Punishing Moral Animals

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Eli Shupe

Abstract There has been recent speculation that some (nonhuman) animals are moral agents. Using a retributivist framework, I argue that if some animals are moral agents, then there are circumstances in which some of them deserve punishment. But who is best situated to punish animal wrongdoers? This paper explores the idea that the answer to this question is humans.

2020 ◽  
pp. 157-176
Author(s):  
Anna L. Peterson

This chapter turns to one of the most important and controversial issues in medical ethics: euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide (PAS). The intensely personal scale of mercy killing makes it possible to consider practice in a very concrete way, including activities that shape the situations of very ill people and their relations with a variety of other moral agents, from family members and physicians to policymakers. The chapter explores not only human euthanasia and PAS but also killings of nonhuman animals, including both the euthanasia of beloved pets and the killing of homeless dogs and cats in shelters. This comparison highlights the difference that relationships make in ethical arguments. It also reveals how much species runs through ethical argumentation, in the form of unquestioned assumptions about what makes a life valuable.


John Rawls ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 273-284
Author(s):  
Sarah Roberts-Cady

Rawls’s theory does not, as many philosophers assume, rule out the possibility of justice for nonhuman animals. A careful reading of Rawls shows that the issue hinges on the answer to this question: would it be reasonable for moral agents to agree to terms of social cooperation that include protections for animals? To establish that it is reasonable, one must make an argument for these legal protections that is grounded in public reason alone. Such arguments exist and, indeed, dominate discussions of the status of animals. Accordingly, a Rawlsian framework can be used to argue for justice for animals.


Author(s):  
Diane Jeske

In examining the case of Thomas Jefferson, the author shows how the impediments to good moral deliberation—cultural pressures and norms, the complexity of consequences, emotions, and self-deception—played a role in his thinking about slavery. The chapter also shows how these impediments play a role in our own thinking about our treatment of nonhuman animals and how the tools of moral philosophy can serve as a way of dealing with those impediments. We have to learn how to balance our own interests against those of others, and how to balance the interests of loved ones against the interests of strangers. We cannot leave moral action to the mercy of conscience, if we mean by conscience whatever we happen to think is the right thing to do. Employing the tools of moral philosophy in moral education can help us to raise good moral deliberators and, hopefully, good moral agents.


2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amanda R. Ridley ◽  
Melanie O. Mirville

Abstract There is a large body of research on conflict in nonhuman animal groups that measures the costs and benefits of intergroup conflict, and we suggest that much of this evidence is missing from De Dreu and Gross's interesting article. It is a shame this work has been missed, because it provides evidence for interesting ideas put forward in the article.


2016 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 206-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Verónica Sevillano ◽  
Susan T. Fiske

Abstract. Nonhuman animals are typically excluded from the scope of social psychology. This article presents animals as social objects – targets of human social responses – overviewing the similarities and differences with human targets. The focus here is on perceiving animal species as social groups. Reflecting the two fundamental dimensions of humans’ social cognition – perceived warmth (benign or ill intent) and competence (high or low ability), proposed within the Stereotype Content Model ( Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002 ) – animal stereotypes are identified, together with associated prejudices and behavioral tendencies. In line with human intergroup threats, both realistic and symbolic threats associated with animals are reviewed. As a whole, animals appear to be social perception targets within the human sphere of influence and a valid topic for research.


2018 ◽  
Vol 125 (3) ◽  
pp. 409-434 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tyler Burge

Author(s):  
Daniel A. Dombrowski

In this work two key theses are defended: political liberalism is a processual (rather than a static) view and process thinkers should be political liberals. Three major figures are considered (Rawls, Whitehead, Hartshorne) in the effort to show the superiority of political liberalism to its illiberal alternatives on the political right and left. Further, a politically liberal stance regarding nonhuman animals and the environment is articulated. It is typical for debates in political philosophy to be adrift regarding the concept of method, but from start to finish this book relies on the processual method of reflective equilibrium or dialectic at its best. This is the first extended effort to argue for both political liberalism as a process-oriented view and process philosophy/theology as a politically liberal view. It is also a timely defense of political liberalism against illiberal tendencies on both the right and the left.


2014 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 42-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarra Tlili

The Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ’s animal epistle is an intriguing work. Although in the body of the narrative the authors challenge anthropocentric preconceptions and present nonhuman animals in a more favourable light than human beings, inexplicably, the narrative ends by reconfirming the privileged status of humans. The aim of this paper is to propose an explanation for this discrepancy. I argue that the egalitarian message reflected in the body of the narrative is traceable back to the Qur'an, the main text with which the authors engage in the fable, whereas the final outcome is due to the Ikhwān's hierarchical worldview.


2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-219 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carol Bakhos

This article surveys Jewish, Christian and Muslim attitudes toward animals in ancient and medieval sources, and demonstrates how the scriptural heritage and its multi-faceted exegetical traditions are shot through with the notion of the superiority of humans to nonhuman animals. Yet at the same time they are suffused with teachings that chasten human arrogance and exhort humans to show compassion toward all species. The article attempts to provide a corrective to both the contestation that these traditions foster the exploitation of animals and the counterargument that ignores an inherent hierarchy in their textual sources. To support the contention that these religious traditions at once uphold a hierarchy and display concern for other animals, the article examines the fate of the fauna in the Noah flood narrative and the Islamic fable, “The Case of the Animals Versus Man.”


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