scholarly journals Necessitism, Contingentism, and Theory Equivalence

2021 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-218
Author(s):  
Bruno Jacinto
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Second Order ◽  
List Type ◽  
Main Question ◽  
Metaphysical Necessity ◽  
Necessary Being ◽  
Modal Metaphysics ◽  
The World ◽  
Serious Actualism

AbstractNecessitism, Contingentism, and Theory Equivalence is a dissertation on issues in higher-order modal metaphysics. Consider a modal higher-order language with identity in which the universal quantifier is interpreted as expressing (unrestricted) universal quantification and the necessity operator is interpreted as expressing metaphysical necessity. The main question addressed in the dissertation concerns the correct theory formulated in this language. A different question that also takes centre stage in the dissertation is what it takes for theories to be equivalent.The whole dissertation consists of an extended argument in defence of the (joint) truth of two seemingly inconsistent higher-order modal theories, specifically: 1.Plantingan Moderate Contingentism, a theory based on Plantinga’s [1] modal metaphysics that is committed to, among other things, the contingent being of some individuals and the necessary being of all possible higher-order entities;2.Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism, a theory advocated by Williamson [3] which is committed to, among other things, the necessary being of every possible individual as well as of every possible higher-order entity.Part of the case for these theories’ joint truth relies on defences of the following metaphysical theses: (i) Thorough Serious Actualism, the thesis that no things could have been related while being nothing, and (ii) Higher-Order Necessitism, the thesis that necessarily, every higher-order entity is necessarily something. It is shown that Thorough Serious Actualism and Higher-Order Necessitism are both implicit commitments of very weak logical theories. The defence of Higher-Order Necessitism constitutes a powerful challenge to Stalnaker’s [2] Thorough Contingentism, a theory committed to, among other things, the view that there could have been some individuals as well as some entities of any higher-order that could have been nothing.In the dissertation it is argued that Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism are in fact equivalent, even if they appear to be jointly inconsistent. The case for this claim relies on the Synonymy account, a novel account of theory equivalence developed and defended in the dissertation. According to this account, theories are equivalent just in case they have the same commitments and conception of logical space.By way of defending the Synonymy account’s adequacy, the account is applied to the debate between noneists, proponents of the view that some things do not exist, and Quineans, proponents of the view that to exist just is to be some thing. The Synonymy account is shown to afford a more nuanced and better understanding of that debate by revealing that what noneists and Quineans are really disagreeing about is what expressive resources are available to appropriately describe the world.By coupling a metatheoretical result with tools from the philosophy of language, it is argued that Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism are synonymous theories, and so, by the lights of the Synonymy account, equivalent. Given the defence of their extant commitments made in the dissertation, it is concluded that Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism are both correct. A corollary of this result is that the dispute between Plantingans and Williamsonians is, in an important sense, merely verbal. For if two theories are equivalent, then they “require the same of the world for their truth.”Thus, the results of the dissertation reveal that if one speaks as a Plantingan while advocating Plantingan Moderate Contingentism, or as a Williamsonian while advocating Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism, then one will not go wrong. Notwithstanding, one will still go wrong if one speaks as a Plantingan while advocating Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism, or as a Williamsonian while advocating Plantingan Moderate Contingentism.On the basis of a conception of the individual constants and predicates of second-order modal languages as strongly Millian, i.e., as having actually existing entities as their semantic values, in the appendix are presented second-order modal logics consistent with Stalnaker’s Thorough Contingentism. Furthermore, it is shown there that these logics are strong enough for applications of higher-order modal logic in mathematics, a result that constitutes a reply to an argument to the contrary by Williamson [3]. Finally, these logics are proven to be complete relative to particular “thoroughly contingentist” classes of models.

scholarly journals Pragmatics and philosophy: In search of a paradigm

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 131-159 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kasia M. Jaszczolt
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
List Type ◽  
Main Question ◽  
Philosophical Logic ◽  
Paradigm Shifts ◽  
Future Prospects ◽  
Philosophy Of Linguistics ◽  
Introductory Part ◽  
Methodology Of Science ◽  
Language Meaning

