scholarly journals The Deceiving Game

Author(s):  
SHLOMO COHEN ◽  
RO'I ZULTAN

Abstract The moral comparison of the three venues of deception—lying, falsely implicating, and nonverbal deception—is a central, ongoing debate in the ethics of deception. To date there has been no attempt to advance in the debate through experimental philosophy. Using methods of experimental economics, we devised a strategic game to test positions in the debate. Our article presents the experimental results and shows how philosophical analysis of the results allows drawing valid normative conclusions. Our conclusions testify against the dominant position in the debate—that lying is morally worse than all non-lying deceptions. They offer prima facie support to the view that the venue of deception makes no moral difference.

2010 ◽  
pp. 117-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Lutz

Proponents of linguistic philosophy hold that all non-empirical philosophical problems can be solved by either analyzing ordinary language or developing an ideal one. I review the debates on linguistic philosophy and between ordinary and ideal language philosophy. Using arguments from these debates, I argue that the results of experimental philosophy on intuitions support linguistic philosophy. Within linguistic philosophy, these experimental results support and complement ideal language philosophy. I argue further that some of the critiques of experimental philosophy are in fact defenses of ideal language philosophy. Finally, I show how much of the current debate about experimental philosophy is anticipated in the debates about and within linguistic philosophy. Specifically, arguments by ideal language philosophers support experimental philosophy.


2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 290-312 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiafeng Zhu

The moral principle of fairness or fair play is widely believed to be a solid ground for political obligation, i.e., a general prima facie moral duty to obey the law qua law. In this article, I advance a new and, more importantly, principled objection to fairness theories of political obligation by revealing and defending a justificatory gap between the principle of fairness and political obligation: the duty of fairness on its own is incapable of preempting the citizen’s liberty to reciprocate fairly in ways other than obeying the law. This justificatory gap is unaffected by the ongoing debate between the voluntarist and the nonvoluntarist accounts of fairness, and it cannot be bridged by the two arguments that are perhaps implicit in Klosko’s account, namely the presumptive benefits argument and the democratic procedure argument.


Episteme ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 219-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
James R. Beebe ◽  
Joseph Shea

AbstractWe report experimental results showing that participants are more likely to attribute knowledge in familiar Gettier cases when the would-be knowers are performing actions that are negative in some way (e.g. harmful, blameworthy, norm-violating) than when they are performing positive or neutral actions. Our experiments bring together important elements from the Gettier case literature in epistemology and the Knobe effect literature in experimental philosophy and reveal new insights into folk patterns of knowledge attribution.


2015 ◽  
pp. 632
Author(s):  
Peng Zhou ◽  
Jacopo Romoli ◽  
Stephen Crain

This paper presents experimental results showing that four-year-old Mandarin- speaking children draw free choice inferences from disjunctive statements, though they are not able to compute inferences of exclusivity for disjunctive statements or other scalar implicatures. The findings connect to those of Chemla & Bott (under review) who report differences in how adults process free choice inferences versus scalar implicatures and, prima facie, the findings pose a challenge to treatments that attempt to unify inferences of both kinds. Instead, the findings appear to favour accounts that invoke different analyses for each kind of inference, such as Zimmerman 2000a, Geurts 2005, and Barker 2010. The results, however, also support the recent approach in the experimental literature which attributes children’s failures to compute scalar implicatures to a difficulty with alternatives: children may lack the lexical knowledge of alternatives, or these implicatures impose such a high processing cost that children are unable to handle the alternatives necessary to compute them (Gualmini, Crain, Meroni, Chierchia & Guasti 2001 Chierchia, Crain, Guasti & Thornton 2001 Reinhart 2006; Barner, Brooks & Bale 2011; Singh, Wexler, Astle, Kamawar & Fox 2012). If accessing alternatives is the source of children’s difficulty, then they would be expected to perform better if the requisite alternatives are made explicit, as sub-strings of the asserted sentences. This is exactly what we found. Children were able to compute free choice inferences based on alternatives that were made explicit in the assertion, but children were unable to compute ‘regular’ scalar implicatures arising from alternatives lacking this property. We discuss the implications of these findings for the debate about the relationship between free choice inferences and scalar implicatures and children’s knowledge of alternatives.


