scholarly journals JUSTIFIED GROUP BELIEF IS EVIDENTIALLY RESPONSIBLE GROUP BELIEF

Episteme ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 262-281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Silva
Keyword(s):  
Total Evidence ◽  
Alternative View ◽  
Adequate Account ◽  
Concrete Case ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Group Belief ◽  
Responsible Group

ABSTRACTWhat conditions must be satisfied if a group is to count as having a justified belief? Jennifer Lackey (2016) has recently argued that any adequate account of group justification must be sensitive (in certain ways) to both the evidence actually possessed by enough of a group's operative members as well as the evidence those members should have possessed. I first draw attention to a range of objections to Lackey's specific view of group justification and a range of concrete case intuitions any plausible view of group justification must explain. I then offer an alternative view of group justification where the basic idea is that group justification is a matter of groups responsibly responding to their total evidence. This view both avoids the problems facing Lackey's account and also explains the relevant concrete case intuitions.

What Is Justified Group Belief?

2020 ◽  
pp. 55-110
Author(s):  
Jennifer Lackey
Keyword(s):  
Group Level ◽  
Epistemic Agent ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Group Belief ◽  
Normative Constraints ◽  
Epistemic Obligations

This chapter, develops and defends a view of justified group belief—the Group Epistemic Agent Account: groups are understood as epistemic agents in their own right, ones that have evidential and normative constraints that arise only at the group level, such as a sensitivity to the relations among the evidence possessed by group members and the epistemic obligations that arise via membership in the group. These constraints bear significantly on whether groups have justified belief. At the same time, however, group justifiedness is still largely a matter of member justifiedness, where the latter is understood as involving both beliefs and their bases. The result is a view that neither inflates nor deflates group epistemology, but instead recognizes that a group’s justified beliefs are constrained by, but are not ultimately reducible to, members’ justified beliefs.

Group Belief: Lessons from Lies and Bullshit

2020 ◽  
Vol 94 (1) ◽  
pp. 185-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
I—Jennifer Lackey
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Sexual Orientation ◽  
Individual Member ◽  
Single Individual ◽  
Adequate Account ◽  
White House ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Group Belief ◽  
Literature Group ◽  
Trump Administration

Abstract Groups and other sorts of collective entities are frequently said to believe things. Sarah Huckabee Sanders, for instance, was asked by reporters at White House press conferences whether the Trump administration ‘believes in climate change’ or ‘believes that slavery is wrong’. Similarly, it is said on the website of the Aclu of Illinois that the organization ‘firmly believes that rights should not be limited based on a person’s sexual orientation or gender identity’. A widespread philosophical view is that belief on the part of a group’s members is neither necessary nor sufficient for group belief. In other words, groups are said to be able to believe that p even when not a single individual member of the group believes that p. In this paper, I challenge this view by focusing on two phenomena that have been entirely ignored in the literature: group lies and group bullshit. I show that when group belief is understood in terms of actions over which group members have voluntarily control, as is standardly thought, paradigmatic instances of a group lying or bullshitting end up counting as a group believing. Thus we need to look elsewhere for an adequate account of group belief.

From universalism to individualism: New approaches to economic growth analysis

2019 ◽  
pp. 108-126
Author(s):  
Ivan L. Lyubimov
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Structural Transformation ◽  
Emerging Economies ◽  
Growth Analysis ◽  
Extended Period ◽  
Economic Policies ◽  
Adequate Account ◽  
New Approaches ◽  
Catching Up

This paper examines the evolution of academic and applied approaches to analyze the problem of economic growth since the mid-XX century. For quite an extended period of time, these views were corresponding to universalist economic policies taking no adequate account of particularities and limitations that a certain catching-up economy embodied. New approaches analyzing the problems of economic growth, on the contrary, individualize growth diagnostics, structural transformation and the organization of reforms processes for the emerging economies. We argue that individualist approaches might be potentially more effective than the universalist ones for solving the problem of slow economic growth.

A new species of Contomastix (Squamata, Teiidae) supported by total evidence, with remarks on diagnostic characters defining the genus

2019 ◽  
pp. 23-36
Author(s):  
Mario. R. Cabrera
Keyword(s):  
New Species ◽  
Geographic Distribution ◽  
Phylogenetic Reconstruction ◽  
Total Evidence ◽  
Molecular Evidence ◽  
Proximal Margin ◽  
Diagnostic Characters ◽  
Morphological Differences ◽  
A New Species ◽  
Molecular Characters

Formerly Cnemidophorus was thought to be the most speciose genus of Teiidae. This genus comprised four morphological groups that were later defined as four different genera, Ameivula, Aurivela, Cnemidophorus and Contomastix. The last appears as paraphyletic in a recent phylogenetic reconstruction based on morphology, but monophyletic in a reconstruction using molecular characters. Six species are allocated to Contomastix. One of them, C. lacertoides, having an extensive and disjunct geographic distribution in Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil. Preliminary analyses revealed morphological differences among its populations, suggesting that it is actually a complex of species. Here, we describe a new species corresponding to the Argentinian populations hitherto regarded as C. lacertoides, by integrating morphological and molecular evidence. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the presence of notched proximal margin of the tongue is a character that defines the genus Contomastix.

