scholarly journals Public and Private Enforcement in European Union Food Law

2022 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Kai P. Purnhagen ◽  
Alexandra Molitorisová

Abstract What type of enforcement is the most effective to punish violations of food law or to prevent them from occurring in the first place? This article examines the question of which mix of private and public enforcement exists in European Union (EU) food law and whether this mix corresponds to the recommendations of existing social science research. Based on this research, we contend that EU-determined enforcement mechanisms differ in effectiveness across Member States. New technologies have the potential to stimulate a novel mix of public and private enforcement tools at the EU and national levels.

2021 ◽  
Vol VI (I) ◽  
pp. 86-95
Shakeel Ahmad ◽  
Mansoor Ahmad ◽  
Asif Mehmood

This study conducted with the objective to measure the pre and post NGOs intervention regarding health awareness and people level of satisfaction. The sample size for this study was selected 230 from the total population of 450. The study concluded that NGOs intervention significantly lunching campaign against tobacco control, HIV/AIDS, immunization awareness, dengue virus awareness. In addition, there was an increase in health hygiene and nutrition education, training of traditional birth attendants and health worker trainings with new technologies. The government and NGOs extend their projects that are focusing on communicable diseases that ultimately lead to the control of various lives threatening disease. Preventive health efforts must be initiated by both public and private agencies at the community level. Health and hygiene-related material must be included in the textbooks of private and public school at all level.

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (21) ◽  
pp. 55-70
Katharina Voss ◽  

This article studies the private enforcement conducted in Visita v Booking from the perspective of the interaction between public and private enforcement of competition law. This case concerned the question whether the narrow MFN clauses maintained by Booking were contrary to Article 101 TFEU and could therefore be prohibited by a Swedish court. The focus of this article is placed on the assessment carried out by the Swedish courts to determine whether the MFN clauses were restrictive of competition by effect and on the standard of proof attached to the claimant in this regard. With regard to the interaction between public and private enforcement, Visita v. Booking is viewed as an illustration of the increased complexity of competition policy, in particular were novel practices are at issue

Wijckmans Frank ◽  
Tuytschaever Filip

This chapter explains the term ‘vertical agreements’ and what it covers. It addresses a number of general issues that are relevant to the EU competition law treatment of vertical agreements in general. It describes the implementation and the (public and private) enforcement of Article 101 TFEU before and after the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003. The chapter provides the historical background of both Regulation 330/2010 and Regulation 461/2010. In particular, it devotes specific attention to the nature and legal and practical consequences of soft EU competition law (in the form of notices, guidelines, etc) as opposed to hard EU competition law (provisions of primary and secondary EU law).

Robert Freitag

The provisions governing the euro as ‘European Single Currency’ are at the core of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union’s (TFEU) rules on the Economic Monetary Union (EMU). Since the euro has replaced the former national currencies of the participating Member States and is to substitute the national currencies of any future members of the euro area, it was mandatory to ascribe to the euro the status of exclusive ‘legal tender’ as per Article 128(1) TFEU. This status of the euro seems to be so evident as to be self-explanatory–but only at first glance since the concept of ‘legal tender’ and its implications in European Union (EU) and national private and public law are less clear. A satisfactory concept of legal tender is hard to define and hardly ever given on the EU level–resulting in a striking lack of legal certainty in a great variety of aspects of public and private law.

2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
Eric Darmon ◽  
Thomas Le Texier

AbstractShould rights be publicly or privately enforced in the case of digital piracy? The emergence of large-scale anti-piracy laws and the existence of illegal non-monitored channels raise important issues for the design of anti-piracy policies. We study the impact of these demand-side policies in two enforcement settings (namely, public and private enforcement settings) with an outside adoption option for users of an illegal non-monitored channel. Our results show that public enforcement generates higher monitoring and lower price levels, and also higher legal welfare than private enforcement. However, we identify potential conflicts of interest between the legal seller and the social planner when the efficiency of the illegal non-monitored channel is low. Introducing supply-side policies, i.e. policies targeted to suppliers of illegal content, we find that they may have unexpected impacts and can damage legal welfare. We also identify situations in which the two policies are substitutes or complements.

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