Abstract There is no doubt that pragmatic theory and philosophy of language are mutually relevant and intrinsically connected. The main question I address in this paper is how exactly they are interconnected in terms of (i) their respective objectives, (ii) explanans – explanandum relation, (iii) methods of enquiry, and (iv) drawing on associated disciplines. In the introductory part I attempt to bring some order into the diversity of use of such labels as philosophical logic, philosophical semantics, philosophical pragmatics, linguistic philosophy, or philosophy of linguistics, among others. In the following sections I focus on philosophical pragmatics as a branch of philosophy of language (pragmaticsPPL) and the trends and theories it gave rise to, discussing them against the background of methodology of science and in particular paradigms and paradigm shifts as identified in natural science. In the main part of the paper I address the following questions: How is pragmaticsPPL to be delimited?How do pragmatic solutions to questions about meaning fare vis-à-vis syntactic solutions? Is there a pattern emerging?and, relatedly,What are the future prospects for pragmaticsPPL in theories of natural language meaning? I conclude with a discussion of the relation between pragmaticsPPL and functionalism, observing that contextualism has to play a central role in functionalist pragmatics at the expense of minimalism and sententialism.

Optimal control of higher order differential inclusions with functional constraints

2020 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elimhan N. Mahmudov
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Control ◽  
Optimality Conditions ◽  
Differential Inclusion ◽  
Differential Inclusions ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Sufficient Optimality Conditions ◽  
Functional Constraints ◽  
Complementary Slackness ◽  
Complementary Slackness Conditions

The present paper studies the Mayer problem with higher order evolution differential inclusions and functional constraints of optimal control theory (PFC); to this end first we use an interesting auxiliary problem with second order discrete-time and discrete approximate inclusions (PFD). Are proved necessary and sufficient conditions incorporating the Euler–Lagrange inclusion, the Hamiltonian inclusion, the transversality and complementary slackness conditions. The basic concept of obtaining optimal conditions is locally adjoint mappings and equivalence results. Then combining these results and passing to the limit in the discrete approximations we establish new sufficient optimality conditions for second order continuous-time evolution inclusions. This approach and results make a bridge between optimal control problem with higher order differential inclusion (PFC) and constrained mathematical programming problems in finite-dimensional spaces. Formulation of the transversality and complementary slackness conditions for second order differential inclusions play a substantial role in the next investigations without which it is hardly ever possible to get any optimality conditions; consequently, these results are generalized to the problem with an arbitrary higher order differential inclusion. Furthermore, application of these results is demonstrated by solving some semilinear problem with second and third order differential inclusions.

Imaginings

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 17-30
Author(s):  
Kelly James Clark
Keyword(s):  
Religious Tradition ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Fine Tuning ◽  
Intellectual Humility ◽  
First Order ◽  
Natural Processes ◽  
Empirically Supported ◽  
Group Violence ◽  
The World ◽  
The Universe

In Branden Thornhill-Miller and Peter Millican’s challenging and provocative essay, we hear a considerably longer, more scholarly and less melodic rendition of John Lennon’s catchy tune—without religion, or at least without first-order supernaturalisms (the kinds of religion we find in the world), there’d be significantly less intra-group violence. First-order supernaturalist beliefs, as defined by Thornhill-Miller and Peter Millican (hereafter M&M), are “beliefs that claim unique authority for some particular religious tradition in preference to all others” (3). According to M&M, first-order supernaturalist beliefs are exclusivist, dogmatic, empirically unsupported, and irrational. Moreover, again according to M&M, we have perfectly natural explanations of the causes that underlie such beliefs (they seem to conceive of such natural explanations as debunking explanations). They then make a case for second-order supernaturalism, “which maintains that the universe in general, and the religious sensitivities of humanity in particular, have been formed by supernatural powers working through natural processes” (3). Second-order supernaturalism is a kind of theism, more closely akin to deism than, say, Christianity or Buddhism. It is, as such, universal (according to contemporary psychology of religion), empirically supported (according to philosophy in the form of the Fine-Tuning Argument), and beneficial (and so justified pragmatically). With respect to its pragmatic value, second-order supernaturalism, according to M&M, gets the good(s) of religion (cooperation, trust, etc) without its bad(s) (conflict and violence). Second-order supernaturalism is thus rational (and possibly true) and inconducive to violence. In this paper, I will examine just one small but important part of M&M’s argument: the claim that (first-order) religion is a primary motivator of violence and that its elimination would eliminate or curtail a great deal of violence in the world. Imagine, they say, no religion, too.Janusz Salamon offers a friendly extension or clarification of M&M’s second-order theism, one that I think, with emendations, has promise. He argues that the core of first-order religions, the belief that Ultimate Reality is the Ultimate Good (agatheism), is rational (agreeing that their particular claims are not) and, if widely conceded and endorsed by adherents of first-order religions, would reduce conflict in the world.While I favor the virtue of intellectual humility endorsed in both papers, I will argue contra M&M that (a) belief in first-order religion is not a primary motivator of conflict and violence (and so eliminating first-order religion won’t reduce violence). Second, partly contra Salamon, who I think is half right (but not half wrong), I will argue that (b) the religious resources for compassion can and should come from within both the particular (often exclusivist) and the universal (agatheistic) aspects of religious beliefs. Finally, I will argue that (c) both are guilty, as I am, of the philosopher’s obsession with belief. 