The Problem of the Formation of Philosophical Prose in Persian

2019 ◽  
Vol 62 (6) ◽  
pp. 126-137
Author(s):  
Tatyana G. Korneeva
Keyword(s):  
Arabic Language ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Philosophical Tradition ◽  
Alternative View ◽  
Ibn Sina ◽  
Language Of Science ◽  
Persian Language ◽  
Arab Muslim ◽  
History Of ◽  
Philosophical Texts

The article discusses the problem of the formation of philosophical prose in the Persian language. The first section presents a brief excursion into the history of philosophical prose in Persian and the stages of formation of modern Persian as a language of science and philosophy. In the Arab-Muslim philosophical tradition, representatives of various schools and trends contributed to the development of philosophical terminology in Farsi. The author dwells on the works of such philosophers as Ibn Sīnā, Nāṣir Khusraw, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, Aḥmad al-Ghazālī, ʼAbū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī and gives an overview of their works written in Persian. The second section poses the question whether the Persian language proved able to compete with the Arabic language in the field of science. The author examines the style of philosophical prose in Farsi, considering the causes of creation of Persian-language philosophical texts and defining their target audience. The article presents viewpoints of modern orientalist researchers as well as the views of medieval philosophers who wrote in Persian. We find that most philosophical texts in Persian were written for a public who had little or no knowledge of the Arabic language, yet wanted to get acquainted with current philosophical and religious doctrines, albeit in an abbreviated format. The conclusion summarizes and presents two positions regarding the necessity of writing philosophical prose in Persian. According to one point of view, Persian-language philosophical works helped people who did not speak Arabic to get acquainted with the concepts and views of contemporary philosophy. According to an alternative view, there was no special need to compose philosophical texts in Persian, because the corpus of Arabic philosophical terminology had already been formed, and these Arabic terms were widely and successfully used, while the new Persian philosophical vocabulary was difficult to understand.

An Alternative View of the Convergence Issue of Growth Empirics

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Gabriel Brida ◽  
Wiston Adrián Risso ◽  
Lionello F. Punzo ◽  
Silvia London
Keyword(s):  
Alternative View ◽  
Growth Empirics

Justificación, educación y libertad

2018 ◽  
Vol 34 ◽  
pp. 79-89
Author(s):  
Mónica Gómez Salazar
Keyword(s):  
Young People ◽  
Social Practices ◽  
Democratic Society ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Epistemological Pluralism ◽  
Freedom And Responsibility

This paper argues the thesis that education should be understood as a guide that directs the young people towards reflexive and imaginative social practices that allow them to formulate new and varied hypotheses as well as alternative justifications. Based on Dewey, we will expose that a goal such as this is only applicable to members of a democratic society. Next, we present some features of onto-epistemological pluralism in relation to freedom and responsibility. It is concluded that there is no justification that is closer to truth or reality. The relevance of a justified belief with good reasons lies in its practical consequences for specific conditions of existence.

Suffering Spectators of Development

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arjun Chowdhury
Keyword(s):  
Civil Wars ◽  
Central Government ◽  
State Capacity ◽  
State Power ◽  
The State ◽  
Colonial Period ◽  
Alternative View

This chapter offers an alternative view of the incidence and duration of insurgencies in the postcolonial world. Insurgencies and civil wars are seen as the primary symptom of state weakness, the inability of the central government to monopolize violence. Challenging extant explanations that identify poverty and low state capacity as the cause of insurgencies, the chapter shows that colonial insurgencies, also occurring in the context of poverty and state weakness, were shorter and ended in regime victories, while contemporary insurgencies are longer and states are less successful at subduing them. The reason for this is the development of exclusive identities—based on ethnicity, religion, tribe—in the colonial period. These identities serve as bases for mobilization to challenge state power and demand services from the state. Either way, such mobilization means that popular demands for services exceed the willingness to disarm and/or pay taxes, that is, to supply the state.

An Outline of a Theory of Propositional Vagueness

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Bacon
Keyword(s):  
Boolean Algebra ◽  
Total Evidence ◽  
Coarse Grained ◽  
Atomic Boolean Algebra

This chapter presents a series questions in the philosophy of vagueness that will constitute the primary subjects of this book. The stance this book takes on these questions is outlined, and some preliminary ramifications are explored. These include the idea that (i) propositional vagueness is more fundamental than linguistic vagueness; (ii) propositions are not themselves sentence-like; they are coarse grained, and form a complete atomic Boolean algebra; (iii) vague propositions are, moreover, not simply linguistic constructions either such as sets of world-precisification pairs; and (iv) propositional vagueness is to be understood by its role in thought. Specific theses relating to the last idea include the thesis that one’s total evidence can be vague, and that there are vague propositions occupying every evidential role, that disagreements about the vague ultimately boil down to disagreements in the precise, and that one should not care intrinsically about vague matters.

Aspect and space

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucas Champollion
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Domain ◽  
The Other ◽  
Alternative View ◽  
Temporal Domain ◽  
Spatial Aspect ◽  
Temporal Aspect ◽  
The Way

This chapter models the relation between temporal aspect (run for an hour vs. *run all the way to the store for an hour) and spatial aspect (meander for a mile vs. *end for a mile) previously discussed by Gawron (2009). The chapter shows that for-adverbials impose analogous conditions on the spatial domain and on the temporal domain, and that an event may satisfy stratified reference with respect to one of the domains without satisfying it with respect to the other one as well. This provides the means to extend the telic-atelic opposition to the spatial domain. The chapter argues in some detail that stratified reference is in this respect empirically superior to an alternative view of telicity based on divisive reference (Krifka 1998).

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document