scholarly journals Striking a balance: resolving conflicts between the duty of confidentiality and duties to third parties in genetics

Legal Studies ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 645-665
Author(s):  
Naomi Hawkins ◽  
Timon Hughes-Davies
Keyword(s):  
Family Member ◽  
Genetic Information ◽  
Family Members ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Legal Rights ◽  
Duty Of Care ◽  
Healthcare Practitioner ◽  
Party Family

AbstractGenetic information is relevant not only to the patient, but also to their family. Where a patient refuses to share that information with family members, then their legal rights may conflict. This paper focuses on that conflict between the rights of individuals and the rights of third parties. We first examine the nature of the duty of confidence as it applies in these circumstances, and the extent to which it can appropriately accommodate the familial nature of genetic information. We then consider the situations in which a healthcare practitioner might owe a third-party family member a tortious duty of care. We conclude that in most cases, there will be no duty owed to third parties, but that in certain limited circumstances, a duty of care should arise.

3. Special duty problems: omissions and acts of third parties

2019 ◽  
pp. 49-59
Author(s):  
Kirsty Horsey ◽  
Erika Rackley
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Duty Of Care ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Common ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
Special Duty

This chapter discusses the problem of when a duty of care arises in respect of negligent omissions, or for the actions of a third party. The common law takes the view that it would be too great a burden to impose liability upon a person for a mere omission, or for the actions of others. Despite this, duties can in fact be imposed in various ways, all of which focus on the reliance of the claimant upon the defendant. This can come about either by the previous conduct of the defendant, which induces reliance by the claimant that the defendant will continue to act in that way, or by reliance which comes out of a relationship of dependence between the parties. As regards third parties, a duty may arise where the defendant has control over or responsibility for the third party’s actions.

4. Special duty problems: omissions and acts of third parties

Tort Law ◽  
2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirsty Horsey ◽  
Erika Rackley
Keyword(s):  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Duty Of Care ◽  
Special Duty

This chapter examines two separate but closely linked concepts of liability for omissions and for the actions of third parties. The first section considers when and how the courts have found that a duty of care should be owed by defendants when the harm was the result of their omission, and the second explores the situations when a defendant may owe a duty in relation to the action(s) of a third party.

Genetic Knowledge and Third-Party Interests

1999 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 386-392 ◽  
Author(s):  
ELISABETH BOETZKES
Keyword(s):  
Genetic Information ◽  
Family Members ◽  
Reproductive Technologies ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Insurance Companies ◽  
Royal Commission ◽  
Dna Testing ◽  
Reasonable Person ◽  
Reasonable Person Standard ◽  
Professional Guidelines

Recent discussions of genetic information have highlighted the need for ethical disclosure guidelines. For instance, the (Canadian) Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies points out the range of third-party interests in genetic information and the lack of clear ethical and professional guidelines governing its dissemination. Among the more worrying interests are those of insurance companies and prospective employers. However, also worrisome is the problem of negotiating the first-party interest in privacy (from which the professional obligation of confidentiality arises) and strong third-party claims from family members. The survey by Knoppers and Laberge of consent forms currently used in DNA testing in Canada shows that fewer than half mention access by family members, and only three out of 20 alert subjects to the possibility of finding nonpaternity. Both the Royal Commission and the Knoppers research group recommend integrated, national consent standards, with the Knoppers group explicitly approving a “reasonable person” standard of disclosure. While endorsing the call for integrated consent guidelines, in this paper I intend to raise some doubts about the adequacy of the reasonable person standard in light of gender differences in reproductive burden and risk perception.

4. Special duty problems: omissions and acts of third parties

Tort Law ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 78-101
Author(s):  
Kirsty Horsey ◽  
Erika Rackley
Keyword(s):  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Duty Of Care ◽  
Special Duty

This chapter examines the two separate but closely linked concepts of liability for omissions and for the actions of third parties. The first section considers when and why the courts have established that a duty of care should be owed by defendants when the harm was the result of their omission, and the second explores the situations when a defendant may owe a duty in relation to the action(s) of a third party. Ordinarily you can be liable only for things that you do, but when someone does not do something that they ought to have done a duty might be found. Similarly, while it appears odd that someone may be liable for harms that someone else caused, the courts have nonetheless found that in limited circumstances people who have responsibility for, or control over, others may incur a duty in respect of the harms caused by these third parties.

