been applied to the following article.


2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 321-322
Author(s):  
Terence P. Stewart

The United States for at least sixteen years has had serious concerns with whether the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement system was operating according to the terms upon which WTO Members had agreed. While the United States has been a major supporter of the WTO system and the dispute settlement system generally, concerns about sovereignty and the proper functioning of the system have been important since at least 2002, reflected in U.S. legislation and actions by three administrations. Concerns have existed on (1) whether panels and the Appellate Body have honored the limitations contained in Articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) not to create rights or obligations; (2) the issuance of advisory opinions on issues not raised or not necessary to the resolution of the dispute; (3) actions of the Appellate Body that permit deviation from the DSU without affirmative authorization by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB); and, former Appellate Body members continuing to be involved in cases after their term has expired (failure to complete appeals in the DSU required maximum time of ninety days). These are all issues that have concerned the United States for years but also have been raised by other members.


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