scholarly journals NO KNOWLEDGE REQUIRED

Episteme ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 303-321 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Reuter ◽  
Peter Brössel
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Social Epistemology ◽  
Knowledge Norm ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Centre Of Gravity ◽  
Knowledge Account ◽  
Exchange Information

ABSTRACTAssertions are the centre of gravity in social epistemology. They are the vehicles we use to exchange information within scientific groups and society as a whole. It is therefore essential to determine under which conditions we are permitted to make an assertion. In this paper we argue and provide empirical evidence for the view that the norm of assertion is justified belief: truth or even knowledge are not required. Our results challenge the knowledge account advocated by, e.g. Williamson (1996), in general, and more specifically, put into question several studies conducted by Turri (2013, 2016) that support a knowledge norm of assertion. Instead, the justified belief account championed by, e.g. Douven (2006), seems to prevail.

scholarly journals Testimony: A Matter of Social Practices

Proceedings ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 43
Author(s):  
Raffaela Giovagnoli
Keyword(s):  
Social Epistemology ◽  
Social Practices ◽  
Sources Of Information ◽  
Contemporary Debate ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Traditional Epistemology

Traditional epistemology rests on sources of information and knowledge such as perception, memory, ways of reasoning etc. In social epistemology, we find the primacy of an “indirect” form of information and knowledge, namely “testimony”: a justified belief can be acquired by hearing what others say or write. We focus on the contemporary debate, and in particular, on “communitarian” views.

Assertion: The Constitutive Norms View

2019 ◽  
pp. 57-73
Author(s):  
Mona Simion ◽  
Christoph Kelp
Keyword(s):  
Final Section ◽  
Speech Act ◽  
Knowledge Norm ◽  
Knowledge Account ◽  
Timothy Williamson ◽  
Constitutive Norms ◽  
Constitutive Norm ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Philosophical Questions ◽  
Better Than

Two important philosophical questions about assertion concern its nature and normativity. This article defends the optimism about the constitutive norm account of assertion and sets out a constitutivity thesis that is much more modest than that proposed by Timothy Williamson. It starts by looking at the extant objections to Williamson’s Knowledge Account of Assertion (KAA) and argues that they fail to hit their target in virtue of imposing implausible conditions on engaging in norm-constituted activities. Second, it makes a similar proposal and shows how it does better than the competition. It suggests that Knowledge Norm of Assertion (KNA) is not constitutive of the speech act of assertion in the same way in which rules of games are constitutive, and thus KAA comes out as too strong. The final section embarks on a rescue mission on behalf of KAA; it puts forth a weaker, functionalist constitutivity thesis. On this view, KNA is etiologically constitutively associated with the speech act of assertion, in virtue of its function of generating knowledge in hearers.

No Need for Excuses

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua Schechter
Keyword(s):  
Knowledge Norm ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Big Picture ◽  
The Subject

This chapter discusses the viability of knowledge-first epistemology. The chapter has two parts. The first part presents several big-picture objections to knowledge-first epistemology and argues that while these considerations are pressing, they are not conclusive. The second part focuses on a specific thesis endorsed by many knowledge-first epistemologists—the knowledge norm of assertion. The chapter considers a familiar concern with this norm: It can be appropriate for someone who has a justified belief that p, but doesn’t know that p, to assert that p. Proponents of the knowledge norm typically explain away such judgments by claiming that the assertion is improper but the subject has an excuse for making it. The chapter argues against this response. The chapter concludes by briefly considering whether we should replace the knowledge norm with an alternative. It argues that that there is no norm specifically tied to assertion.

The Prophetic Bacon

2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (3) ◽  
pp. 78-86
Author(s):  
Steve Fuller ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Knowledge Production ◽  
Social Epistemology ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Historical Figures ◽  
The Senses ◽  
Level I

This paper is both a reflection on Francis Bacon’s social epistemology and a meta-reflection on how we should be think about historical figures such as Bacon, who are of continuing philosophical, scientific and even political relevance. The impetus for this paper is provided by Daniel Garber’s ‘Bacon’s Metaphysical Method’, which depicts Bacon as making various moves in the scholastic debates of his time. In contrast, I draw two sorts of conclusions: (1) At the historiographical level, I argue against the sort of ‘contextualism’ that artificially constrains the ‘transcendental’ horizons of a thinker such as Bacon, who was clearly addressing not simply his immediate contemporaries but perhaps more importantly, some future readers whose identities he cannot know. What is sometimes called the ‘conversation of mankind’ has just this rather odd communicative character. (2) At the more substantive philosophical level, it is clear that Bacon does not have a conception of knowledge as a kind of (justified) belief at all. On the contrary, knowledge is the product of a process that is largely conducted by humans on humans, very much in the spirit of a judicial inquisition. In this context, humans – no less than the technologies normally found in laboratories – are instruments of knowledge production. Here Bacon presages the c19-c20 ideas of media as the ‘extension of the senses’ and Karl Popper’s World 3.

