Pecresse can challenge Macron in French election

Significance Pecresse's poll ratings received an immediate boost, to 17%, putting her on a par with far-right politician Marine Le Pen and behind President Emmanuel Macron on 24%. Polls suggests that, if she beats Le Pen in the first round, she would severely challenge or narrowly defeat Macron in the second round. Impacts France’s presidential election will be won and lost on the right; the left stands very little chance of progressing beyond the first round. Macron would likely face a much more significant challenge from Pecresse than the far-right candidates in the second round. To boost his re-election prospects, Macron will pursue a protectionist trade agenda during France’s EU Council Presidency.

The German EU Council Presidency Translator

This contribution describes the German EU Council Presidency Translator (EUC PT), a machine translation service created for the German EU Council Presidency in the second half of 2020, which is open to the general public. Following a series of earlier presidency translators, the German version exhibits important extensions and improvements. The German EUC PT is the first to integrate systems from commercial vendors, public services, and a research center, using a mix of custom and generic translation engines, and to introduce a new webpage translation widget. A further important feature is the close collaboration with human translators from the German ministries, who were provided with computer-assisted translation tool plugins integrating machine translation services into their daily work environments. Uptake by the public reflects a huge interest in the service, showing the need for breaking language barriers.

Interview with Janez Lenarčič

Janez Lenarčič is currently serving as Commissioner for Crisis Management in the European Commission, a mandate he took up in December 2019. In this capacity, he is responsible for EU civil protection as well as humanitarian aid. Mr Lenarčič served as Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Slovenia to the European Union (EU) in Brussels from 2016 to 2019. From 2014 to 2016, he held the Secretary of State position in the cabinet of the Slovenian Prime Minister. His previous experience also includes the position of Director of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, in Warsaw, from 2008 to 2014. He has also served as Secretary of State for European Affairs, including representing Slovenia during the Lisbon Treaty negotiations in 2007 and later representing the Slovenian EU Council Presidency to the European Parliament in 2008. In 2002 and 2003 he held the position of State Secretary in the cabinet of the Slovenian Prime Minister, after which he served as Slovenian Ambassador to the OSCE. In 2005, he was also Chairman of the Permanent Council of the OSCE in Vienna. In 2000 he served as Adviser to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the following year he became the Diplomatic Adviser to the then Slovenian Prime Minister. Between 1994 and 1999 he was posted to Slovenia's Permanent Representation to the United Nations (UN) in New York, where he also served as the alternate representative of Slovenia on the UN Security Council. Mr Lenarčič holds a degree in international law from Ljubljana University.

Slovenia’s EU presidency will meet stiff opposition

Headline SLOVENIA/EU: Council presidency will have opponents

Slovenia will remain polarised, whatever Jansa’s fate

Significance The government led by the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) is under mounting pressure as Slovenia prepares to take over the European Council presidency. This is due mainly to hostility in parliament and society to Prime Minister Janez Jansa, who promotes a popular but divisive form of national conservatism. Impacts A successful no-confidence vote in the government followed by early elections would complicate Slovenia’s handling of its EU presidency. The fall of the current government and its replacement by the centre-left would improve Slovenia’s relations with the EU and United States. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban would lose an ally at EU level if Jansa lost office.

Measuring the Success of the Presidency of the Council of the EU

This paper aims to contribute to the ongoing debate on criteria for measuring the performance of the rotating Presidencies of the Council of the EU. The comparison between Austria and Croatia, two countries that concluded the two most recent Council Presidency Trios, can be illustrative in identifying the main factors that can influence the overall performance of rotating Presidencies. Based on the series of quantitative and qualitative indicators, the overall score of both countries’ Presidencies turned to be positive, despite some failures of these Presidencies to demonstrate a firm commitment to fundamental EU values. In view of the lack of evaluations of the Council Presidencies based on verifiable, measurable indicators, this paper seeks to contribute to the development of a more objective methodological framework for the assessment of the future Presidencies of the Council as a still under-researched area within EU studies.