2013 ◽  
Vol 23 ◽  
pp. 632 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peng Zhou ◽  
Jacopo Romoli ◽  
Stephen Crain

This paper presents experimental results showing that four-year-old Mandarin- speaking children draw free choice inferences from disjunctive statements, though they are not able to compute inferences of exclusivity for disjunctive statements or other scalar implicatures. The findings connect to those of Chemla & Bott (under review) who report differences in how adults process free choice inferences versus scalar implicatures and, prima facie, the findings pose a challenge to treatments that attempt to unify inferences of both kinds. Instead, the findings appear to favour accounts that invoke different analyses for each kind of inference, such as Zimmerman 2000a, Geurts 2005, and Barker 2010. The results, however, also support the recent approach in the experimental literature which attributes children’s failures to compute scalar implicatures to a difficulty with alternatives: children may lack the lexical knowledge of alternatives, or these implicatures impose such a high processing cost that children are unable to handle the alternatives necessary to compute them (Gualmini, Crain, Meroni, Chierchia & Guasti 2001 Chierchia, Crain, Guasti & Thornton 2001 Reinhart 2006; Barner, Brooks & Bale 2011; Singh, Wexler, Astle, Kamawar & Fox 2012). If accessing alternatives is the source of children’s difficulty, then they would be expected to perform better if the requisite alternatives are made explicit, as sub-strings of the asserted sentences. This is exactly what we found. Children were able to compute free choice inferences based on alternatives that were made explicit in the assertion, but children were unable to compute ‘regular’ scalar implicatures arising from alternatives lacking this property. We discuss the implications of these findings for the debate about the relationship between free choice inferences and scalar implicatures and children’s knowledge of alternatives.


2012 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 337-354
Author(s):  
Damián Enrique Szmuc ◽  

Some recent researches in experimental philosophy have posed a problem for philosophers’ appeal to intuition (hereinafter referred to as PAI); the aim of this paper is to offer an answer to this challenge. The thesis against PAI implies that, given some experimental results, intuition does not seem to be a reliable epistemic source, and —more importantly— given the actual state of knowledge about its operation, we do not have sufficient resources to mitigate its errors and thus establish its reliability. That is why PAI is hopeless. Throughout this paper I will defend my own conception of PAI, which I have called the Deliberative Conception, and consequently, I will defend intersubjective agreement as a means to mitigate PAI errors, offering empirical evidence from recent studies on the Argumentative Theory of Reason that favor the conception I defend here. Finally, I will reply to some objections that might arise against the Deliberative Conception, which will lead me to discuss some metaphilosophical issues that are significantly relevant for the future of the dispute about the appeal to intuition.


2019 ◽  
pp. 111-134
Author(s):  
Daniel Sperling

This chapter explores some of the major political-philosophical justifications for and against state interference in suicide tourism. These are divided into five main arguments from the perspective of the state in which assisted suicide is illegal: the idea of state sovereignty; global justice and moral particularism; cosmopolitanism and moral universalism; inter-state moral pluralism; and the notion of common ownership. While these arguments do not necessarily rely on the morality of suicide tourism, their overall evaluation reveals that there are prima facie good reasons against state intervention or for the adoption of a neutral view towards permissive countries. The discussion in this chapter concludes that although there are relatively weak justifications for state intervention in suicide tourism, there are strong justifications for non-intervention.


2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 243-261 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aaron Kashtan

Long dominated by straight white male fans, superhero comics fandom has recently grown more diverse and inclusive. As with other fan communities like science fiction and gaming, this diversification has led to a backlash from enfranchised fans who are angry at losing their dominant position. Focusing on three controversies surrounding three comic book covers that were accused of sexism, this article analyses the ongoing debate between ‘traditional’ and ‘progressive’ superhero fans. I argue that this debate – like the Gamergate and Sad Puppies controversies, but in significantly different ways – is a microcosm of larger divisions within American society.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Dinges

The term “know” is one of the ten most common verbs in English, and yet a central aspect of its usage remains mysterious. Our willingness to ascribe knowledge depends not just on epistemic factors such as the quality of our evidence. It also depends on seemingly non-epistemic factors. For instance, we become less inclined to ascribe knowledge when it’s important to be right, or once our attention is drawn to possible sources of error. Accounts of this phenomenon proliferate, but no consensus has been achieved, decades of research notwithstanding. The author offers a fresh examination of this ongoing debate. After reviewing and complementing relevant data from both armchair and experimental philosophy, he assesses extant accounts of this data including semantic, metaphysical, pragmatic, doxastic as well as more recent psychological accounts. Against this background, he offers a novel psychological account based on the idea that non-epistemic factors affect estimates of probability.


2005 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Larry Samuelson

This paper explores the questions of how economic theory can be used to design and interpret experiments and how experimental results can be used to construct and interpret economic theories. The relationship between economic theory and experiments is modeled and illustrated with examples from both theoretical and experimental work. The emphasis is on combing theory and experiment to the benefit of both.


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