Vagueness and the World

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Bacon
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
Formal Models ◽  
Logical Space ◽  
The World ◽  
The Way

According to a fairly widespread assumption, there is some definite collection of completely factual or fundamental propositions upon which all truths supervene and which are unaffected by vagueness. This assumption manifests itself in formal models of vagueness as well—for example, the supervaluationist who represents propositions as sets of world-precisification pairs may divide logical space into propositions that only depend on the world-coordinate. This chapter argues that this assumption leads to paradoxes of higher-order vagueness, and, ultimately, should be rejected in favour of a weaker notion of fundamentality or factuality. It suggests an alternative picture in which there is vagueness ‘all the way down’: logical-space can be divided into basic propositions that settle all precise matters, but it is vague where those divisions lie.

Beyond Concepts

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Garrett Millikan
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Conceptual Development ◽  
Natural World ◽  
Language Function ◽  
Natural Signs ◽  
Transmission Of Information ◽  
The World ◽  
Natural Information ◽  
Natural Ontology

This book weaves together themes from natural ontology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language and information, areas of inquiry that have not recently been treated together. The sprawling topic is Kant’s how is knowledge possible? but viewed from a contemporary naturalist standpoint. The assumption is that we are evolved creatures that use cognition as a guide in dealing with the natural world, and that the natural world is roughly as natural science has tried to describe it. Very unlike Kant, then, we must begin with ontology, with a rough understanding of what the world is like prior to cognition, only later developing theories about the nature of cognition within that world and how it manages to reflect the rest of nature. And in trying to get from ontology to cognition we must traverse another non-Kantian domain: questions about the transmission of information both through natural signs and through purposeful signs including, especially, language. Novelties are the introduction of unitrackers and unicepts whose job is to recognize the same again as manifested through the jargon of experience, a direct reference theory for common nouns and other extensional terms, a naturalist sketch of uniceptual—roughly conceptual— development, a theory of natural information and of language function that shows how properly functioning language carries natural information, a novel description of the semantics/pragmatics distinction, a discussion of perception as translation from natural informational signs, new descriptions of indexicals and demonstratives and of intensional contexts and a new analysis of the reference of incomplete descriptions.

Fighting Childhood Pneumonia in Uganda

2017 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Tim Calkins ◽  
Kara Palamountain ◽  
Aniruddha Chatterjee ◽  
Robert Frantz ◽  
Elizabeth Hart ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Stakeholder Analysis ◽  
List Type ◽  
Patient Journey ◽  
Childhood Pneumonia ◽  
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers ◽  
The World ◽  
Women And Children ◽  
Potential Impact ◽  
Global Stakeholders ◽  
The U.S

It is January 2014, and the case protagonist, David Milestone (senior advisor at the Center for Accelerating Innovation and Impact at the U.S. Agency for International Development's Global Health Bureau), is preparing for a meeting of global stakeholders and pharmaceutical manufacturers who are interested in reducing mortality caused by childhood pneumonia and are prepared to donate $10 million to support this effort.Milestone's goal is to propose a strategy to address childhood pneumonia in Uganda, toward which the $10 million donation would go. In addition to effectively and sustainably reducing childhood pneumonia deaths, the plan must align the interests of various stakeholders behind the problem. A successful strategy in Uganda could be a model for interventions elsewhere. The United Nations Commission on Lifesaving Commodities for Women and Children recently identified Uganda as a “pathfinder” country, meaning it could serve as the example for other countries wrestling with the same issues. This is a remarkable opportunity to change the lives of children in Uganda—and all around the world.After reading and analyzing the case, students will be able to: Perform a stakeholder analysis Appreciate the challenges involved in improving public health, especially in developing countries Create a patient journey and use it to identify potential impact points

scholarly journals Preserving the Shape of Functions by Applying Multidimensional Schoenberg-Type Operators

