The Nicolas Maduro Regime (O.A.S.)

2020 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 226-230
Author(s):  
Christina M. Cerna
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
September 11 ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
Armed Attack ◽  
American States ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
Un General Assembly ◽  
Article 5

On September 11, 2019, twelve states parties invoked the Inter-American Treaty on Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR), because they considered the crisis in Venezuela to have a destabilizing impact on the peace and security of the hemisphere. Venezuela was one of the twelve, voting in favor; this was because, on April 9, 2019, the Organization of American States (OAS) formally recognized Juan Guaido's representative, Gustavo Tarre, in lieu of Nicolas Maduro's Ambassador. At the OAS General Assembly in June, Tarre's appointment was approved in a much contested and heated session. The OAS has thirty-five member states and approximately one-third of its membership supported the invocation of the TIAR. The TIAR is the OAS's mutual defense pact; it was last invoked following the events of September 11, 2001. Article 5 of the NATO Charter, calling for collective action in the case of an armed attack on one member, is derived from Article 3 of the TIAR. Following invocation of the TIAR, the Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (the OAS equivalent to the UN Security Council, but without veto power) held its 30th meeting in New York City during the UN General Assembly. The result of that meeting was the adoption of the Resolution under consideration here.

Part 1 The Cold War Era (1945–89), 24 The Lebanon War—1982

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Williamson Myra
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
The Political ◽  
Armed Attack ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Us ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
Un General Assembly ◽  
The Cold War

This chapter analyses the context and legality of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, also referred to as the First Lebanon War and ‘Operation Peace for Galilee’. It began on 6 June 1982 and became an 18-year-long occupation, ending on 22 May 2000. The first section discusses the immediate pretext for Israel’s invasion—the attempted assassination in London of the Israeli Ambassador to Britain, Schlomo Argov, by Abu Nidal terrorists—as well as the more complex causes, such as the political animosity between Israel, Lebanon, Syria and the PLO. Section two analyses the positions of the main antagonists—Israel, Lebanon and the PLO—as well as other interested parties (the US, the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly). The third section addresses the legality of Israel’s use of force, citing the arguments of scholars on both sides of the debate. Finally, the chapter assesses the precedential value of this use of force, in light of the Security Council’s refusal to accept that the attempted assassination was an ‘armed attack’ and its condemnation of the Israeli aggression.

scholarly journals The Afghan question in the work of SC & GA of UNO in January, 1980

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 81
Author(s):  
Oleksandr L. Kovalkov
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
Un General Assembly ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
The Government

In December, 1979 sub-units of the Soviet Army invaded the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, eliminated Hafizullah Amin from power, established the government of Babrak Karmal and occupied the country. These events caused the condemnation of the international community, that were reflected by the statement on the Afghan question in the agenda of the Security Council and the UN General Assembly in January, 1980. The minute-books of SC of the UNO, as well as the UN General Assembly resolutions are the main sources of research of this problem. The discussion of the Afghan question in the UN Security Council lasted from 5 to 7 January, 1980, involving 42 countries. The USSR Representative to the United Nations O. Troyanovskyi and Foreign Minister of DRA Sh. M. Dost tried to persuade all those present that Soviet troops had been brought to Afghanistan at the invitation of a legitimate Afghan government to repulse allegedly externally-aggressive aggression. Herewith they referred to Article 51 of the UN Charter and Article 4 of the Treaty of Friendship, Neighborhood and Cooperation between the USSR and the DPA. Most of the delegations (primarily the US delegation, Pakistan, the Chinese People’s Republic, Great Britain) rejected the arguments of the Soviet and Afghan sides and condemned Soviet aggression and called for the withdrawal of troops from the territory of Afghanistan immediately. The Soviet Union and the DRA were supported only by a few delegations of Soviet satellites (Poland, the GDR, Hungary, the Mongolian People’s Republic, Laos and Vietnam). But during the vote on the anti-Soviet resolution on January 7, 1980, the USSR expected vetoed it. After that, the consideration of the «Afghan question» was postponed to the General Assembly, where 108 countries condemned the Soviet aggression on January, 14 (18 countries abstained, the same number supported the USSR). The discussion of the «Afghan question» at the United Nations Organization in January, 1980 assured that the Soviet Union had suffered a loud defeat in the international arena, its authority was severely undermined. This was also confirmed by the end of the policy of "discharging" and the subsequent eruption of the Cold War in international relations. In addition, the consideration of the Afghan question at the UNO has shown the lack of a mechanism for influencing an aggressor country that has a veto power in the UN Security Council. The USSR was expected to veto the Security Council resolution, and the decisions of the General Assembly were recommendatory. This is particularly relevant in terms of the current UN crisis in deterring the aggressive actions of the Russian Federation, the DPRK, Syria and others like that.