New Hydrogen Strategies of Germany and the EU and Prospects for Cooperation with Russia

In June 2020, Germany adopted a national hydrogen strategy. A month later, when Germany assumed the EU Council presidency, the European Union Commission presented a similar document. Both strategies acknowledge the need to import hydrogen to meet the demand of the EU countries as an essential prerequisite for the transition to a climate-neutral economy. In parallel, the Government of the Russian Federation adopted the Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2035, which sets the goal of turning our country into one of the global players in the world hydrogen market. Despite Russia's obvious competitive advantages in this relatively new segment of the energy market, Berlin and Brussels do not mention it as a potential partner. The article provides an assessment of the main provisions of these strategic documents. The author explores the prospects and possibilities of Germany and the EU cooperating with the Russian Federation in the production and supply of hydrogen, analyzes the content of the position documents of the German-Russian Chamber of Commerce and the Eastern Committee of the German Economy on these issues, draws conclusions and formulates recommendations for interested parties.

Croatia’s EU Presidency: A strong Europe in a world of challenges

The article reflects on Croatia’s EU Council Presidency in the first half of 2020. The programme for Croatia’s Presidency had four pillars: a Europe that is developing, a Europe that connects, a Europe that protects and an influential Europe. The article focuses on the various challenges faced by the Croatian Presidency during its six-month term. The period of Croatia’s Presidency will forever be remembered as the time when the COVID-19 pandemic began. Other demanding issues also had to be dealt with: the UK leaving the EU; the challenges of European (non-)solidarity; the continuation of the enlargement process, with the green light being given to Northern Macedonia and Albania; the migrant crisis at the border of Turkey and Greece; the preparations for the EU’s 2021–7 budget; and the COVID-19 recovery plan.

European Council Notes 2020/04-05 - May to July: The MFF and the Recovery Fund

The present paper resumes where the previous paper in this series concluded. At its video conference on 23 April the European Council mandated the Commission to draft a Recovery Plan, and on 21 July, at the end of a fve-day meeting, it signed off on a Recovery Fund and a revised MFF.<br/> The size and economic signifcance of the package are illustrated in the text and tables. It is big money which, because it is targeted primarily at the more vulnerable member states, should have a considerable economic impact, particularly in the South. Talk of a crossing of the Rubicon is nonetheless misplaced. Firstly because, though large, it is still much smaller than member states' Covid-related spending. Secondly, more importantly, because the politics of the agreement, which are analysed at some length in the narrative section of the paper, confrm that the leading players in Europe's Union of sovereign states have little or no appetite for the huge systemic changes which would be required to deliver on the federalists' dream.<br/> Four features of the political narrative are of particular importance.<br/> Firstly, the making of the July agreement was a success story which, in the face of widespread scepticism, confrmed that the EU can deliver. As a result, both the self-confdence of the insiders and the standing of the EU with its citizens have been boosted.<br/> Secondly, the story vindicated the Union's European Council centred system of government. Media focus on the 18 May Statement by Merkel and Macron was misleading. The story begins on 23 April and ends on 21 July with the European Council.<br/> Thirdly, individuals and institutions matter too. In institutional terms, the European Commission, the Council's rotating Presidency as well as the European Council itself have been at the heart of the process. In individual terms, Angela Merkel was once again in a league of her own, von der Leyen and Michel performed well, and the leaders of the F4, reinforced for most of the time by the Finnish prime minister, left their mark in a positive still more than a negative sense. As too did Conte and Sanchez. Macron was also important needless to say, but not as important as the French government and the international media suggested.<br/> Fourthly, the story draws attention to the limits as well as the potential of the system. Two closely related episodes since July are cited by way of illustration. In the frst, the negotiations between the German Council Presidency and the European Parliament about the budget, the parliamentary negotiators over-estimated both the powers and the signifcance of the Parliament in the system. In the second, involving the Council, the Parliament and the Hungarian and Polish governments, the latter have, as often before, challenged the shared values on which the EU system is based. On this occasion however their interlocutors have considerable leverage and, rightly in our view, appear determined to stand frm, even if, as is still possible, this puts the MFF/NGEU package at risk.