scholarly journals Testimony: A Matter of Social Practices

Proceedings ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 43
Author(s):  
Raffaela Giovagnoli
Keyword(s):  
Social Epistemology ◽  
Social Practices ◽  
Sources Of Information ◽  
Contemporary Debate ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Traditional Epistemology

Traditional epistemology rests on sources of information and knowledge such as perception, memory, ways of reasoning etc. In social epistemology, we find the primacy of an “indirect” form of information and knowledge, namely “testimony”: a justified belief can be acquired by hearing what others say or write. We focus on the contemporary debate, and in particular, on “communitarian” views.

scholarly journals Assertion and Assurance: Some Empirical Evidence

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Alternative Theory ◽  
Knowledge Account ◽  
Knowledge Account Of Assertion

I report three experiments relevant to evaluating Krista Lawlor's theory of assurance, respond to her criticism of the knowledge account of assertion, and propose an alternative theory of assurance.

scholarly journals Selfless Assertions: Some Empirical Evidence

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
Knowledge Account ◽  
General Lesson

It is increasingly recognized that knowledge is the norm of assertion. As this view has gained popularity, it has also garnered criticism. One widely discussed criticism involves thought experiments about “selfless assertion.” Selfless assertions are said to be intuitively compelling examples where agents should assert propositions that they don’t even believe and, hence, don’t know. This result is then taken to show that knowledge is not the norm of assertion. This paper reports four experiments demonstrating that “selfless assertors” are viewed as both believing and knowing the propositions they assert: this is the natural and intuitive way of interpreting the case. Thought experiments about selfless assertions do not threaten the knowledge account and they do not motivate weaker alternative accounts. The discussion also highlights a general lesson for philosophers: thought experiments intended to probe for mental state attributions should not conflict with basic principles that guide social cognition.

Challenges to the social motivation theory of autism: The dangers of counteracting an imprecise theory with even more imprecision

2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mirko Uljarević ◽  
Giacomo Vivanti ◽  
Susan R. Leekam ◽  
Antonio Y. Hardan
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Social Motivation ◽  
Motivation Theory ◽  
The Social

Abstract The arguments offered by Jaswal & Akhtar to counter the social motivation theory (SMT) do not appear to be directly related to the SMT tenets and predictions, seem to not be empirically testable, and are inconsistent with empirical evidence. To evaluate the merits and shortcomings of the SMT and identify scientifically testable alternatives, advances are needed on the conceptualization and operationalization of social motivation across diagnostic boundaries.

Integrating perspectives: How the development of second-personal competence lays the foundation for a second-personal morality

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Corbit ◽  
Chris Moore
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Developmental Process ◽  
Focal Point ◽  
Personal Information ◽  
Personal Competence ◽  
Triadic Interactions ◽  
Personal Morality ◽  
Integrative Process

Abstract The integration of first-, second-, and third-personal information within joint intentional collaboration provides the foundation for broad-based second-personal morality. We offer two additions to this framework: a description of the developmental process through which second-personal competence emerges from early triadic interactions, and empirical evidence that collaboration with a concrete goal may provide an essential focal point for this integrative process.

A hitchhiker’s guide to microscopy and microanalysis using telecommunications, e-mail, and the Internet

1994 ◽  
Vol 52 ◽  
pp. 390-391 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nestor J. Zaluzec
Keyword(s):  
The Internet ◽  
Information Superhighway ◽  
The World ◽  
Exchange Information ◽  
On Line ◽  
Computer Based ◽  
Software And Hardware ◽  
Communication Software ◽  
Basic Ideas ◽  
E Mail

The Information SuperHighway, Email, The Internet, FTP, BBS, Modems, : all buzz words which are becoming more and more routine in our daily life. Confusing terminology? Hopefully it won't be in a few minutes, all you need is to have a handle on a few basic concepts and terms and you will be on-line with the rest of the "telecommunication experts". These terms all refer to some type or aspect of tools associated with a range of computer-based communication software and hardware. They are in fact far less complex than the instruments we use on a day to day basis as microscopist's and microanalyst's. The key is for each of us to know what each is and how to make use of the wealth of information which they can make available to us for the asking. Basically all of these items relate to mechanisms and protocols by which we as scientists can easily exchange information rapidly and efficiently to colleagues in the office down the hall, or half-way around the world using computers and various communications media. The purpose of this tutorial/paper is to outline and demonstrate the basic ideas of some of the major information systems available to all of us today. For the sake of simplicity we will break this presentation down into two distinct (but as we shall see later connected) areas: telecommunications over conventional phone lines, and telecommunications by computer networks. Live tutorial/demonstrations of both procedures will be presented in the Computer Workshop/Software Exchange during the course of the meeting.

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