France Accused: French North Africa before the United Nations, 1952–1962

2001 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Thomas
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
United Nations ◽  
North Africa ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
Algerian War ◽  
North African ◽  
Un General Assembly ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
Nationalist Parties ◽  
Major General

In the decade after 1952 France faced sustained United Nations criticism of its colonial policies in north Africa. As membership of the UN General Assembly expanded, support for the non-aligned states of the Afro-Asian bloc increased. North African nationalist parties established their permanent offices in New York to press their case for independence. Tracing UN consideration of French North Africa from the first major General Assembly discussion of Tunisia in 1952 to the end of the Algerian war in 1962, this article considers the tactics employed on both sides of the colonial/anti-colonial divide to manipulate the UN Charter's ambiguities over the rights of colonial powers and the jurisdiction of the General Assembly in colonial disputes.

scholarly journals Proposals for the Negotiation Process on the United Nations Global Compact for Migration

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 682-693 ◽  
Author(s):  
Víctor Genina
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
United Nations ◽  
International Migration ◽  
Negotiation Process ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
Global Compact ◽  
Member States ◽  
Un General Assembly ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
High Level

On September 19th, 2016, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted Resolution 71/1, the text of the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (the “New York Declaration”). Resolution 71/1 is the outcome document of the high-level plenary meeting on addressing large movements of refugees and migrants, held at the UN headquarters. The New York Declaration reflects how UN member states have decided to address the challenge of large movements of people in two main legal categories: asylum seekers/refugees and migrants. Resolution 71/1 includes an annex titled “Towards a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration” (the “global compact for migration” or “global compact”). This document is comprised of several thematic issues related to international migration that will be the basis of a globally negotiated agreement on how member states should respond to international migration at the national, regional, and international levels, as well as to issues related to international migration and development. The global compact for migration is intended to be adopted at a conference on international migration and development before the inauguration of the 73rd annual session of the UN General Assembly in September 2018. This paper addresses how UN member states should plan to address international migration in the future. It does not refer to refugees and asylum seekers: a global compact on refugees will be drafted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 2018, and to be presented to the UN General Assembly for states' consideration during its 73rd annual session, which starts in September 2018.1 For those who have been involved in migration issues within the United Nations, the fact that member states have finally agreed to convene an international conference on international migration represents a major achievement. It is the result of an extended process that started decades ago and was made possible by a long chain of efforts by many state delegations and other stakeholders. The global compact for migration will not be the first outcome document dealing exclusively with international migration. A declaration2 adopted at a high-level meeting at the United Nations in October 2013, for example, paved the way for the 2018 conference. Nonetheless, the global compact represents a unique opportunity to address international migration comprehensively and humanely. This paper contributes to the discussion on the elements that should be included in the global compact for migration. The paper is divided into two sections. The first section analyzes the main elements of Annex II, “Towards a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration,” and the criteria that needs to be adopted in order to achieve a substantive outcome. In particular, participants in the negotiation process should aim to balance the concerns of states and the members of host societies, on one hand, with the needs and rights of migrants, on the other. The second section includes proposals to enrich the final global compact for migration and takes into account two documents written by two different actors within the UN system, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Migration, and the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants. In particular, the paper proposes that the global compact for migration: • sets forth principles that can inform the actions of governments in relation to international migration at all levels; • enunciates a clearer definition of state protection responsibilities in relation to migrants in crisis situations and so-called “mixed flows”3; affords a substantive role to civil society organizations, the private sector, and academic institutions in the global compact's follow-up and review process; • defines the institutional framework for the implementation and follow-up of the global compact within the United Nations, including through the work of the UN High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF); • establishes a mechanism to fund migration policies for states that lack enough resources to invest sufficiently in this task; and • builds a cooperation-oriented, peer-review mechanism to review migration policies. The paper has been conceived as an input for those who will take part in the negotiation of the global compact for migration, as well as those who will closely follow those negotiations. Thus, the paper assumes a level of knowledge on how international migration has been addressed within the United Nations during the last several years and of the complexities of these negotiation processes. The author took part in different UN negotiation processes on international migration from 2004 to 2013. The paper is primarily based on this experience.4

Interview with Janez Lenarčič

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
International Law ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Secretary Of State ◽  
Treaty Negotiations ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
State Position ◽  
Council Presidency

Janez Lenarčič is currently serving as Commissioner for Crisis Management in the European Commission, a mandate he took up in December 2019. In this capacity, he is responsible for EU civil protection as well as humanitarian aid. Mr Lenarčič served as Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Slovenia to the European Union (EU) in Brussels from 2016 to 2019. From 2014 to 2016, he held the Secretary of State position in the cabinet of the Slovenian Prime Minister. His previous experience also includes the position of Director of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, in Warsaw, from 2008 to 2014. He has also served as Secretary of State for European Affairs, including representing Slovenia during the Lisbon Treaty negotiations in 2007 and later representing the Slovenian EU Council Presidency to the European Parliament in 2008. In 2002 and 2003 he held the position of State Secretary in the cabinet of the Slovenian Prime Minister, after which he served as Slovenian Ambassador to the OSCE. In 2005, he was also Chairman of the Permanent Council of the OSCE in Vienna. In 2000 he served as Adviser to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the following year he became the Diplomatic Adviser to the then Slovenian Prime Minister. Between 1994 and 1999 he was posted to Slovenia's Permanent Representation to the United Nations (UN) in New York, where he also served as the alternate representative of Slovenia on the UN Security Council. Mr Lenarčič holds a degree in international law from Ljubljana University.

