International territorial administration as a means of dispute settlement - the post-war experiments of the League of Nations and the United Nations

Author(s):  
Carsten Stahn
Author(s):  
Dimitar Tyulekov ◽  
Ilko Drenkov ◽  
Jani Nikolla

The League of Nations sets strict professional frameworks that are subordinate to scientific knowledge and international law and respect, without any differences between small and big powers. The first chairman, Eric Drummond, who headed up to 1934, established a huge international prestige of the organization and achieved a number of successes in peace building. The League’s policy in the Balkans is revealed mainly through its relations with Albania and Bulgaria, which both joined the League in December 1920. The two countries rely on the international organization for the peaceful resolution of their political, minority and social problems. Under the supervision of the League of Nations, a number of agreements for voluntary and mutual exchange of people between Greece and Bulgaria are being concluded, which aims to soothe the Macedonian problem in Aegean Macedonia. Under her patronage are the agreements between Greece and Albania regulating the protection of Greek minorities and schools, as well as settling the border dispute between the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom and Albania in 1921. The rapid intervention of the United Nations suspended the Greek aggression on Bulgarian territory in the autumn of 1925 and prevented a possible new war. Dimitar Shalev's petitions from Skopje to the United Nations aim to achieve the Yugoslav state's humane treatment towards Bulgarian minorities within its borders, but political dependencies and overlapping contradictions are an obstacle to peaceful and sustainable political outcomes. In the second half of the 1930s, the League lost its initial prestige, and in the course of the emerging new global conflict it fell into political dependence, marking its collapse. Unresolved issues and contradictions, along with the harsh political post-war realities, quickly bury the League’s noble impetus.


1943 ◽  
Vol 37 (5) ◽  
pp. 903-909 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edvard Hambro

It is right that post-war planning should be made the subject of popular discussion. It is, on the whole, a healthy sign that so many books and articles are devoted to the winning of the peace, although some of them indubitably create a smoke screen of confusion. The same applies to committees and other organizations for the same purpose. These committees and their statements have two things in common: innumerable and inconclusive quotations from democratic leaders and illustrations drawn from the “success” of, or “failure” of, the League of Nations.The “Four Freedoms,” the “Atlantic Charter,” the “Declaration of the United Nations,” as well as other speeches, articles, and statements of all sorts are vague and all-comprising. They give ample scope for divergent interpretations. It should also be remembered that President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, important though their utterances are, speak for themselves. They cannot bind Congress or Parliament, although it is true that the British Parliament feels a strong loyalty to the leader of the nation.These two characteristics of the declarations of program give great scope to the professors, diplomats, politicians, journalists, and other prophets who dream of the future. Those of the soberer cast of mind try not to indulge in the luxury of day dreams. They realize that the future must be built on the experience of the past. They ask searching questions about the League.


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 310-330
Author(s):  
Nigel D. White

Abstract The “Covenant” embodied the idea of a contract for peace in 1919. The “Charter” of 1945 appeared more boldly to embody a world constitution for peace. This article analyses the United Nations and its predecessor organisation, the League of Nations, to demonstrate how each organisation was primarily a product of the conflict that preceded it and how each captured the post-war status quo. Despite this shared backward-looking aspect, both treaties were sufficiently broad to accommodate significant constitutional developments with the potential to shape the collective security systems to meet changing geopolitical conditions. Members of the League failed to seize this opportunity but the promise of an improved collective security system, moreover one based on fundamental laws, offered by the drafters of the Charter, is found to be problematic. The transference of competence from member states to organisation that marked the transition from League to UN, which, when combined with the legalisation of hierarchy by the Charter, have meant that the UN order, despite appearing to be more obviously constitutionalised, was potentially less able to achieve peace through law than its predecessor.


Polar Record ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-211 ◽  
Author(s):  
Naohiro Nakamura

ABSTRACTThis commentary reviews Maruyama's article ‘Japan's post-war Ainu policy: why the Japanese Government has not recognised Ainu indigenous rights?’ (Maruyama 2013a), published in this journal. Maruyama criticises the government for its reluctance to enact a new Ainu law to guarantee indigenous rights, even after Japan's ratification of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). However, in actuality, the government is searching for the foundation of new Ainu policies in the existing legal frameworks and trying to guarantee some elements of indigenous rights. Japan's case suggests the possibility of realising indigenous rights without the enactment of a specific law.


Diplomatica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 187-199
Author(s):  
Nicholas J. Cull

Abstract This essay considers the phenomenon of British local authorities mobilizing to oppose the policies of apartheid in post-war South Africa. Activities include boycott, divestment, twinning agreements, media campaigns, and re-naming/memorialization. The activity is placed in the context of a transnational anti-apartheid network overseen by the United Nations organization. The campaign is shown to be inversely related the level of national government activity and especially associated with opposition to Margaret Thatcher and her government.


1983 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 281-298 ◽  
Author(s):  
T.A. Keenleyside

Prior to 1947, India, despite its dependence upon Great Britain, was represented in most of the bonafide international conferences and organizations that evolved especially during the inter-war years. For example, India participated in the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the Washington Conference on Naval Armaments of 1921, the London Naval Conference of 1930, the Disarmament Conference of 1932 and the annual inter-war conferences of the International Labour Organization. In addition, India was represented in two important international organizations of the inter-war period—the British Commonwealth, in whose deliberations it was included from 1917 onwards and the League of Nations, of which it was a founding member. For a variety of reasons; Indians involved in the independence movement disassociated themselves from and were critical of official Indian diplomacy conducted through the major international conferences and institutions of the world community and tended to attach greater importance to those non-governmental organizations in which the voice of nationalist India could be fully heard—that is to the deliberations of such bodies as the League Against Imperialism, 1927–1930, the Anti-War Congress of 1932, the World Peace Congress of 1936 and the International Peace Campaign Conference of 1938. Nevertheless, despite the nationalist antipathy for official Indian diplomacy, an examination of such governmental institutions as the League of Nations from the perspective of nationalist India is still important in order to understand some aspects of independent India's foreign policy and more specifically its approach to international organization. Further, even though Indian delegations to the League were unrepresentative, there were subtle ways in which they reflected national Indian opinions and exhibited specifically Indian traits, so that a study of the official Indian role is useful in drawing attention to what were to prove to be some of the earliest and most persisting elements of independent Indian diplomacy via such bodies as the United Nations. It is thus the purpose of this article first to explore nationalist Indian attitudes towards the League (especially the reasons for opposition to the organization), second to analyze the extent to which the official Indian role in the League reflected nationalist Indian concerns, and third to comment upon the impact of the League of Nations on independent India's foreign policy, especially its role in the United Nations.


Author(s):  
Jussi M. Hanhimäki

The International Peace Conference in 1899 established the Permanent Court of Arbitration as the first medium for international disputes, but it was the League of Nations, established in 1919 after World War I, which formed the framework of the system of international organizations seen today. The United Nations was created to manage the world's transformation in the aftermath of World War II. ‘The best hope of mankind? A brief history of the UN’ shows how the UN has grown from the 51 nations that signed the UN Charter in 1945 to 193 nations in 2015. The UN's first seven decades have seen many challenges with a mixture of success and failure.


2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 198-200
Author(s):  
Natalie Y. Morris-Sharma

These remarks approach the panel topic of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) at the crossroads, by reflecting on the ongoing discussions on ISDS reform that are taking place at the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). There are three sets of factors likely to inform how ISDS is being transformed.


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