Symmetry ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (6) ◽  
pp. 1016
Author(s):  
Camelia Liliana Moldovan ◽  
Radu Păltănea
Keyword(s):  
Applied Sciences ◽  
Degree Of Approximation ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Dimensional Case ◽  
Moduli Of Continuity ◽  
One Dimensional ◽  
Multidimensional Generalization ◽  
The One

The paper presents a multidimensional generalization of the Schoenberg operators of higher order. The new operators are powerful tools that can be used for approximation processes in many fields of applied sciences. The construction of these operators uses a symmetry regarding the domain of definition. The degree of approximation by sequences of such operators is given in terms of the first and the second order moduli of continuity. Extending certain results obtained by Marsden in the one-dimensional case, the property of preservation of monotonicity and convexity is proved.

Gaslighting, First- and Second-Order

Hypatia ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Paul-Mikhail Catapang Podosky
Keyword(s):  
Second Order ◽  
First Order ◽  
The World ◽  
In Virtue Of

Abstract In what sense do people doubt their understanding of reality when subject to gaslighting? I suggest that an answer to this question depends on the linguistic order at which a gaslighting exchange takes place. This marks a distinction between first-order and second-order gaslighting. The former occurs when there is disagreement over whether a shared concept applies to some aspect of the world, and where the use of words by a speaker is apt to cause hearers to doubt their interpretive abilities without doubting the accuracy of their concepts. The latter occurs when there is disagreement over which concept should be used in a context, and where the use of words by a speaker is apt to cause hearers to doubt their interpretive abilities in virtue of doubting the accuracy of their concepts. Many cases of second-order gaslighting are unintentional: its occurrence often depends on contingent environmental facts. I end the article by focusing on the distinctive epistemic injustices of second-order gaslighting: (1) metalinguistic deprivation, (2) conceptual obscuration, and (3) perspectival subversion. I show how each reliably has sequelae in terms of psychological and practical control.

scholarly journals Higher order Hamiltonian Monte Carlo sampling for cosmological large-scale structure analysis

2021 ◽  
Vol 502 (3) ◽  
pp. 3976-3992
Author(s):  
Mónica Hernández-Sánchez ◽  
Francisco-Shu Kitaura ◽  
Metin Ata ◽  
Claudio Dalla Vecchia
Keyword(s):  
Fourth Order ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Equations Of Motion ◽  
Large Scale Structure ◽  
Real Space ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Scale Structure ◽  
Integration Schemes ◽  
Reconstruction Methods

ABSTRACT We investigate higher order symplectic integration strategies within Bayesian cosmic density field reconstruction methods. In particular, we study the fourth-order discretization of Hamiltonian equations of motion (EoM). This is achieved by recursively applying the basic second-order leap-frog scheme (considering the single evaluation of the EoM) in a combination of even numbers of forward time integration steps with a single intermediate backward step. This largely reduces the number of evaluations and random gradient computations, as required in the usual second-order case for high-dimensional cases. We restrict this study to the lognormal-Poisson model, applied to a full volume halo catalogue in real space on a cubical mesh of 1250 h−1 Mpc side and 2563 cells. Hence, we neglect selection effects, redshift space distortions, and displacements. We note that those observational and cosmic evolution effects can be accounted for in subsequent Gibbs-sampling steps within the COSMIC BIRTH algorithm. We find that going from the usual second to fourth order in the leap-frog scheme shortens the burn-in phase by a factor of at least ∼30. This implies that 75–90 independent samples are obtained while the fastest second-order method converges. After convergence, the correlation lengths indicate an improvement factor of about 3.0 fewer gradient computations for meshes of 2563 cells. In the considered cosmological scenario, the traditional leap-frog scheme turns out to outperform higher order integration schemes only when considering lower dimensional problems, e.g. meshes with 643 cells. This gain in computational efficiency can help to go towards a full Bayesian analysis of the cosmological large-scale structure for upcoming galaxy surveys.

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