scholarly journals Uniting for “Peace” in the Second Cold War: A Response to Larry Johnson

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 108 ◽  
pp. 129-134
Author(s):  
Boris N. Mamlyuk
Keyword(s):  
Security Council ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
International Peace ◽  
Legal Form ◽  
Primary Responsibility ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
Peace And Security ◽  
General Assembly Resolution ◽  
Un General Assembly ◽  
Legal Justification

Larry Johnson’s timely and important essay challenges both utopian and realist accounts of UN law and practice by reviving the debate over the nature and functions of the UN General Assembly, particularly the General Assembly’s power to deploy certain legal tactics not only to influence collective security deliberations in the UN Security Council, but also, more significantly, to provide some legal justification for multilateral military “collective measures” in the event of Security Council gridlock. One vehicle by which the General Assembly may assert its own right to intervene in defense of “international peace and security” is a “Uniting for Peace” (UFP) resolution, authorized by resolution 377(V) (1950). At its core, a “uniting for peace” resolution is an attempt to circumvent a Security Council deadlock by authorizing Member States to take collective action, including the use of force, in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. General Assembly resolution 377(V) does not require resolutions to take specific legal form—language that echoes the preambular “lack of unanimity of the permanent members [that results in the Security Council failing to] exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” is sufficient to render a given resolution a UFP, provided the General Assembly resolution calls for concrete “collective [forceful] measures.” For this reason, experts disagree on precisely how many times a UFP has indeed been invoked or implemented, although informed analysts suggest UFP has been invoked in slightly more than ten instances since 1950.

scholarly journals Strengthening the Global Refugee Protection System: Recommendations for the Global Compact on Refugees

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 780-799 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Appleby
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Due Process ◽  
Warning System ◽  
Protection System ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
Global Compact ◽  
Protection Measures ◽  
Refugee Protection ◽  
Self Sufficiency ◽  
Un General Assembly

On September 19, 2016, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants. This document launched a two-year process to develop a Global Compact on Responsibility Sharing on Refugees (“Global Compact on Refugees”) and a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration. With a record 65 million displaced persons in the world, the global community must come together to fashion a stronger protection regime for persons on the move. This paper outlines broad themes and specific recommendations that the Global Compact on Refugees should adopt on how to strengthen the global refugee protection system. The recommendations fall into several categories: (1) responsibility sharing for the protection of refugees; (2) filling in protection gaps; (3) balancing and replacing deterrence strategies with protection solutions; (4) refugee resettlement; and (5) building refugee self-sufficiency. Some of the key recommendations include: • the development of a responsibility-sharing formula to respond to large movements of refugees; • the development of an early warning system to identify and respond to nations in crisis; • the adoption of principles included in the Nansen and Migrants in Countries of Crisis initiatives; • the use of temporary protection measures to protect populations that flee natural disaster; • the adoption of model processes that ensure safe and voluntary return; • cooperation between destination and transit countries to expand refugee protections; • the provision of asylum and due process protections at borders; • the use of development assistance to ensure the self-sufficiency of refugees; • the adoption of a goal to resettle 10 percent of the global refugee population each year; • the establishment of a refugee matching system between refugees and resettlement countries; and • the adoption of coherent strategies, involving all sectors, to address large movements of refugees. This paper draws heavily, albeit not exclusively, from a series of papers published as a special collection in the Journal on Migration and Human Security1 on strengthening the global system of refugee protection.

A1. UN SEC.-GEN. KOFI ANNAN, REPORT TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONCERNING ISRAEL'S CONSTRUCTION OF THE SEPARATION WALL IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, NEW YORK, 24 NOVEMBER 2003 (EXCERPTS).

2004 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 156-157
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
The United States ◽  
Marshall Islands ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
The European Union ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
Occupied Territories ◽  
Legal Position ◽  
Un General Assembly

The secretary-general's report was prepared in keeping with UN General Assembly Resolution ES-10/13 of 21 October 2003, which ““demand[ed] that Israel stop and reverse the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, which is in departure of the Armistice Line of 1949 and is in contradiction to relevant provisions of international law.”” The resolution had also called upon the secretary-general to report periodically on Israel's compliance with the demand of the resolution, which was approved by 144 member states (including all members of the European Union), with four votes against (Israel, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and the United States) and twelve abstentions. The secretary-general's report covers the background, description, construction progress, and impact of the wall. Reproduced below are the secretary-general's concluding ““observations”” and the summary of Israel's legal position. The document is available on the International Court of Justice Web site at www.icj-cij.org.

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