scholarly journals China Perspective in Reforming of the World Trade Organization

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 104
Author(s):  
Asif khan ◽  
Ahmad Arafa Abd Elrhim ◽  
Nishan-E-Hyder Soomro ◽  
Muhammad Abid Hussain Shah Jillani
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Reform Process ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Primary Position ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
The World ◽  
Negotiation Mechanism

In recent years, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the multilateral trading system, has faced many difficulties and challenges due to the great vows of anti-globalisation and trade protectionism. The appellate body, as a significant portion of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSU) of the WTO, has been suffering from an unprecedented crisis of suspension because the United States continues to prevent the appointment of vacant members. Now to save the World Trade Organization from an unprecedented crisis of survival reform has become a consensus. However, each member has a different opinion concerning the basic principle and specific contents of WTO reforms. In general, it is proposed to increase the flexibility of the negotiation mechanism and break the deadlock in multilateral negotiations caused by "consensus" and advocate the system in terms of substantive rules. It is proposed to establish new trade regulations, strengthen trade fairness, and eliminate investment Obstacles; in terms of disciplinary constraints, it advocates better use of the WTO's review and supervision functions and strengthens the constraints on members' compliance with transparency and notification obligations. In dispute settlement, it proposes to amend the relevant agreements as soon as possible To break the deadlock in the selection of judges of the Appellate Body and ensure the regular operation of the World Trade Organization. China clarifies its primary position and fundamental concerns, based on the existing paper, and introducing specific reform programs to participate more effectively in the WTO reform process. Qualitative research methodology has been applied to the following article.

scholarly journals The Impending Dejudicialization of the WTO Dispute Settlement System?

2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 316-321
Author(s):  
Richard H. Steinberg
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The World ◽  
Dispute Settlement System

The Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is facing a crisis. Appointment of AB members requires a consensus of the Dispute Settlement Body (comprised of all WTO members), and the United States has been blocking a consensus on further appointments since Donald J. Trump became the president. Without new appointments, the ranks of the AB have been diminishing as AB members’ terms have been expiring. If this continues (and many expect the United States to continue blocking a consensus on appointments), then in December 2019, through attrition, the number of AB members will fall below the threshold necessary to render decisions, at which point the AB will cease to function.

scholarly journals U.S. Refusal to Appoint Members Renders WTO Appellate Body Unable to Hear New Appeals

2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (3) ◽  
pp. 518-525
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Appellate Body Report ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
The World ◽  
Bona Fide ◽  
Wto Appellate Body

Over the last few years, the United States has been pressuring the World Trade Organization (WTO) to reform the Appellate Body by refusing proposals to fill vacancies. On December 10, 2019, the terms of two Appellate Body members expired, leaving one member left for the seven-member body. This has brought new appeals to a standstill, as an appeal from a panel established by the Dispute Settlement Body must be heard by three Appellate Body members. In February of 2020, the United States elaborated on its complaints about the Appellate Body in a report published by the Office of the United States Trade Representative. In the spring of 2020, in response to the continued U.S. resistance to filling vacancies on the Appellate Body, a group of WTO members established an interim arrangement to handle appeals through arbitration. Also in the spring of 2020, the United States described as invalid a recent Appellate Body report regarding a dispute between Canada and the United States, asserting that none of the three persons who issued the report were in fact bona fide Appellate Body members.

scholarly journals United States Continues to Block New Appellate Body Members for the World Trade Organization, Risking the Collapse of the Appellate Process

2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (4) ◽  
pp. 822-831 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Selection Processes ◽  
The World ◽  
Wto Appellate Body

With only three remaining members of what is supposed to be a seven-member body, the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Appellate Body may soon cease to function. Since 2016, the United States has blocked the reappointment of Appellate Body members and rejected over a dozen proposals to launch selection processes that could fill the remaining vacancies. As a lead reason for these blocks, the United States has cited concerns about the practice whereby members whose terms have expired continue to serve on appeals to which they were previously appointed. On December 10, 2019, the terms of two Appellate Body members will expire, leaving only one member remaining. Because the WTO's dispute settlement process requires three Appellate Body members for each appeal, WTO members will be unable to make any new appeals by this year's end unless a solution emerges to the current impasse.

scholarly journals The Future of Amicus Participation at the WTO: Implications of the Sardines Decision and Suggestions for Further Developments

2005 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 449-470 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Keller
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Public Access ◽  
Democratic Participation ◽  
Global Society ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
The World ◽  
The Future

In today's increasingly interdependent global society, international institutions formerly committed to operating as insular systems recognizing only states as legitimate participants have come under pressure to open their processes to public view and participation. The World Trade Organization (WTO) in particular has been widely criticized for its lack of transparency and democratic participation. Nowhere has this criticism been more prevalent than in the arena of dispute settlement. The controversy over the acceptance of amicus briefs at the WTO reflects the tensions among WTO members and non-members concerning greater public access to dispute settlement proceedings. This battle has been fought primarily through the Appellate Body and its important series of decisions on amicus briefs.

High Stakes: US-China Trade Disputes under the World Trade Organization (WTO)

2013 ◽  
Vol 41 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 352-380 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ka Zeng
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Bilateral Trade ◽  
Cost Benefit Analysis ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Trade Disputes ◽  
The Past ◽  
China Trade ◽  
The World

Abstract This paper examines US-China trade disputes under the World Trade Organization (WTO) and argues that Chinese leaders are increasingly resorting to the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism to target issues of most critical concern to domestic constituencies. The following overview of the WTO disputes initiated by China suggests that China’s WTO disputes tend to be dominated by cases involving anti-dumping duties (ADs) and countervailing duties (CVDs). The disproportionate share of such trade remedy cases in China’s WTO cases needs to be viewed in light of the fact that China has become the leading target of such cases worldwide in the past decades. The above pattern of China’s WTO initiation is explicable within the leader cost-benefit analysis, which would lead us to expect Chinese leaders to use the WTO DSM either to open foreign markets for Chinese businesses or to shield domestic firms from perceived unfair foreign trade practices. This paper further argues that the significant expansion of bilateral trade relations in the past decades has provided opportunities for Chinese leaders to identify or threaten retaliation against anti-protectionist groups in the other country in order to mobilise them against the disputed measure.

European Communities restrictions on imports of beef treated with hormones—nontariff trade barriers—control of food additives—scientific basis for restrictions—WTO dispute settlement mechanisms—scope of review

1998 ◽  
Vol 92 (4) ◽  
pp. 755-759 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernard H. Oxman ◽  
David A. Wirth
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Food Additives ◽  
Meat Products ◽  
The United States ◽  
Scientific Basis ◽  
Safety Measures ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement

European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products. WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R & WT/DS48/AB/R.World Trade Organization Appellate Body, January 16, 1998.This report of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is both the most recent development in a long-running trade battle between the United States and the European Communities and the first dispute to be addressed under a new Uruguay Round agreement concerning food safety measures.

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