Extending Rawlsian Justice to Nonhuman Animals
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Rawls’s theory does not, as many philosophers assume, rule out the possibility of justice for nonhuman animals. A careful reading of Rawls shows that the issue hinges on the answer to this question: would it be reasonable for moral agents to agree to terms of social cooperation that include protections for animals? To establish that it is reasonable, one must make an argument for these legal protections that is grounded in public reason alone. Such arguments exist and, indeed, dominate discussions of the status of animals. Accordingly, a Rawlsian framework can be used to argue for justice for animals.
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2020 ◽
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2010 ◽
Vol 12
(1-2)
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pp. 167-187
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