9. Negligence: Duty of Care—Omissions and Acts of Third Parties

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Lunney ◽  
Donal Nolan ◽  
Ken Oliphant
Keyword(s):  
Affirmative Action ◽  
General Principle ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Duty Of Care ◽  
The Third ◽  
Dangerous Situation ◽  
The Third Party

This chapter examines liability for omissions and for the acts of a third party in negligence. Despite the general principle excluding liability for omissions, liability may arise in certain exceptional circumstances, but no precise categorisation is possible of the various situations in which a duty of affirmative action is recognised. The question of liability for the acts of a third party often overlaps with the question of liability for omissions because in a third party case the complaint is often of an omission, for example a failure to control a third party, or to prevent a dangerous situation from being sparked off by a third party. But not all third-party cases involve omissions. Sometimes the complaint is simply that the defendant provided the third party with the opportunity or the means to injure the claimant, and it is that conduct which is alleged to be negligent, regardless of whether the defendant unreasonably failed at some subsequent point of time to intervene to prevent the injury.

scholarly journals The Principle of Trust for Exceptions to the Non-Regression Clause in the Case of Delict of Negligence

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 ◽  
pp. 86-94
Author(s):  
Laura Feldmanis
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Legal Rights ◽  
Level Of Care ◽  
Duty Of Care ◽  
Comprehensive List ◽  
Penal Law ◽  
A Chain ◽  
General Communication ◽  
Traffic Rules

The delict of negligence is defined in terms of violation of the duty of care. While that duty entails displaying the level of care required from anyone and necessary for communication in the relevant society, there is no comprehensive list of the standards pertaining to the duty of care, especially as would be foreseeable from an objective perspective. In addition, a question arises: in which case does the person have to take responsibility in accordance with the delict of negligence for damaging a person’s legal rights stemming from a crime committed by a third party, or rather is this specific person’s duty restricted to his own acts. While the answer may seem at first glance to be provided by the non-regression clause, in line with which a person’s intervention within a chain created by the person who caused the original threat rules out the possibility of accusing the person who caused the original threat, the matter is not so simple: exceptions to the non-regression clause exist, and it is not always applicable. Certain principles are employed in the dogmatics of penal law accordingly, to specify how the duty of care and objective predictability are substantiated and how to handle exceptions to the non-regression clause. One of these rules, which is an outgrowth of the traffic rules, is the principle of trust. Applied not just with regard to traffic but also in situations of division of duties and in relation to general communication between people, this principle has been confirmed in Estonian Supreme Court practice. The article considers two significant questions that arise in connection with the principle of trust: firstly, in what cases is there a reason to trust, and, secondly, where is there a reason to doubt? After addressing the meaning of the principle of trust, the paper examines the effect on liability in scenarios wherein the person who originally caused the threat acts out of negligence yet the threat caused by that person is actualised in the form of an act violating legal rights by another, realised in either delict of negligence or an intentional delict. Finally, the article presents the conclusion that it is important to investigate which element of the structure of delict the principle of trust belongs to.

3. Special duty problems: omissions and acts of third parties

2021 ◽  
pp. 50-61
Author(s):  
Kirsty Horsey ◽  
Erika Rackley
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Duty Of Care ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Common ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
Special Duty

This chapter discusses the problem of when a duty of care arises in respect of negligent omissions, or for the actions of a third party. The common law takes the view that it would be too great a burden to impose liability upon a person for a mere omission, or for the actions of others. Despite this, duties can in fact be imposed in various ways, all of which focus on the reliance of the claimant upon the defendant. This can come about either by the previous conduct of the defendant, which induces reliance by the claimant that the defendant will continue to act in that way, or by reliance which comes out of a relationship of dependence between the parties. As regards third parties, a duty may arise where the defendant has control over or responsibility for the third party’s actions.

3. Special duty problems: omissions and acts of third parties

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirsty Horsey ◽  
Erika Rackley
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Duty Of Care ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Common ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
Special Duty

This chapter discusses the problem of when a duty of care arises in respect of negligent omissions, or for the actions of a third party. The common law takes the view that it would be too great a burden to impose liability upon a person for a mere omission, or for the actions of others. Despite this, duties can in fact be imposed in various ways, all of which focus on the reliance of the claimant upon the defendant. This can come about either by the previous conduct of the defendant, which induces reliance by the claimant that the defendant will continue to act in that way, or by reliance which comes out of a relationship of dependence between the parties. As regards third parties, a duty may arise where the defendant has control over or responsibility for the third party’s actions.

4. Special duty problems: omissions and acts of third parties

2021 ◽  
pp. 78-101
Author(s):  
Kirsty Horsey ◽  
Erika Rackley
Keyword(s):  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Duty Of Care ◽  
Special Duty

This chapter examines the two separate but closely linked concepts of liability for omissions and for the actions of third parties. The first section considers when and why the courts have established that a duty of care should be owed by defendants when the harm was the result of their omission, and the second explores the situations when a defendant may owe a duty in relation to the action(s) of a third party. Ordinarily you can be liable only for things that you do, but when someone does not do something that they ought to have done a duty might be found. Similarly, while it appears odd that someone may be liable for harms that someone else caused, the courts have nonetheless found that in limited circumstances people who have responsibility for, or control over, others may incur a duty in respect of the harms caused by these third parties.

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